Implications of Edinburgh: The Taxing Issue of Votes at 16

David Cameron and Alex Salmond this week agreed a decision of monumental magnitude.  Undoubtedly, the “Edinburgh Agreement” – which could ultimately see the dissolution of the Union – has the potential to shape the future of the nation.  However, the stakes are far higher than arguments of economy and mineral wealth: with 16- and 17-year-olds to be granted the franchise by the Scottish Parliament, the very design of British democracy could be refashioned.

The case is often made that, at age 16, one can fight for Queen and country, running the risk of paying the ultimate sacrifice in the line of patriotic duty.  Similarly, in certain parts of the UK at least, 16-year-olds can marry and have children.  Logically, so such reasoning runs, the minimum voting age should thus be lowered to 16.

As persuasive as these arguments are, however, they do not irrefutably validate the proposition for broadening the franchise.  Indeed, such claims need to be variously qualified and treated with a degree of caution: as with marriage in England, 16-year-olds can join the armed forces only with parental consent, and even then are not eligible for frontline combat.  With other significant decisions not being taken until the age of 18, such as whether to continue into tertiary education or whether to get a mortgage, a strong defence can be mounted for maintaining current regulations.

Nonetheless, despite such rhetoric, one argument trumps all others.  Dating back to the American Revolution and forming a cornerstone of democratic society, the notion that there should be no taxation without representation is difficult, if not impossible, to disregard.  At the age of 16, individuals become liable for National Insurance contributions and income tax: to reason against suffrage being extended to the age of 16, therefore, is to devalue the concept of representative democracy and runs against the spirit of the social contract.

To be clear, expanding the franchise to include those aged 16 and 17 is a move that would not only realise this fundamental relationship between taxation and representation, but one that would, if correctly managed, strengthen the democratic fabric by maximising participation in the political process.  With this goal in mind, it is important to recognise that 16- and 17-year-olds are increasingly intelligent, informed and opinionated; when coupled with the prospective obligation to contribute to the national tax take, the case for retaining 18 as the minimum age of entitlement appears increasingly untenable. 

It is also important to recognise that 16- and 17-year-olds, just like those aged 18 and above, are direct consumers of those public services funded by the state purse.  Indeed, in areas such as education, it is under-18s that are the primary consumers of such public services.  Similarly, young people are subject to legislation passed by Parliament, as well as Government policies in areas including tuition fees, working regulations, and military engagement.

Nonetheless, young people are currently disengaged from, and many disillusioned with, the political system, not being afforded any meaningful level of input into policies or control over services in terms of design or delivery.  Broadening the franchise would represent a significant step towards facilitating a solution to this anomaly, granting young people the opportunity to participate and create a desirable societal milieu while instilling a level of civic responsibility that could begin to address long-term issues surrounding falling turnout and voter apathy.

To be certain, assertions that young people are ill-informed and lack the sophistication and sensibility required to vote responsibly are feasible, if not stereotypical and outdated.  Without doubt, there are many young people for whom the world of politics holds no allure.  However, universalising such contentions is severely flawed on two counts. First, to assume that an instantaneous moment of maturity is reached on one’s eighteenth birthday is an absurdity; the process of developing political awareness begins at an early age and continues throughout an individual’s lifetime.  Second, presenting such problems without proposing solutions is akin to declaring that young people are second-class citizens, worthy of paying taxes but not of determining how such revenue is best spent.

An obvious solution to the dilemma would entail making better use of the time allocated in secondary education timetables to Pastoral/Citizenship/PSHE lessons.  These valuable hours could be better utilised to provide lessons in civic responsibilities such as voting, providing an opportunity to promote an understanding of the political systems that shape the world we live in, as well as for debate and discussion on topical issues.  By engaging young people and educating in a politically neutral manner, the potential exists for current trends of voter apathy to be overcome and for arguments pertaining the ignorance of the under-18s to be negated.

