The Quiet Referendum: Egypt on the Road to Democracy

The headlines of the past week have portrayed a sombre and melancholic outlook on world affairs.  Dominated by stories of war in Libya and the accompanying issues of morality and legality, fears of nuclear fallout and pictures of tsunami-induced suffering in Japan, tales of violent retaliation against pro-democracy factions across the Middle East and North Africa, and arguments surrounding the utility of a 1p cut in Britain’s fuel duty, one could be forgiven for accepting the view that all is not well in the world.  This is before the weekend’s protests marches through London – which spawned a splinter group intent on causing unnecessary damage by way of “protest” – even enters the equation.  However, one story that brings a glimpse of hope was buried underneath the despondency, broadly failing to make front page news.

On 19 March, voting took place at 54,000 polling stations across Egypt in a referendum on constitutional reforms stimulated by the revolution that began nearly two months earlier.  This, the first green shoot of change to emerge from the upheavals, should spread hope across the region.  While headline analyses do not necessarily make for enthralling reading – turnout, at 41%, was not particularly high by Western standards, while the 77.2% approval rate suggests that the underlying issues were not overly contentious – delving a little deeper allows the true worth of the occasion to be appreciated.

On the issue of turnout, it is important to remember that Egypt is not a democracy; with no tangible value previously attached to votes, coupled with a franchise that was not universal, the sense of civic duty felt across the democratic world had hitherto failed to develop in Egypt.  Thus, in 2010, when legislative elections were last held, turnout was widely reported to be below 25% (some sources reported figures as low as 10%) while instances of judges reporting local officials fabricating figures were not uncommon.  With the referendum billed as the first vote in Egyptian memory whereby the result is not predetermined, a turnout of 41% amongst an expanded electorate looks more like a triumphant achievement and a step towards realising the ambitions of the revolution.  It is no coincidence that this is the highest recorded turnout in Egyptian polls.  Indeed, US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, declared the peaceful exercising of newly won democratic freedoms on a scale never before seen in the country to be ‘cause for great optimism’.  While Mohamed ElBaradei encountered initial difficulties, tweeting concerns regarding an absence of law and order, the presence of some 37,000 soldiers to assist the police in securing the streets ensured that the vote was generally smooth and calm.  Moreover, in a further contrast to those polls experienced under Mubarak, and 2010 in particular, 17,000 judges were on hand to monitor proceedings.

The constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum created greater divisiveness  amongst reformist opinion than results would tend to suggest.  Many insisted the reforms to be insufficient, arguing that the constitution needs fully re-writing before elections are held.  Others professed general satisfaction with the map for progress, opining that a newly elected parliament should have authority to re-write the constitution.  Prior to the ballot, therefore, debate was roughly divided between liberals and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists and conservatives on the other.  This fits nicely with theories that the Muslim Brotherhood, along with remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), would support the proposals in order to trigger a rapid transition of power away from the military.  This, the argument goes, would allow these groups to capitalise on organisational advantages when contesting elections, enabling their dominance within the next parliament and the ability to draft a new constitution firmly in their interests.  Predicting such a scenario, a statement by groups involved in the January 25 Revolution called for a “no” vote in order to negate the ‘attempt to abort revolution’, with Salma Said calling for the poll to be delayed on the grounds that ‘this referendum is based on a constitution that the revolution was meant to stop’.  Revisions to Article 75, for instance, have caused particular upset, implicitly removing the possibility that any Egyptian citizen can aspire to the presidency by introducing regulations precluding marriage to a non-Egyptian and extending restrictions regarding dual nationality to a candidate’s parents.  In a similar vein, the continuing power of the president has also raised eyebrows.  Critics have highlighted how the amendments allow the president to retain the ability to appoint one-third of the shura council, as well as the upper house of parliament and up to ten members of the lower chamber, while preserving the power to unilaterally dissolve parliament.  Undoubtedly, these powers are not symptomatic of a democratic polity.

