Reforming the House of Lords: Balancing Efficiency and Legitimacy

In a speech delivered at Demos this week, Nick Clegg sought to defend the precepts of the ‘Open Society’.  Aiming to reinvigorate the drive towards greater political pluralism and democratic involvement, while promoting such values as openness and equality that define his political perspective, the deputy prime minister placed reform of the House of Lords back into the spotlight.

Reform of the Second Chamber is undoubtedly a central issue, both within and beyond liberal reformist circles.  However, the matter is dominated by talk of increasing legitimacy, overshadowing the opportunity, if not the responsibility, to enhance the efficiency of the House.  Strengthening the democratic functioning of the Lords requires a broadening of their ability to act rather than solely focussing on the conviction with which they act.

Chief amongst Parliament’s many activities is the passage of effective legislation.  The bi-cameral nature of Parliament provides for an upper House to review proposed legislation, holding the government to account through deliberation and reassessment.  The incorporation of experts is therefore vastly beneficial to the process of scrutiny.  Unfortunately, the price of such expertise is democratic legitimacy, undermining any authority attached to amendments emerging from the Lords.  While the case for electing the Lords, or at least a significant majority, is therefore a strong one, insufficient attention has been paid to considering how functions could be better performed through concurrent structural and procedural reforms.

Currently, the House of Lords is chamber-oriented, relying on individuals who are both unelected and part-time.  Such working practices under-utilise the wealth of experience and knowledge of the Lords; with much time in the House being dedicated to detailed scrutiny of bills at the committee stage of the legislative process, many central issues fail to be debated by Peers.  This shortcoming adds to the case supporting reform of the House of Lords.  However, responses to questions concerning heightening efficiency and legitimacy need not be mutually exclusive.  

A reformed Chamber should complement the work of the Commons, providing an alternative perspective to legislative scrutiny.  An overriding fear of duplicating the work of the Commons has prevented the emergence of a strong committee system within the House of Lords.  Given the nature of the Lords’ remit, such a development path is peculiar; parallel departmental committees would greatly enhance opportunities for effective scrutiny, potentially producing stronger legislation, while allowing committee chairs in both Houses to coordinate workloads and avoid unnecessary duplication.  

A further advantage of allowing for a stronger committee system in the Lords comes in the shape of a solution to the trade-off between democratic legitimacy and expert input.  Rather than being permanently sitting members of the Lords, experts would continue to be integrated into the legislative process as Special Advisers or, alternatively, being called by committees considering specific legislation.  Expertise would thus remain eminent, while experts would not expected to choose between providing legislative advice and an existing career.  Similarly, the quality and relevance of legislative scrutiny would be improved, while democratic legitimacy would be revived by ensuring that the final say falls to elected representatives, suitably informed.

A revised House of Lords would, despite anticipated reductions in size, likely become more assertive in challenging government proposals as a result of Members’ knowledge that they represent the wishes of voters.  While this will ultimately improve governance through enhanced accountability, formal mechanisms above and beyond the Salisbury Convention and Parliament Acts would need to be established to confirm the continued primacy of the Commons, and to safeguard against legislative deadlock.  The House of Commons, as the driver of reform, could feasibly specify in legislation the powers of a revised Upper Chamber, for example by restricting the selection of ministers to the House of Commons.  However, the establishing of joint legislative committees to reconcile competing drafts of bills, as used in the United States, would further enhance the democratic functionality of Parliament.

With Clegg’s speech serving as a reminder that reform of the House of Lords remains a primary liberal concern, the opportunity for streamlining the structure of the Chamber as well as its composition, is one that should not be passed up.  Making such modifications simultaneously would maximise the efficiency of reform, fulfilling the desire for both democratic legitimacy and expert input into legislation.

The AV Referendum: A Wasted Opportunity?

Today the nation goes to the polls in the first nationwide referendum since 1975.  In the past six weeks, both David Cameron and Nick Clegg have returned to their roles as respective party leaders, rather than coalition partners.  The promised maturity was delivered while the campaigns were in their infancy; speeches announcing both “Yes” and “No” campaigns were timed so as not to coincide, partisan mudslinging was absent, and both even agreed that the referendum should select a voting system that promotes democratic fairness.  However, the arguments set out on both sides of the divide, despite aiming to promote a vibrant democracy, have consistently been at odds with one another.  This, unfortunately, resulted in the build-up to polling day being dominated by deceptive factional disparagement, rather than informed discourse concerning the benefits, or otherwise, to be had from each of the systems in question.  Paradoxically, the course of campaigning could itself be a blow for the very democracy that the referendum initially sought to promote.