Importantly, the ability to participate in free elections is a human right, safeguarded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and enshrined in the UK’s Human Rights Act.  As such, the rationale for denying the franchise to groups of individuals is required to be fair and balanced.  Allegations that these criteria are not being met carry increasing weight, with young people ever more focussed on salient issues and ambitious to have their voices heard through various alternative channels to the ballot box.

Undoubtedly, the Section 30 mechanism is not the ideal way to introduce the under-18s to the world of political voting; a renewed debate, both in Westminster and throughout society, on lowering the voting age would clarify the issues and add greater legitimacy.  Nonetheless, Scotland’s enfranchising of 16- and 17-year-olds is a democratic step in the right direction.  Perhaps Britain could be the next to join the ranks of Austria and Brazil (and Cuba) in recognising the rights of the under-18s.

The AV Referendum: A Wasted Opportunity?

Today the nation goes to the polls in the first nationwide referendum since 1975.  In the past six weeks, both David Cameron and Nick Clegg have returned to their roles as respective party leaders, rather than coalition partners.  The promised maturity was delivered while the campaigns were in their infancy; speeches announcing both “Yes” and “No” campaigns were timed so as not to coincide, partisan mudslinging was absent, and both even agreed that the referendum should select a voting system that promotes democratic fairness.  However, the arguments set out on both sides of the divide, despite aiming to promote a vibrant democracy, have consistently been at odds with one another.  This, unfortunately, resulted in the build-up to polling day being dominated by deceptive factional disparagement, rather than informed discourse concerning the benefits, or otherwise, to be had from each of the systems in question.  Paradoxically, the course of campaigning could itself be a blow for the very democracy that the referendum initially sought to promote.

Take two examples.  Firstly, Chris Huhne, the LibDem energy secretary, recently vented frustration over campaign literature focusing on Clegg’s broken election pledges, opining that Cameron personally ‘had the power to stop these’ by virtue of the Conservatives’ role in financing the “No” lobby.  (Previously, Huhne went so far as to suggest that the “Yes” camp would take legal action amidst allegations of untruths being promulgated by George Osborne.  While the Electoral Commission ruled itself not to have the necessary powers to investigate the contentions, Huhne did not rule out resignation over the issue.)  Secondly, Lord Mandelson suggested that many within the Labour Party were displaying misplaced priorities prior to the ballot, namely ‘a short-term desire to kick Nick Clegg, rather than see the long-term benefit of defeating Cameron’.  It is detestable that support for, or hatred of, an individual representative or partisan grouping should play a central role in determining the conduct of future elections; personality politics should not be allowed to intrude on matter of such constitutional significance.

Hidden within the name-calling, backbiting, and claims of attempting to defend the indefensible, a significant political issue is at stake.  The serious debate surrounding the referendum should not be ignored.  The “Yes” campaign has variously argued that the AV system makes (would-be) representatives work harder, minimising so-called “safe” seats while ensuring that every vote counts.  Equally, weight has been assigned to the assertion that AV is a relatively simple upgrade to the current FPTP system, potentially providing a steppingstone towards fully proportional representation.  In contrast, the “No” camp has countered that AV would place more power in the hands of politicians, arguing change to be expensive not only financially, but also ideologically; adopting AV, the argument runs, would lead to the democratic principle of “one man, one vote” being abandoned in the long grass.  Who, then, is right?