However, there are flaws in this line of reasoning, and it must be recognised that the democracy achieved in much of the Western world cannot be manufactured overnight, let alone imposed in perfect fashion.  Primarily, drafting a new constitution prior to elections, with the generals still in power, would necessarily entail some level of military influence, be it in drafting the document or in the appointment of a committee to undertake the task.  Clearly, such a move would fly in the face of all that the revolution stood for; better to have a constitution penned by scholars and elected representatives than one dictated by the military which would potentially accommodate interference by the generals in the political sphere.  While it is true that the amendments voted on in the referendum were drawn up by a judicial panel appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military has consistently expressed a desire to relinquish authority to an elected government as quickly as possible to avoid accusations of attempting to hold onto the reigns of power.

While fears abound that the “yes” vote will be interpreted as tacit approval on articles of the current constitution, granting automatic title to their inclusion in future documents, it is here that revisions to Article 189 are of great significance.  Requiring that a Constitutional Committee be formed within six months of parliament taking office, and with the stipulation that proposals face a public vote, accusations that interim amendments enacted by the referendum are merely cosmetic are effectively neutralised.  Plainly, further changes to meet demands are anticipated, with provision clearly being made to facilitate, rather than merely cater for, constitutional overhaul.  Moreover, had proposed amendments been broader, fears pertaining the “yes” vote as bestowing automatic entitlement to incorporation within any future document would surely have worsened, prompting claims of excessive military involvement.  In this respect, the military faced a “lose-lose” situation.  Similarly, claims that presidential powers would remain unreformed are mistaken.  The revised Article 77, for example, imposes a limit of two four-year presidential terms – a rare restriction across the Arab world – while Article 139 mandates that a vice president be appointed within sixty days.  Furthermore, the president’s right to use military courts would also be cancelled, while Article 88 ensures full judicial oversight of electoral processes.  Crucially, Article 76 opens elections to greater competition, enabling independent candidates to stand alongside those from established parties.  Also, importantly, in a state currently without a president, those retained powers presently serve no purpose.  Revisions to Articles 77 and 139, by this reading, serve as a safeguard only, confirming the military’s desire for stable, civilian-led governance.

Importantly, Article 75 aside, there has been little by way of complaint regarding the direction of reform (and even revisions to Article 75, if read to be a temporary measure designed to apply in the next presidential poll only, could be interpreted as an insurance policy for Egyptian self-determination).  The primary grievance has instead been the view that the short turnaround time will favour Islamists and players associated with the former regime; the weeks that have passed since Mubarak was ousted have not, in the opinion of many activists, been sufficient to reverse the decades of oppression encountered and the distortions to political life that this produced.  Nor will a few months be adequate for new parties to organise and compete effectively in legislative elections.  While it is true that the Brotherhood and the NDP were the primary sources of support for the amendments, this should not be interpreted as anything other than the professed desire for democratic stability.  Undoubtedly, the size of the “yes” vote confirms that these groups continue to exude considerable influence, though this cannot be grounds for suspecting ulterior motives; the true concern should rest with alternative of prolonged military rule and the prospect of sustained military intervention, not with efforts to enact a transition to civilian governance at the earliest opportunity.  As Mostafa Hussein points out, delaying elections through fear of Brotherhood and/or NDP success ‘would be like delaying the World Cup because you are worried Brazil will win’.  Accordingly, in an effort to reassure those unconvinced, Muhammad Abbas, a prominent young Brother, openly professed that the movement hopes to get a third of the seats in the new parliament (contesting perhaps 40%), desiring a broad alliance comprising secular socialists, liberals and Christians alike.  Moreover, the Brotherhood will not put up a candidate for president.  This outlook was confirmed by Mohamed el-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, who professed that the movement would be reserved in their political undertakings ‘until the time there are forces that can compete.  At that point, we will take part in the competition’.