Take two examples.  Firstly, Chris Huhne, the LibDem energy secretary, recently vented frustration over campaign literature focusing on Clegg’s broken election pledges, opining that Cameron personally ‘had the power to stop these’ by virtue of the Conservatives’ role in financing the “No” lobby.  (Previously, Huhne went so far as to suggest that the “Yes” camp would take legal action amidst allegations of untruths being promulgated by George Osborne.  While the Electoral Commission ruled itself not to have the necessary powers to investigate the contentions, Huhne did not rule out resignation over the issue.)  Secondly, Lord Mandelson suggested that many within the Labour Party were displaying misplaced priorities prior to the ballot, namely ‘a short-term desire to kick Nick Clegg, rather than see the long-term benefit of defeating Cameron’.  It is detestable that support for, or hatred of, an individual representative or partisan grouping should play a central role in determining the conduct of future elections; personality politics should not be allowed to intrude on matter of such constitutional significance.

Hidden within the name-calling, backbiting, and claims of attempting to defend the indefensible, a significant political issue is at stake.  The serious debate surrounding the referendum should not be ignored.  The “Yes” campaign has variously argued that the AV system makes (would-be) representatives work harder, minimising so-called “safe” seats while ensuring that every vote counts.  Equally, weight has been assigned to the assertion that AV is a relatively simple upgrade to the current FPTP system, potentially providing a steppingstone towards fully proportional representation.  In contrast, the “No” camp has countered that AV would place more power in the hands of politicians, arguing change to be expensive not only financially, but also ideologically; adopting AV, the argument runs, would lead to the democratic principle of “one man, one vote” being abandoned in the long grass.  Who, then, is right?

Clearly, arguments exist on both sides.  Some, however, are more rational than others, while still more are founded upon flawed logic.  A study by the New Economics Foundation has, for instance, estimated that AV would only marginally reduce, rather than abolish, safe seats – 16% rather than 13% of seats would typically change hands at elections under the alternative vote.  (Interestingly, the notion of the safe seat is often misconstrued; there is nothing inherently undemocratic about a candidate or party being able to hold a constituency for sustained periods as a result of voter satisfaction.)  Similarly, claims that AV would require all representatives to gain majority support are wide of the mark: the potential for ‘plumping’ under AV would ensure this.  Declarations that voting “yes” will cost in the region of £250 million and, by association, detract from spending on health and defence, are farfetched – expensive vote-counting machinery, while widely used in mayoral elections, is not a requisite of AV, while some £120 million has already been set aside for the next general election (let us not forget that all elections cost money, not just those employing AV; this is a cost of democracy).  Suggestions that a “yes” outcome would result in some voters effectively being able to vote more than once are likewise confused; while secondary preferences would be granted equal weight to first preference votes, detracting from the notion of equality, no voter would be entitled to cast more than one ballot.  This mistake, as made recently by John Humphrys when interviewing Cameron on voting reform, casts an ironic shadow over claims that AV is ‘terribly simple’.  The list goes on.

Whether the electorate will have been able, or, indeed, willing, to see beyond partisan tussling remains to be seen.  What has become obvious, however, is that the suspicions of politicians held by voters are reciprocal; elected representatives forwent the opportunity to engage electors in serious dialogue on the future of British democracy (sustained debate on future proportional representation, for instance, was conspicuously absent) as well as to reverse some of the damage caused to their collective reputation as a result of the expenses scandal.

A Sunday Times/YouGov poll indicated on Sunday a 10-point lead for the “No” camp.  While this is down from 18 points, the lead remains considerable and represents a turnaround from earlier in the campaign.  However, when polling stations opened, the contest was still considered to be wide open.  Indeed, results will not be known for another twenty-four hours.  With national turnout likely to be low despite over 9,000 local council seats also being up for grabs, coupled with the immature campaigning tactics all round, the outcome will be more politicised than political.

Nick Clegg’s Leadership and the Health of the Coalition

Amidst chants of ‘shame on you for turning blue’ outside the Sheffield City Hall venue this weekend, Nick Clegg addressed the LibDem Spring Conference.  Throughout, he maintained that the party – which he has led since 2007 – will ‘never lose their soul’ and that, despite assuming the office of Deputy Prime Minister, he has not changed ‘one bit’.  While Clegg attempted to reassert the individuality and independence of the LibDems in the build-up to May’s local elections, dubiously proclaiming the party to ‘own the freehold to the centre ground of British politics’ and thereby rendering any attack on the Conservatives redundant, the whole affair was dominated by one headline issue that could determine the future direction of the governing coalition: Tory-led reforms of the NHS.