Clearly, arguments exist on both sides.  Some, however, are more rational than others, while still more are founded upon flawed logic.  A study by the New Economics Foundation has, for instance, estimated that AV would only marginally reduce, rather than abolish, safe seats – 16% rather than 13% of seats would typically change hands at elections under the alternative vote.  (Interestingly, the notion of the safe seat is often misconstrued; there is nothing inherently undemocratic about a candidate or party being able to hold a constituency for sustained periods as a result of voter satisfaction.)  Similarly, claims that AV would require all representatives to gain majority support are wide of the mark: the potential for ‘plumping’ under AV would ensure this.  Declarations that voting “yes” will cost in the region of £250 million and, by association, detract from spending on health and defence, are farfetched – expensive vote-counting machinery, while widely used in mayoral elections, is not a requisite of AV, while some £120 million has already been set aside for the next general election (let us not forget that all elections cost money, not just those employing AV; this is a cost of democracy).  Suggestions that a “yes” outcome would result in some voters effectively being able to vote more than once are likewise confused; while secondary preferences would be granted equal weight to first preference votes, detracting from the notion of equality, no voter would be entitled to cast more than one ballot.  This mistake, as made recently by John Humphrys when interviewing Cameron on voting reform, casts an ironic shadow over claims that AV is ‘terribly simple’.  The list goes on.

Whether the electorate will have been able, or, indeed, willing, to see beyond partisan tussling remains to be seen.  What has become obvious, however, is that the suspicions of politicians held by voters are reciprocal; elected representatives forwent the opportunity to engage electors in serious dialogue on the future of British democracy (sustained debate on future proportional representation, for instance, was conspicuously absent) as well as to reverse some of the damage caused to their collective reputation as a result of the expenses scandal.

A Sunday Times/YouGov poll indicated on Sunday a 10-point lead for the “No” camp.  While this is down from 18 points, the lead remains considerable and represents a turnaround from earlier in the campaign.  However, when polling stations opened, the contest was still considered to be wide open.  Indeed, results will not be known for another twenty-four hours.  With national turnout likely to be low despite over 9,000 local council seats also being up for grabs, coupled with the immature campaigning tactics all round, the outcome will be more politicised than political.

AV or not AV: Some Myths Debunked

In the past week, campaigning for the 5 May constitutional referendum on changing the parliamentary voting system gained momentum, once again bringing tensions within the governing coalition to the fore.  Amidst fears of apathy and low turnout which would call into question the legitimacy of the ballot – likely the result of conflicting and often misleading messages being peddled by both “Yes” and “No” campaigns – the Electoral Commission weighed in, delivering booklets offering official, neutral advice concerning the technical aspects of the systems in question.  However, several of the finer aspects have been largely overlooked thus far.

A primary contention of the “Yes” campaign has been that candidates will, under the AV system, have to work much harder in attracting support from beyond their core clients to secure a majority of the votes and avoid the anomalous scenario whereby a candidate can win a seat with a minority (217 of the 650 MPs elected in 2010 did not achieve a majority).  As far as representative democracy goes, the returning of majorities is to be applauded.  However, unlike the variant of AV employed in Australia, British voters will retain the option of voting for one candidate only in a practice Vernon Bogdanor refers to as ‘plumping’.  Thus, the potential for seats to be secured with a minority of votes would continue unabashed even if AV is enacted.  By the same token, one must question the accuracy of terming an outcome a “majority” when the result consists of non-first preference ballots.  Campaigners from the “Yes” lobby are making promises beyond that which the system can deliver.   While the Alternative Vote is not as complex as some in the “No” camp would like us to believe, and would not require the use of expensive equipment to tally votes, this is scant consolation.

Indeed, Bogdanor notes that in Queensland and New South Wales, where plumping is permitted in elections to state legislatures, the practice is rather common – some 63% of voters in Queensland plumped in 2009 after a Labour Party campaign to “Just Vote 1”, while the Green Party similarly advised that second preferences be given to Labour.  This raises another issue concerning AV: tactical voting.  Given the opportunity to rank candidates, it is likely that many will vote with their heart for the first preference and their head for any secondary allocations, thereby giving rise to greater strategic ballot-casting and opening the door for negative campaigning.  Equally, while the plight of AV to allow every voter a meaningful ballot is admirable, such an outcome is not realistic against a backdrop of competitive multi-party politics; as long as a majoritarian system of vote counting is in operation, some electors will inevitably be disappointed – this is the nature of electoral politics.  In this regard, all that the Alternative Vote succeeds in doing is assigning greater weight to the ballots of those electing for nominees from unpopular parties in the first instance, thereby disregarding Aristotelian notions of democratic equality.  Clearly, this challenges the principle of One Man One Vote, justifying the description of AV as ‘unacceptably unfair’ by the Jenkins Report on voting reform.