Any effort to delay the transition from military rule to civilian government would be counterintuitive to the premise of the revolution.  Ideally, with presidential powers being only partly tempered, a new constitution would be penned and enacted by a newly elected parliament prior to presidential polls, thereby circumventing the entire issue of amendments not going far enough.  However, such an outcome is unlikely.  As such, installing a civilian president is inherently less objectionable from a democratic perspective than retaining military rule, particularly given the penchant of generals in the region for prolonged political activity – Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, let us not forget, tasted governmental power as minister of defence under Mubarak for some twenty years, perhaps adding to the urgency surrounding transition.  The “yes” vote, therefore, while on amendments that perhaps do not go as far as they could, should be read as a beacon of hope in a sea of turmoil.  Perhaps the upheaval and turmoil have been worthwhile.

*UPDATE*

• On 23 March, in a crucial step towards reinvigorating political life in Egypt, a law easing the restrictions that distorted political life was passed, allowing the formation of new political parties that will be able to compete in legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place later this year.  The law is expected to result in a multitude of new parties, opening up real political choice in the country for the first time.  Amongst the new parties is likely to be the Freedom and Justice Party, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood.

• On 28 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced legislative elections are to be held in September, with emergency laws being lifted prior to the polls.  This gives parties, many of whom were crushed under Mubarak, some five months to prepare for the first free elections in decades.  However, Mamdouh Shaheen, a member of the Council, said that a date had yet to be set for presidential elections.  With power not being transferred to the civilian-led government until after presidential polls, the military’s initial target of transition within six months is destined to be missed.  However, this raises hopes that a new constitution can be approved prior to a president taking over.

Military Action in Libya and the Arab League’s Cold Feet

The United Nations Security Council passed, on 17 March, Resolution 1973.  The official aim of the Resolution is to protect Libyan civilians from pro-Gaddafi troops and avert a potential humanitarian catastrophe through ‘the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence’, calling on Libyan authorities to ‘comply with their obligations under international law’ and to ‘take all measures to protect civilians’.  However, with pro-Gaddafi forces continuing their violent onslaught eastwards, coalition forces exercised the provision of Resolution 1973, beginning on 19 March, to ‘take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’.

Various claims relating to ulterior motives of regime change and increasing oil market stability, as well as criticisms concerning an alleged continuation of Western “liberal interventionism” in a Blairite mould, have all been voiced.  However, Resolution 1973 does not explicitly call for regime change: French President Sarkozy, who has been at the forefront of operations, opines that it is ‘our duty’ to respond to the ‘anguished appeal’ of the Libyan population in their demands to the right to determine their own destiny.  This necessarily entails protecting citizens from the ‘mortal danger’ posed by pro-Gaddafi forces.  With Gaddafi perched atop of Libya’s military infrastructure, his removal could be seen as a viable (indeed, for some such as Senator Joe Lieberman, the only viable) means through which to achieve this end, though the issue of whether this amounts to de facto regime change should remain subordinate to the ultimate aim of protecting Libyan civilians.  Importantly, in this context, no exit strategy has been confirmed, meaning coalition allied forces have to be prepared to maintain a presence until Gaddafi leaves through one means or another.  However, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged on 20 March that the end-game of military action in Libya is ‘very uncertain’ and could indeed end in stalemate: with a no-fly zone successfully imposed, Gaddafi would be unable to mount offensive operations, but revolutionary forces would not have the assets to loosen his grip on power.