Clegg warned his party at a rally on Friday to ‘get used’ to protesters now that they had become a party of government, defending his party’s record so far through such policies as increasing the income tax threshold.  Indeed, Clegg pleaded with party members to ‘hold their nerve’, insisting that the LibDems are helping to build ‘a new economy from the rubble of the old’.  However, Clegg was dealt a blow on Saturday when delegates voted overwhelmingly in favour of amending controversial proposals to overhaul the NHS, placing GPs in charge of 80% of health service budgets for commissioning services in England while introducing private sector competition into care provision.

The amendment declared many of the proposed reforms to have ‘never been Liberal Democrat policy’, having failed to feature in either the 2010 election manifesto or in the agreed coalition programme.  Indeed, with the plans also failing to feature in the Conservative Party’s manifesto, the coalition agreement had pledged instead to end the very ‘large-scale top-down reorganisations’ that the legislation proposes – a factor which has angered party members and the wider public, neither of whom were consulted on the proposals prior to the general election.  With the vote at the conference constituting the only view that the party as a whole has expressed on the issue, LibDem ministers have necessarily been granted a mandate to seek changes to Andrew Lansley’s tension-causing reforms; Clegg and his ministerial team must convey this message through seeking substantial changes to governmental health policy.  However, while Clegg promised to take delegates’ concerns seriously, vowing to look ‘in detail’ at the proposals during a Q&A session, he refused to be bound by them.  This could have serious implications not only for the party, but also for Clegg’s leadership.

Primarily, further questions will be raised regarding the nature of the coalition; the issue of health reform, when considered alongside ongoing themes such as Trident and electoral reform, represents a further crack in the bond that holds together two parties who, prior to the general election, seemed to be diametrically opposed (barring a desire to prevent Labour retaining power).  Sadiq Khan, the Shadow Justice Minister, has remarked that ‘Nick Clegg is propping up a Tory-led government that is undermining our economy and destroying our communities’.  A failure to respond to the expressed will of the party would seemingly confirm this interpretation of Britain’s coalition rule, doubtlessly prompting further accusations of Clegg becoming increasingly “blue blooded” and calling into question the continued workability of the Conservative-LibDem partnership.  Equally, given the reductions in popular support, rifts within the party itself could prompt calls for Clegg to step aside as party leader, or even contribute to a potential split in the party.  While such outcomes are not immediate threats, owing largely to the party’s ascendency to the position of co-governing party, disgruntlement and disaffection within party ranks is unsustainable if the LibDems are serious about maintaining this rank.

To his credit, Clegg, in his speech to the conference, vowed not to let the ‘profit motives drive a coach and horses through the NHS’, pledging to pursue reform but not privatisation.  Baroness Williams rightly described the reorganisation as ‘stealth privatisation’: with private companies looking to ‘cherry pick’ profitable services rather than treat patients according to need, the NHS would be privatised via the back door.  With most profitable sections of the health service likely to be the first to be tied up, the viability of what remains of the NHS will be somewhat compromised.  Thus, reforms would not only damage the holistic nature of the health service and the efficiencies that this produces, but would place the very existence of the NHS itself at risk.  Furthermore, by placing GPs in charge of commissioning services, there arises a potential conflict of interest: the incentive for rapid and effective treatment is arguably diminished under a system incorporating private competition, with unscrupulous GPs potentially being more concerned with protecting a budget than providing first class healthcare for patients.

Facing growing public and professional discontent – the BMA is scheduled to meet to discuss the reforms, while 38 Degrees collected in excess of 80,000 signatures against the proposed reforms over the weekend – Lansley signalled a willingness to make concessions.  Speaking after the LibDem vote, he suggested that reforms were not set in stone, maintaining that ‘[o]ur proposals are always under review’.  However, despite these overtures, Downing Street has ruled out making ‘significant’ changes to the proposals.  With no agreement being discussed prior to the formation of the coalition, MPs are under no obligation to back Tory-led reforms – the passage of the proposals through parliament without substantial modifications and alterations being imposed is thus by no means guaranteed.  However, Clegg’s inability to assert any meaningful influence in stimulating a government rethink on such a high profile issue that has little by way of mandate within his party could spell disaster for the LibDems: Clegg has been portrayed to be, at best, a weak leader who values power over principle; at worst, as having Conservative tendencies that are ideologically incompatible with the outlook of the party he leads.