Also in the headlines recently, Baroness Warsi claimed that the AV system would benefit extremist organisations, suggesting that its implementation would strengthen parties such as the BNP.  This is very much a falsehood, no doubt an effort to play to popular sentiment and pull voters onside; with only 1.9% of the vote nationally in 2010 on first preferences and with many candidates failing to reclaim their deposits, it is unlikely that many BNP candidates would make it beyond the first series of vote redistributions, let alone surpass the 50% hurdle.  Indeed, given their current standings in the popularity stakes, it is unlikely that AV would much benefit even the LibDems at this moment.  However, the outrage that has been expressed at this misguided possibility reveals a fascinating contradiction: in a referendum that seeks to refine the democratic credentials of parliamentary elections, is there (or, indeed, should there exist) room to object with who can and cannot succeed?

The Quiet Referendum: Egypt on the Road to Democracy

The headlines of the past week have portrayed a sombre and melancholic outlook on world affairs.  Dominated by stories of war in Libya and the accompanying issues of morality and legality, fears of nuclear fallout and pictures of tsunami-induced suffering in Japan, tales of violent retaliation against pro-democracy factions across the Middle East and North Africa, and arguments surrounding the utility of a 1p cut in Britain’s fuel duty, one could be forgiven for accepting the view that all is not well in the world.  This is before the weekend’s protests marches through London – which spawned a splinter group intent on causing unnecessary damage by way of “protest” – even enters the equation.  However, one story that brings a glimpse of hope was buried underneath the despondency, broadly failing to make front page news.

On 19 March, voting took place at 54,000 polling stations across Egypt in a referendum on constitutional reforms stimulated by the revolution that began nearly two months earlier.  This, the first green shoot of change to emerge from the upheavals, should spread hope across the region.  While headline analyses do not necessarily make for enthralling reading – turnout, at 41%, was not particularly high by Western standards, while the 77.2% approval rate suggests that the underlying issues were not overly contentious – delving a little deeper allows the true worth of the occasion to be appreciated.

On the issue of turnout, it is important to remember that Egypt is not a democracy; with no tangible value previously attached to votes, coupled with a franchise that was not universal, the sense of civic duty felt across the democratic world had hitherto failed to develop in Egypt.  Thus, in 2010, when legislative elections were last held, turnout was widely reported to be below 25% (some sources reported figures as low as 10%) while instances of judges reporting local officials fabricating figures were not uncommon.  With the referendum billed as the first vote in Egyptian memory whereby the result is not predetermined, a turnout of 41% amongst an expanded electorate looks more like a triumphant achievement and a step towards realising the ambitions of the revolution.  It is no coincidence that this is the highest recorded turnout in Egyptian polls.  Indeed, US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, declared the peaceful exercising of newly won democratic freedoms on a scale never before seen in the country to be ‘cause for great optimism’.  While Mohamed ElBaradei encountered initial difficulties, tweeting concerns regarding an absence of law and order, the presence of some 37,000 soldiers to assist the police in securing the streets ensured that the vote was generally smooth and calm.  Moreover, in a further contrast to those polls experienced under Mubarak, and 2010 in particular, 17,000 judges were on hand to monitor proceedings.

The constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum created greater divisiveness  amongst reformist opinion than results would tend to suggest.  Many insisted the reforms to be insufficient, arguing that the constitution needs fully re-writing before elections are held.  Others professed general satisfaction with the map for progress, opining that a newly elected parliament should have authority to re-write the constitution.  Prior to the ballot, therefore, debate was roughly divided between liberals and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists and conservatives on the other.  This fits nicely with theories that the Muslim Brotherhood, along with remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), would support the proposals in order to trigger a rapid transition of power away from the military.  This, the argument goes, would allow these groups to capitalise on organisational advantages when contesting elections, enabling their dominance within the next parliament and the ability to draft a new constitution firmly in their interests.  Predicting such a scenario, a statement by groups involved in the January 25 Revolution called for a “no” vote in order to negate the ‘attempt to abort revolution’, with Salma Said calling for the poll to be delayed on the grounds that ‘this referendum is based on a constitution that the revolution was meant to stop’.  Revisions to Article 75, for instance, have caused particular upset, implicitly removing the possibility that any Egyptian citizen can aspire to the presidency by introducing regulations precluding marriage to a non-Egyptian and extending restrictions regarding dual nationality to a candidate’s parents.  In a similar vein, the continuing power of the president has also raised eyebrows.  Critics have highlighted how the amendments allow the president to retain the ability to appoint one-third of the shura council, as well as the upper house of parliament and up to ten members of the lower chamber, while preserving the power to unilaterally dissolve parliament.  Undoubtedly, these powers are not symptomatic of a democratic polity.

However, there are flaws in this line of reasoning, and it must be recognised that the democracy achieved in much of the Western world cannot be manufactured overnight, let alone imposed in perfect fashion.  Primarily, drafting a new constitution prior to elections, with the generals still in power, would necessarily entail some level of military influence, be it in drafting the document or in the appointment of a committee to undertake the task.  Clearly, such a move would fly in the face of all that the revolution stood for; better to have a constitution penned by scholars and elected representatives than one dictated by the military which would potentially accommodate interference by the generals in the political sphere.  While it is true that the amendments voted on in the referendum were drawn up by a judicial panel appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military has consistently expressed a desire to relinquish authority to an elected government as quickly as possible to avoid accusations of attempting to hold onto the reigns of power.

While fears abound that the “yes” vote will be interpreted as tacit approval on articles of the current constitution, granting automatic title to their inclusion in future documents, it is here that revisions to Article 189 are of great significance.  Requiring that a Constitutional Committee be formed within six months of parliament taking office, and with the stipulation that proposals face a public vote, accusations that interim amendments enacted by the referendum are merely cosmetic are effectively neutralised.  Plainly, further changes to meet demands are anticipated, with provision clearly being made to facilitate, rather than merely cater for, constitutional overhaul.  Moreover, had proposed amendments been broader, fears pertaining the “yes” vote as bestowing automatic entitlement to incorporation within any future document would surely have worsened, prompting claims of excessive military involvement.  In this respect, the military faced a “lose-lose” situation.  Similarly, claims that presidential powers would remain unreformed are mistaken.  The revised Article 77, for example, imposes a limit of two four-year presidential terms – a rare restriction across the Arab world – while Article 139 mandates that a vice president be appointed within sixty days.  Furthermore, the president’s right to use military courts would also be cancelled, while Article 88 ensures full judicial oversight of electoral processes.  Crucially, Article 76 opens elections to greater competition, enabling independent candidates to stand alongside those from established parties.  Also, importantly, in a state currently without a president, those retained powers presently serve no purpose.  Revisions to Articles 77 and 139, by this reading, serve as a safeguard only, confirming the military’s desire for stable, civilian-led governance.