The outbreak of fighting was accompanied by a concurrent outbreak of high-minded morality.  A spokesman from Russia’s foreign ministry stated that Moscow regretted the decision by the Western powers to take military action, despite giving tacit approval through abstaining at the vote of the UNSC.  Similarly, a committee of heads of state requested by the African Union to find solutions to the Libyan crisis, also called for an end to hostilities on Sunday, with Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who chaired the AU panel, declaring that the solution ‘must adhere to the value we place in respecting territorial unity and integrity, as well as the rejection of all foreign military intervention, whatever form it takes’.  Meanwhile, Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League – who called, on 12 March, for the UN to impose a no-fly zone on Libya amidst claims that Gaddafi’s regime had ‘lost legitimacy’ as a result of efforts to crush a revolution aiming to remove him from power – claimed that the military action in Libya ‘differs from the goal of imposing a no-fly zone’.  However, with the issue of a NFZ having been widely discussed prior to the UNSC vote on 17 March, the practical implications of neutralising Libya’s integrated air defence system were broadly understood prior to action being undertaken.  The redoubling of fears concerning the legitimacy of Western actions in enforcing Resolution 1973 have seemingly been caused by a confusion between principles of “preemption” and “prevention”, given that pro-Gaddafi forces had not previously utilised air power in a meaningful way in the suppression of pro-democracy revolutionaries.  Such fears, however, are unwarranted.

Post-9/11, preemptive and preventive uses of force have caused much controversy, particularly concerns regarding the moral legitimacy of the latter.  The distinction lies in the perceived imminence of attack, though the subjectivity of this measure is a potential flaw – as witnessed prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when allies such as France contested the alleged evidence of WMD.  Traditionally, states (and, by extrapolation, individuals) have been afforded the right to utilise force in self-defence.  While this has not customarily allowed for an unqualified right to employ force, there exists no obligation to allow an aggressor to fire first: preemption is therefore a derivative of traditional self-defence when an offensive strike is perceived to be imminent.  Prevention, on the other hand, is the response to a presumed threat; action undertaken in anticipation of injurious undertakings that are neither in progress nor on the horizon.  Prevention is thus widely perceived as illegitimate on the basis that other responses could first be undertaken, meaning that the vital “last resort” requirement of a just conflict remains unfulfilled.

Clearly, the situation in Libya was desperate.  With pro-Gaddafi forces surging eastwards towards Benghazi, having already retaken many towns and former rebel strongholds in bloody and violent battles, the threat posed to civilians was plainly imminent.  To be certain, claims pertaining military intervention to be covertly aimed at a protection of Western interests are wide of the mark: with Gaddafi’s forces massacring Libyan citizens, civil war and humanitarian crisis loomed.  On this basis, the decision to vote in favour of a UNSC Resolution authorising measures to protect civilians, while excluding a foreign occupation force ‘of any form’, was correct.  By the same token, targeting military installations housing air defence mechanisms was a necessary step in enabling the implementation of a NFZ.  Not only will this allow coalition forces to protect against air strikes with a diminished risk of being themselves fired at, but has also enabled actions against imminent ground surges given the ambiguity surrounding the proscription of the use of ground forces.

Nick Clegg’s Leadership and the Health of the Coalition

Amidst chants of ‘shame on you for turning blue’ outside the Sheffield City Hall venue this weekend, Nick Clegg addressed the LibDem Spring Conference.  Throughout, he maintained that the party – which he has led since 2007 – will ‘never lose their soul’ and that, despite assuming the office of Deputy Prime Minister, he has not changed ‘one bit’.  While Clegg attempted to reassert the individuality and independence of the LibDems in the build-up to May’s local elections, dubiously proclaiming the party to ‘own the freehold to the centre ground of British politics’ and thereby rendering any attack on the Conservatives redundant, the whole affair was dominated by one headline issue that could determine the future direction of the governing coalition: Tory-led reforms of the NHS.

Clegg warned his party at a rally on Friday to ‘get used’ to protesters now that they had become a party of government, defending his party’s record so far through such policies as increasing the income tax threshold.  Indeed, Clegg pleaded with party members to ‘hold their nerve’, insisting that the LibDems are helping to build ‘a new economy from the rubble of the old’.  However, Clegg was dealt a blow on Saturday when delegates voted overwhelmingly in favour of amending controversial proposals to overhaul the NHS, placing GPs in charge of 80% of health service budgets for commissioning services in England while introducing private sector competition into care provision.