Highlighting the discontent with the party, the LibDems, for the second time in as many weeks, lost ground in an electoral contest, falling from first place to third in a council by-election at Burnley Borough (the LibDems also took the Commons seat in 2010).  Labour scored another landslide victory, with winning candidate Beatrice Foster gaining an 11.8% swing compared to last May’s polls.  The BNP came second, though failied to repeat the performance of 2002 when they returned a councillor in the ward.  If such trends continue into May’s local elections, as is widely expected, greater pressure will be placed on Clegg’s leadership and the feasibility of the coalition.

Barnsley Central: British Anti-Government Protests?

On 3 March, in a by-election in Barnsley Central, the Labour Party successfully retained the seat vacated by Eric Illsley.  Gaining a 11,771 vote majority from a 60.8% share of the vote, newly-elected MP Dan Jarvis managed to increase Labour’s lead by 678.  With the interesting stories lurking below the obvious headline, what does the result in Yorkshire really say about the health of British party politics?

Turnout in Barnsley, at 36.5%, was markedly down on the 2010 participation rate of 56.45%.  However, this should come as no real surprise: turnout in by-elections is traditionally lower than on general election day.  Moreover, that Barnsley Central was considered to be a “safe” Labour seat potentially deterred some voters, as well as being a factor in discouraging much campaigning (this may, in turn, be an argument in support of the necessity of the redrawing of constituency boundaries, announced today).  Nonetheless, that 63.5% of eligible voters preferred to stay away from the polls at a time when partisan tensions are relatively high, and political issues such as budget cuts and changes to education and health policies are constantly in the media spotlight, is alarming.  While the nature of the by-election – triggered by the parliamentary expenses scandal that saw Eric Illsley required to vacate his seat – may account for some level of discontent and, indeed, could reasonably have elicited a measure of dissociation from politics itself, such apathy is detrimental to democratic legitimacy.


Possibly the most fascinating reading of the by-election results concerns the governing coalition: the Conservatives were pushed into third by UKIP; the Lib Dems, who polled second in 2010, finished sixth behind an independent candidate and the BNP, achieving just 4.18% of the vote  – thereby failing to even reclaim their £500 deposit.  This, said Simon Hughes, deputy leader of the Lib Dems, was ‘clearly not a success’, while Tim Farron, party president of the Lib Dems, suggested that the coalition parties had been ‘concertinaed’.  However, should the outcome be interpreted as the statement of despondence aimed at the government that many are claiming?  While Jarvis proclaimed the people of Barnsley to have sent ‘the strongest possible message’ to Cameron and Clegg in protest at ‘broken promises’ and ‘unfair cuts’, Clegg was correct to assert that a single result (particularly one already unmistakably situated in Labour territory) cannot be taken as an accurate gauge of wider popular opinion.  However, with the Conservative vote also falling by more than half to 8.25%, UKIP seemingly experienced the greatest success in picking up the pieces, obtaining 12.19%.  While this is doubtlessly attributable to the protest vote – a phenomenon that often rears it’s head in such by-elections – rather than true UKIP gains, the potential for the Conservative Party to be experiencing not only a reduced ability to attract the centre-left vote but also a reduced capacity to motivate the centre-right, should not be underestimated.  With potential cracks appearing in the governing coalition around such issues as as the impending AV referendum and recent multiculturalism speeches, adroitness in assimilating disenchanted voters could prove decisive.

Voting on Voting: The Politics of Fairness

In the week that the The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill finally succeeded in navigating its route onto the statute books in time for a 5 May 2011 referendum on electoral reform, more questions have seemingly been asked than answered. Indeed, rather than the merits, or otherwise, of the alternative vote (AV) system, the difficulties encountered by a coalition government divided on the issue of electoral reform are perhaps the very reason for the most significant change to the electoral system since reducing the minimum voting age only now becoming compellingly political, rather than a constitutional obiter dictum or academic fixation.

Both Cameron and Clegg, in the first instance of the prime minister and his deputy speaking from opposing standpoints, have insisted that neither the campaign nor the outcome will impede the ability of the coalition to govern, with Cameron remarking that ‘on this one, I don’t agree with Nick’. However, the existence of this divide – itself a microcosm of the coalition’s stance, broadly speaking – is representative of fundamental underlying incompatibilities within the ideological beliefs of the governing parties: will the coalition survive the campaign, let alone the result?