Importantly, Article 75 aside, there has been little by way of complaint regarding the direction of reform (and even revisions to Article 75, if read to be a temporary measure designed to apply in the next presidential poll only, could be interpreted as an insurance policy for Egyptian self-determination).  The primary grievance has instead been the view that the short turnaround time will favour Islamists and players associated with the former regime; the weeks that have passed since Mubarak was ousted have not, in the opinion of many activists, been sufficient to reverse the decades of oppression encountered and the distortions to political life that this produced.  Nor will a few months be adequate for new parties to organise and compete effectively in legislative elections.  While it is true that the Brotherhood and the NDP were the primary sources of support for the amendments, this should not be interpreted as anything other than the professed desire for democratic stability.  Undoubtedly, the size of the “yes” vote confirms that these groups continue to exude considerable influence, though this cannot be grounds for suspecting ulterior motives; the true concern should rest with alternative of prolonged military rule and the prospect of sustained military intervention, not with efforts to enact a transition to civilian governance at the earliest opportunity.  As Mostafa Hussein points out, delaying elections through fear of Brotherhood and/or NDP success ‘would be like delaying the World Cup because you are worried Brazil will win’.  Accordingly, in an effort to reassure those unconvinced, Muhammad Abbas, a prominent young Brother, openly professed that the movement hopes to get a third of the seats in the new parliament (contesting perhaps 40%), desiring a broad alliance comprising secular socialists, liberals and Christians alike.  Moreover, the Brotherhood will not put up a candidate for president.  This outlook was confirmed by Mohamed el-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, who professed that the movement would be reserved in their political undertakings ‘until the time there are forces that can compete.  At that point, we will take part in the competition’.

Any effort to delay the transition from military rule to civilian government would be counterintuitive to the premise of the revolution.  Ideally, with presidential powers being only partly tempered, a new constitution would be penned and enacted by a newly elected parliament prior to presidential polls, thereby circumventing the entire issue of amendments not going far enough.  However, such an outcome is unlikely.  As such, installing a civilian president is inherently less objectionable from a democratic perspective than retaining military rule, particularly given the penchant of generals in the region for prolonged political activity – Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, let us not forget, tasted governmental power as minister of defence under Mubarak for some twenty years, perhaps adding to the urgency surrounding transition.  The “yes” vote, therefore, while on amendments that perhaps do not go as far as they could, should be read as a beacon of hope in a sea of turmoil.  Perhaps the upheaval and turmoil have been worthwhile.

*UPDATE*

• On 23 March, in a crucial step towards reinvigorating political life in Egypt, a law easing the restrictions that distorted political life was passed, allowing the formation of new political parties that will be able to compete in legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place later this year.  The law is expected to result in a multitude of new parties, opening up real political choice in the country for the first time.  Amongst the new parties is likely to be the Freedom and Justice Party, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood.

• On 28 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced legislative elections are to be held in September, with emergency laws being lifted prior to the polls.  This gives parties, many of whom were crushed under Mubarak, some five months to prepare for the first free elections in decades.  However, Mamdouh Shaheen, a member of the Council, said that a date had yet to be set for presidential elections.  With power not being transferred to the civilian-led government until after presidential polls, the military’s initial target of transition within six months is destined to be missed.  However, this raises hopes that a new constitution can be approved prior to a president taking over.

Voting on Voting: The Politics of Fairness

In the week that the The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill finally succeeded in navigating its route onto the statute books in time for a 5 May 2011 referendum on electoral reform, more questions have seemingly been asked than answered. Indeed, rather than the merits, or otherwise, of the alternative vote (AV) system, the difficulties encountered by a coalition government divided on the issue of electoral reform are perhaps the very reason for the most significant change to the electoral system since reducing the minimum voting age only now becoming compellingly political, rather than a constitutional obiter dictum or academic fixation.

Both Cameron and Clegg, in the first instance of the prime minister and his deputy speaking from opposing standpoints, have insisted that neither the campaign nor the outcome will impede the ability of the coalition to govern, with Cameron remarking that ‘on this one, I don’t agree with Nick’. However, the existence of this divide – itself a microcosm of the coalition’s stance, broadly speaking – is representative of fundamental underlying incompatibilities within the ideological beliefs of the governing parties: will the coalition survive the campaign, let alone the result?

With both returning to their roles as respective party leaders, rather than coalition partners, the promised campaign maturity was delivered; the speeches were timed so as not to coincide, partisan mudslinging was absent, and both even agreed that the referendum should select a voting system that promotes democratic fairness. So far, so good. However, the arguments laid down on either side of the divide, despite aiming at the same ends, differ significantly.