The amendment declared many of the proposed reforms to have ‘never been Liberal Democrat policy’, having failed to feature in either the 2010 election manifesto or in the agreed coalition programme.  Indeed, with the plans also failing to feature in the Conservative Party’s manifesto, the coalition agreement had pledged instead to end the very ‘large-scale top-down reorganisations’ that the legislation proposes – a factor which has angered party members and the wider public, neither of whom were consulted on the proposals prior to the general election.  With the vote at the conference constituting the only view that the party as a whole has expressed on the issue, LibDem ministers have necessarily been granted a mandate to seek changes to Andrew Lansley’s tension-causing reforms; Clegg and his ministerial team must convey this message through seeking substantial changes to governmental health policy.  However, while Clegg promised to take delegates’ concerns seriously, vowing to look ‘in detail’ at the proposals during a Q&A session, he refused to be bound by them.  This could have serious implications not only for the party, but also for Clegg’s leadership.

Primarily, further questions will be raised regarding the nature of the coalition; the issue of health reform, when considered alongside ongoing themes such as Trident and electoral reform, represents a further crack in the bond that holds together two parties who, prior to the general election, seemed to be diametrically opposed (barring a desire to prevent Labour retaining power).  Sadiq Khan, the Shadow Justice Minister, has remarked that ‘Nick Clegg is propping up a Tory-led government that is undermining our economy and destroying our communities’.  A failure to respond to the expressed will of the party would seemingly confirm this interpretation of Britain’s coalition rule, doubtlessly prompting further accusations of Clegg becoming increasingly “blue blooded” and calling into question the continued workability of the Conservative-LibDem partnership.  Equally, given the reductions in popular support, rifts within the party itself could prompt calls for Clegg to step aside as party leader, or even contribute to a potential split in the party.  While such outcomes are not immediate threats, owing largely to the party’s ascendency to the position of co-governing party, disgruntlement and disaffection within party ranks is unsustainable if the LibDems are serious about maintaining this rank.

To his credit, Clegg, in his speech to the conference, vowed not to let the ‘profit motives drive a coach and horses through the NHS’, pledging to pursue reform but not privatisation.  Baroness Williams rightly described the reorganisation as ‘stealth privatisation’: with private companies looking to ‘cherry pick’ profitable services rather than treat patients according to need, the NHS would be privatised via the back door.  With most profitable sections of the health service likely to be the first to be tied up, the viability of what remains of the NHS will be somewhat compromised.  Thus, reforms would not only damage the holistic nature of the health service and the efficiencies that this produces, but would place the very existence of the NHS itself at risk.  Furthermore, by placing GPs in charge of commissioning services, there arises a potential conflict of interest: the incentive for rapid and effective treatment is arguably diminished under a system incorporating private competition, with unscrupulous GPs potentially being more concerned with protecting a budget than providing first class healthcare for patients.

Facing growing public and professional discontent – the BMA is scheduled to meet to discuss the reforms, while 38 Degrees collected in excess of 80,000 signatures against the proposed reforms over the weekend – Lansley signalled a willingness to make concessions.  Speaking after the LibDem vote, he suggested that reforms were not set in stone, maintaining that ‘[o]ur proposals are always under review’.  However, despite these overtures, Downing Street has ruled out making ‘significant’ changes to the proposals.  With no agreement being discussed prior to the formation of the coalition, MPs are under no obligation to back Tory-led reforms – the passage of the proposals through parliament without substantial modifications and alterations being imposed is thus by no means guaranteed.  However, Clegg’s inability to assert any meaningful influence in stimulating a government rethink on such a high profile issue that has little by way of mandate within his party could spell disaster for the LibDems: Clegg has been portrayed to be, at best, a weak leader who values power over principle; at worst, as having Conservative tendencies that are ideologically incompatible with the outlook of the party he leads.

Highlighting the discontent with the party, the LibDems, for the second time in as many weeks, lost ground in an electoral contest, falling from first place to third in a council by-election at Burnley Borough (the LibDems also took the Commons seat in 2010).  Labour scored another landslide victory, with winning candidate Beatrice Foster gaining an 11.8% swing compared to last May’s polls.  The BNP came second, though failied to repeat the performance of 2002 when they returned a councillor in the ward.  If such trends continue into May’s local elections, as is widely expected, greater pressure will be placed on Clegg’s leadership and the feasibility of the coalition.