With both returning to their roles as respective party leaders, rather than coalition partners, the promised campaign maturity was delivered; the speeches were timed so as not to coincide, partisan mudslinging was absent, and both even agreed that the referendum should select a voting system that promotes democratic fairness. So far, so good. However, the arguments laid down on either side of the divide, despite aiming at the same ends, differ significantly.

Cameron, in affirming his support of the “No” campaign, suggested that AV can produce illogical and unrepresentative outcomes, allowing some votes to count multiple times and empowering bland second-choice candidates to limp to victory. Similarly, he argued, AV will produce more hung parliaments – the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, more often than not, produces strong governments in Britain – and result in more bargaining behind closed doors with manifesto pledges being sacrificed. This puts Cameron in an awkward position; given the circumstances under which the current government was formed, such a statement could easily be read as an acceptance that the coalition is both unsatisfactory and unfair.

For Clegg, FPTP dictates that millions of votes are wasted; AV will halt the notion of ‘jobs for life in safe seats’ and will bring an end to elections decided by a few thousand voters in swing seats, giving smaller parties a greater input and fostering a truly multiparty system. Furthermore, Clegg suggests that AV will force MPs to work harder for each ballot, moving away from their core vote in order to maximise appeal and thereby providing representative outcomes while maintaining the all-important constituency link (with constituency sizes being standardised to ensure the equal worth of each vote).

How we conceive fairness, therefore, is clearly a central issue: do we prefer to allow the voices of those voting for smaller parties to count more than once, defying the central democratic principle of “one man, one vote”; or do we favour effectively disenfranchising those voters in “safe” seat constituencies wishing to elect someone other than the dominate candidate. Such a choice is not straightforward. Complicating matters is the knowledge that not only would implementing AV not have changed the outcome of any national election since 1983, but also that the safe seats that hamper FPTP are also prevalent under AV; in Australia the only large country to employ AV, nearly 50% of seats are considered to be “safe”. Incidentally, an October 2010 Newspoll survey suggested that 57% of Australians would scrap AV in favour of FPTP, while only 37% would retain AV.

Further confusing the matter of fairness is the issue of cost: supporters of the “No” campaign have suggested that the focus of the coalition, at a time of austerity and substantial cutbacks, should be cementing economic recovery, not spending £90m on a referendum, £130m on changing the voting system should the outcome be positive, and a further £26m on educating the electorate. The “Yes” camp have openly questioned the figures, pointing out that the £130m expenditure is a drastic overestimate as electronic vote-counting machines are not necessary, and countering that, following the expenses scandal, we can’t afford not to press for change. Indeed, Clegg professed the necessity of change ‘when a system makes corruption more likely’, albeit utilising flawed logic given the probable persistence of safe seats under AV (and, indeed, the dubious correlation between safe seats and a propensity for corruption). Thus, for Norman Smith, BBC Radio 4’s Chief Political Correspondent, the referendum will hinge not on the merits of the respective voting systems, but on the perceived contest between “the people’s choice” and “the politician’s choice”; anything that might result in the happiness of politicians is sure to be ‘a huge vote loser’.

An interesting repercussion of the fairness rhetoric that underpins the power politics at play in the story of electoral reform so far is evident in the actions of the House of Lords. The unelected upper chamber was able to severely hamper progression of the bill. While concerns regarding turnout, insufficient debate, and the potential for gerrymandering were all cited as justifications for repeated filibustering, there is little doubt that the underlying motive was, in fact, opposition to the notion of electoral reform. In an act of self-preservation, Lord Strathclyde recommended that the Lords ‘respect the will of the elected Chamber’ when it became evident that MPs would not accept Lord Rooker’s 40% turnout amendment, seeking to deflect attention away from the inequitable power held by a chamber that is appointed rather than elected. Inevitably, however, this opens the debate for further constitutional reform regarding an elected House of Lords – an issue conveniently already featuring on Clegg’s reform agenda. Nonetheless, filibustering over AV indicated the difficulties that would be faced in asking the Lords to vote themselves out of existence.

Irrespective of the outcome of the referendum, claims of inequality, unfairness and partisan bias will persist from one bloc or another. Seemingly, then, when it comes to the issue of electoral politics, Voltaire’s observation continues to hold true: while the citizens of the state may be equally free, they cannot be equally powerful.