Cameron, in affirming his support of the “No” campaign, suggested that AV can produce illogical and unrepresentative outcomes, allowing some votes to count multiple times and empowering bland second-choice candidates to limp to victory. Similarly, he argued, AV will produce more hung parliaments – the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, more often than not, produces strong governments in Britain – and result in more bargaining behind closed doors with manifesto pledges being sacrificed. This puts Cameron in an awkward position; given the circumstances under which the current government was formed, such a statement could easily be read as an acceptance that the coalition is both unsatisfactory and unfair.

For Clegg, FPTP dictates that millions of votes are wasted; AV will halt the notion of ‘jobs for life in safe seats’ and will bring an end to elections decided by a few thousand voters in swing seats, giving smaller parties a greater input and fostering a truly multiparty system. Furthermore, Clegg suggests that AV will force MPs to work harder for each ballot, moving away from their core vote in order to maximise appeal and thereby providing representative outcomes while maintaining the all-important constituency link (with constituency sizes being standardised to ensure the equal worth of each vote).

How we conceive fairness, therefore, is clearly a central issue: do we prefer to allow the voices of those voting for smaller parties to count more than once, defying the central democratic principle of “one man, one vote”; or do we favour effectively disenfranchising those voters in “safe” seat constituencies wishing to elect someone other than the dominate candidate. Such a choice is not straightforward. Complicating matters is the knowledge that not only would implementing AV not have changed the outcome of any national election since 1983, but also that the safe seats that hamper FPTP are also prevalent under AV; in Australia the only large country to employ AV, nearly 50% of seats are considered to be “safe”. Incidentally, an October 2010 Newspoll survey suggested that 57% of Australians would scrap AV in favour of FPTP, while only 37% would retain AV.

Further confusing the matter of fairness is the issue of cost: supporters of the “No” campaign have suggested that the focus of the coalition, at a time of austerity and substantial cutbacks, should be cementing economic recovery, not spending £90m on a referendum, £130m on changing the voting system should the outcome be positive, and a further £26m on educating the electorate. The “Yes” camp have openly questioned the figures, pointing out that the £130m expenditure is a drastic overestimate as electronic vote-counting machines are not necessary, and countering that, following the expenses scandal, we can’t afford not to press for change. Indeed, Clegg professed the necessity of change ‘when a system makes corruption more likely’, albeit utilising flawed logic given the probable persistence of safe seats under AV (and, indeed, the dubious correlation between safe seats and a propensity for corruption). Thus, for Norman Smith, BBC Radio 4’s Chief Political Correspondent, the referendum will hinge not on the merits of the respective voting systems, but on the perceived contest between “the people’s choice” and “the politician’s choice”; anything that might result in the happiness of politicians is sure to be ‘a huge vote loser’.

An interesting repercussion of the fairness rhetoric that underpins the power politics at play in the story of electoral reform so far is evident in the actions of the House of Lords. The unelected upper chamber was able to severely hamper progression of the bill. While concerns regarding turnout, insufficient debate, and the potential for gerrymandering were all cited as justifications for repeated filibustering, there is little doubt that the underlying motive was, in fact, opposition to the notion of electoral reform. In an act of self-preservation, Lord Strathclyde recommended that the Lords ‘respect the will of the elected Chamber’ when it became evident that MPs would not accept Lord Rooker’s 40% turnout amendment, seeking to deflect attention away from the inequitable power held by a chamber that is appointed rather than elected. Inevitably, however, this opens the debate for further constitutional reform regarding an elected House of Lords – an issue conveniently already featuring on Clegg’s reform agenda. Nonetheless, filibustering over AV indicated the difficulties that would be faced in asking the Lords to vote themselves out of existence.

Irrespective of the outcome of the referendum, claims of inequality, unfairness and partisan bias will persist from one bloc or another. Seemingly, then, when it comes to the issue of electoral politics, Voltaire’s observation continues to hold true: while the citizens of the state may be equally free, they cannot be equally powerful.