Barnsley Central: British Anti-Government Protests?

On 3 March, in a by-election in Barnsley Central, the Labour Party successfully retained the seat vacated by Eric Illsley.  Gaining a 11,771 vote majority from a 60.8% share of the vote, newly-elected MP Dan Jarvis managed to increase Labour’s lead by 678.  With the interesting stories lurking below the obvious headline, what does the result in Yorkshire really say about the health of British party politics?

Turnout in Barnsley, at 36.5%, was markedly down on the 2010 participation rate of 56.45%.  However, this should come as no real surprise: turnout in by-elections is traditionally lower than on general election day.  Moreover, that Barnsley Central was considered to be a “safe” Labour seat potentially deterred some voters, as well as being a factor in discouraging much campaigning (this may, in turn, be an argument in support of the necessity of the redrawing of constituency boundaries, announced today).  Nonetheless, that 63.5% of eligible voters preferred to stay away from the polls at a time when partisan tensions are relatively high, and political issues such as budget cuts and changes to education and health policies are constantly in the media spotlight, is alarming.  While the nature of the by-election – triggered by the parliamentary expenses scandal that saw Eric Illsley required to vacate his seat – may account for some level of discontent and, indeed, could reasonably have elicited a measure of dissociation from politics itself, such apathy is detrimental to democratic legitimacy.


Possibly the most fascinating reading of the by-election results concerns the governing coalition: the Conservatives were pushed into third by UKIP; the Lib Dems, who polled second in 2010, finished sixth behind an independent candidate and the BNP, achieving just 4.18% of the vote  – thereby failing to even reclaim their £500 deposit.  This, said Simon Hughes, deputy leader of the Lib Dems, was ‘clearly not a success’, while Tim Farron, party president of the Lib Dems, suggested that the coalition parties had been ‘concertinaed’.  However, should the outcome be interpreted as the statement of despondence aimed at the government that many are claiming?  While Jarvis proclaimed the people of Barnsley to have sent ‘the strongest possible message’ to Cameron and Clegg in protest at ‘broken promises’ and ‘unfair cuts’, Clegg was correct to assert that a single result (particularly one already unmistakably situated in Labour territory) cannot be taken as an accurate gauge of wider popular opinion.  However, with the Conservative vote also falling by more than half to 8.25%, UKIP seemingly experienced the greatest success in picking up the pieces, obtaining 12.19%.  While this is doubtlessly attributable to the protest vote – a phenomenon that often rears it’s head in such by-elections – rather than true UKIP gains, the potential for the Conservative Party to be experiencing not only a reduced ability to attract the centre-left vote but also a reduced capacity to motivate the centre-right, should not be underestimated.  With potential cracks appearing in the governing coalition around such issues as as the impending AV referendum and recent multiculturalism speeches, adroitness in assimilating disenchanted voters could prove decisive.

The Arab Revolt: Revolution Without Religion

The scent of jasmine carries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on the winds of change that continue to blow across the region.  As the revolutionary bent that was born in Tunisia continues to spread, the Arab world is awakening to the potential for change: no longer do the peoples of the MENA region feel constrained to a life dominated by authoritarian strongmen who embezzle state funds and suppress political freedoms in all manifestations.  Importantly, another conclusion being broadly realised as a result of the pro-democracy demonstrations is that, although related, politics and religion in the region need not be inseparable; the choice in the region is not restricted to Islamism and dictatorship alone.

In an address broadcast on state television, Colonel Gaddafi this week proclaimed that the anti-government protests that have crippled Libya, provoking a violent response that has attracted international condemnation, were directly linked to Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda, Gaddafi proposed, is responsible for proselytising youths below the age of prosecution, through a combination of drugs and alcohol, to partake in ‘destruction and sabotage’.  Similarly, both Ben Ali and Mubarak blamed “the Islamists” for stirring dissent, while King Abdullah of Jordan implied al-Qaeda influence and Bahraini authorities proclaimed the meddling of Hizbollah.  That Gaddafi persists in his claims serves only to add further credence to assertions from Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, that Libya’s leader is ‘delusional’ and ‘unfit to lead’.  However, with the issue of religion having been almost wholly absent from the protests, barring (largely Western) concerns raised regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such accusations are alarmingly wide of the mark.  This begs the question of whether Arab despots genuinely misread the situation in horrific fashion, or chose a path of ignorance and further suppression only to be thwarted by a combination of determined revolutionaries and the emergence of powerful social media tools.  

It is something of a necessity that those who promote democracy in the Muslim world will, sooner or later, be forced to deal with Islamists.  To associate all Islamist groups with extremist goals is,  nonetheless, incredibly naive; the mildly Islamic Justice and Development Party that governs in Turkey is the perfect exemplification of the ability of Islam and politics to engage constructively, with a non-secular party having secular objectives and proving itself capable of playing within the democratic framework.  Indeed, as Charlemagne highlights, not all groups bearing an “Islamic” prefix or suffix are puppets of the Iranian ayatollahs or colleagues of Bin Laden.  This failure to distinguish between different strands of Islam-inspired political groups has long been an error of Europeans, purposefully or otherwise, contributing to the prolonged existence of totalitarian regimes.  Thus, while Hamas was indeed an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Brotherhood has declared itself to be non-violent and has embraced democracy, much to the ire of al-Qaeda.  This exodus of radical elements to form separate external factions following failed efforts to influence the Brotherhood’s ideology, coupled with renewed efforts to gain power legitimately through the ballot box, seemingly contradicts Western fears that the embrace of democracy is opportunistic, aimed at a system of “one man, one vote, one time”.

Very mention of the Brotherhood often causes great unease in the West, largely attributable to incomprehension pertaining to the precise nature and objectives of the movement.  No two branches are the same:  the designation of various groups as counterparts is arguably a misnomer, based largely on common ancestry.  Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently announced that they would form a legitimate political party, though they would not field a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections – symptomatic of belief in democratic norms of inclusion and participation rather than a determination to impose a shari’a state.  Talking with Islamists, even those with objectionable views, and including them within a democratic system is not symbolic of “Islamisation” or of an acceptance of their beliefs; inclusion is a fundamental tenet of democracy, with any unpopular worldview being judged by the court of popular opinion.  Such an identification should, as a bare minimum, be afforded such an appraisal.  By equal measure, as the region begins to recognise democratic aspirations, the role of the West must be to assist where needed, but not to interfere where not wanted and attempt to impose democracy at gunpoint.

Possibly the most striking characteristic of the wave of protests is that genuine political protest has been entangled with religion only in the minds of those authoritarian leaders whose tenure was suddenly placed under the microscope.  Even in Bahrain, ruled by a Sunni minority, the protests have remained secular and non-sectarian, focussing on political demands for greater freedoms, fuller democracy and economic improvements.  Sheikh Ali Salman, head of the al-Wefaq party, denied that demonstrations in Manama had been orchestrated by Iran as a means to exert greater political influence in the region, while Jaffar al-Shayeb, a Saudi Shia and political activist, described the demonstrations as being about ‘national demands’ and ‘political reform’ – issues which draw Sunni Bahrainis alongside their Shia brethren.  However, this is where many problems originate.  Demands  for “freedom” and “democracy” carry with them heavy connotations, an understanding of which is not straightforward owing to the dynamic nature of such concepts.  As Maya Zippel correctly points out, ousting a despotic ruler – often seen as the ‘final piece of the puzzle’ – is but the first step of a lengthy transition process that requires compromise on all sides in building a state infrastructure capable of handling political renewal.  Will the demonstrators be capable of maintaining their appetite for democratic reform throughout?

The answer so far appears to be a resounding “yes”, despite actual reform throughout MENA getting off to a slow start.  After twelve straight days of protests, the Bahraini government declared on 25 February that it was ready for compromise, with King Hamad ordering the release of several Shia prisoners under royal pardon and inviting protesters to talks on political reform.  Protesters, however, insist the move is not enough; demands that the government resign, the deaths of protesters be investigated, and political reforms leading to a constitutional monarchy be implemented continue to echo around Manama.  Similarly in Egypt, the Supreme Military Council has moved only slowly: while 10 days of consultations have produced a cabinet reshuffle, with members of the opposition Wafd and Tagammu parties now being represented, as well as a constitutional reform committee, controversial and disliked figures, such as Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Ahmed Shafiq, remain within the regime.  However, such a slow pace of reform was the topic of further demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square; protesters vowed to return every Friday until change is enacted, though such gatherings represent more a celebration of the undertaking of reform and the dawn of a new era, gently seeking to move the process along, rather than displaying the emotional revolutionary fervour that Mubarak sought to dampen.  Likewise in Tunisia, Mohammed Ghannouchi, a veteran of many Ben Ali governments, resigned only this week after prolonged protests that saw him dismiss many of the old guard from the cabinet.  They may be moving slowly, but, importantly, the wheels of change are turning.  So far, protesters have not been duped by token tweeks that would prolong the regime.

Another important and interlinked feature of the pro-democracy demonstrations that have swept across the MENA region is that of Israel.  Or, more precisely, the lack of Israel’s mention.  That Tel Aviv has been a background issue at most should not be surprising, given the secular nature of the demands of the protesters.  While Mark LeVine suggests that the second intifada movement was a source of much solidarity that aided the coordination and fortitude of the protesters as a result of Cairo’s active branch of the Palestine Solidarity Committee, what is more interesting is the potential that the pro-democracy movement in the region holds to unseat opposition to Israel as the dominant unifying force throughout the Muslim world.  Recognition that the prominence of corruption and oppression are the root causes of many problems across the region, while currently overshadowing peace talks, may in the long run contribute to jolting the Middle East peace process into meaningful action.

With demonstrations continuing across the MENA region, exactly how far they will spread remains to be seen.  Oman, which had avoided much of the regional unrest, recently experienced pro-reform rallies that stimulated a cabinet reshuffle and an increase in social benefits for students.  Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, on returning to the Kingdom following a 3-month medical absence, announced a series of benefits totalling $10.7bn, including funding to offset high inflation and to aid the many young unemployed people and Saudi citizens studying abroad, as well the writing off some loans.  These are clearly efforts to placate any revolutionary ferment before substantial pro-democracy sentiment has chance to assimilate.  Demonstrations, however, are unlikely in the Saudi kingdom as a consequence of the vast oil wealth that enables the House of Saud to “buy”  popular acquiescence.

As an interesting aside, many MENA states share several features with regimes in Asia: autocratic regimes holding power for decades, widespread political repression, and a harsh economic environment with instances of drastic inequality between the ruling elites and many within the general populace.  Could the “Jasmine Revolution” spread into totalitarian Asia?  While similar underlying conditions are present, the flight to Asia is unlikely.  Significant structural differences, such as the prominence of party machines throughout the state infrastructure in authoritarian countries such as China and North Korea, complicate the notion of pro-democracy (or anti-regime) protests.  Equally, the alarming efficiency with which repressive media controls are implemented by such regimes prevents the flow of information.  For instance, Linkedin, the business networking site, was shut down by Beijing authorities on 25 February after a user set up a forum discussing the notion of a “Jasmine Revolution”, while internet users inside China reported that some sites were also blocking information on Jon Huntsman, the US ambassador to Beijing spotted attending a pro-democracy protest.  While the authorities continue to scrupulously censor micro-blogging and internet sites, preventing the spread of revolutionary fever, the chances of unrest remain minimal.