Nuclear Fallout: Iran’s Worsening Relations with the West

When European foreign ministers met in Brussels last week, the agenda was dominated by discussion of measures to be taken against Iran.  Such considerations were primarily a response to an IAEA report, released in early November, suggesting that activities in the Republic indicate the conducting of tests necessary for the ‘development of a nuclear device’.  However, the magnitude of such discussions was undoubtedly elevated by the recent assault on the British embassy in Tehran, which has been asserted by senior figures to have been state-supported and has accordingly been interpreted as a direct attack on Western interests.    

Despite continued protestations from Tehran that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, Britain has been particularly keen to impose further sanctions.  The storming of Britain’s embassy has done little to remedy an already delicate situation: Iranian diplomats were expelled from London on 2 December in response to the attack, with British diplomats from Tehran being similarly evacuated, while an announcement was made on 22 November that Britain was severing ‘all financial ties with Iran’.  As a result, Iran became the first country to have its entire banking sector cut off from UK financial institutions, being denigrated from all sides in the process amidst growing concern regarding Tehran’s increasingly secretive behaviour and political infighting.

The Iranian parliament (majlis) responded by voting, with a large majority, to downgrade diplomatic relations with the UK, effectively expelling Britain’s newly appointed ambassador, Dominick Chilcott.  In so doing, Tehran is teetering towards the diplomatic wilderness.  While sustaining diplomatic relations would arguably not be enough to avert mounting tensions, let alone definitively resolve the nuclear impasse, such outcomes appear markedly less likely in their absence.  

This situation has potential diplomatic implications beyond Iranian borders.  Prior to the recent restructuring of relations, Britain had played a frontline role in efforts to manoeuvre Iran into conforming with internationally agreed nuclear protocols.  While foreign minister William Hague insists that British-Iranian relations have not been cut completely, with the possibility remaining of dialogue at international meetings as occurs between Iran and the US, former minister Mark Malloch-Brown observes that London’s role in negotiations will, in all probability, shrink significantly.  By necessity, being less well-informed than previously, Britain will cease to be the primary point of contact for other nations; Britain, without an embassy to remain in the loop, will become a ‘bystander’, and a check on Iranian actions will be lost.

Elsewhere, confirming widespread objection, France, Germany and the Netherlands all recalled their respective ambassadors from Tehran for consultations on the developing situation.  Italy and Sweden both summoned Iranian ambassadors, while Norway temporarily closed its embassy in Tehran, citing security concerns.  Hillary Clinton declared that the US ‘condemns this attack in the strongest possible terms’, describing the events in Tehran as ‘an affront not only to the British people but also the international community’.  Thus, while the storming of the British embassy was a response to the decision to impose further sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme, the move could have boomeranged: many Western countries may now be persuaded that more rigorous measures are required.

Bernard Valero, a spokesman for the French foreign ministry, announced that President Sarkozy  had taken the initial step of proposing a freezing of the Iranian Central Bank’s assets and banning oil imports from the Republic – a notion that has Hague’s support as part of a package prescribing further punitive measures and an intensification of existing sanctions.  Such measures are an obvious extension of current restrictions placed on Tehran, aiming to introduce further obstacles in an economic climate that is already difficult for Iran to operate in.  However, with the developing eurozone debt crisis and parts of Europe on the verge of another recession, the potential for increased crude oil prices as the result of an EU oil embargo render such a strategy highly contentious.

The latest IAEA report reaffirms suspicions surrounding the potential for hostile ambitions to be underpinning nuclear developments in the Republic, providing greater detail than previously available.  Alarmingly, the report states that Tehran has undertaken activities ‘relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device’.  Indeed, some such undertakings, notably experiments on detonating a nuclear weapon and techniques with which to adapt a device to fit into the nose-section of a missile, are condemned as useful only in the pursuit of such an end.  While this is not conclusive proof that Iran has made progress towards successfully weaponising these technologies, such signs cast an ominous shadow over the underlying intent.  Regardless of persistent assurances to the contrary, Tehran’s prior record of concealing the enrichment programme continues to drive suspicion.  As long as such ambiguity exists, relations with the West will remain hesitant.

Nonetheless, the IAEA report failed to convince officials in Beijing, while Moscow dismissed the sanctions as ‘seriously [complicating] efforts for constructive dialogue with Tehran’.  With China and Russia remaining unwilling to allow deeper UN sanctions to be imposed, the inconsistency with which the sanctions regime is applied is gradually deepening.  Indeed, Iran’s strengthening ties with Beijing, primarily based around energy, encourage sanctions to be sidestepped.  In this regard, the direction and pace of development depends on political factors as much as on technological constraints.

Mehdi Ghazanfari, Iran’s trade minister, described sanctions as ‘a lose-lose game’ with all concerned making a loss, with the West standing to ‘lose an appealing market‘ through failing to invest in Iranian oil projects.  Rostam Qasemi, Iran’s oil minister, further suggested that Iran was willing to use oil as a political tool.  However, such concealed threats will likely be difficult to act upon.  Primarily, Iran is not capable of slowing production without OPEC co-operation – other OPEC members would willingly pick up any slack to maintain output levels.  Similarly, despite Mehdi Mehdizadeh, a majlis member, claiming that oil price rises would result if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, it is important to recognise that Oman, not Iran, is responsible for controlling the Strait.  Ultimately, Tehran does not have the authority to carry through this threat unilaterally, and lacks the necessary support for a collective effort at disrupting supply.  Equally, to do so would represent an ill-targeted response, impacting upon non-Western consumers and severely constraining oil income, particularly in emerging Asian markets.

The measures emerging from the meeting of EU foreign ministers were relatively weak, continuing with a sanctions regime that has thus far failed to entice Tehran back to the negotiating table while failing to agree an oil embargo.  This will do little to resolve tensions and restore diplomatic relations.  However, with the Iranian issue firmly back on the agenda,  and rumours of pre-emptive invasion led by Tel Aviv or Washington gaining ground since the IAEA report was released, this is unlikely to be the final scenario.  Accordingly, the need to push for a diplomatic solution has increased – a failure to do so could result in yet further turmoil in the Middle East, be it in the shape of direct conflict or the reincarnation of nuclear arms racing in response to a nuclear armed Iran.

The Arab Revolt: Revolution Without Religion

The scent of jasmine carries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on the winds of change that continue to blow across the region.  As the revolutionary bent that was born in Tunisia continues to spread, the Arab world is awakening to the potential for change: no longer do the peoples of the MENA region feel constrained to a life dominated by authoritarian strongmen who embezzle state funds and suppress political freedoms in all manifestations.  Importantly, another conclusion being broadly realised as a result of the pro-democracy demonstrations is that, although related, politics and religion in the region need not be inseparable; the choice in the region is not restricted to Islamism and dictatorship alone.

In an address broadcast on state television, Colonel Gaddafi this week proclaimed that the anti-government protests that have crippled Libya, provoking a violent response that has attracted international condemnation, were directly linked to Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda, Gaddafi proposed, is responsible for proselytising youths below the age of prosecution, through a combination of drugs and alcohol, to partake in ‘destruction and sabotage’.  Similarly, both Ben Ali and Mubarak blamed “the Islamists” for stirring dissent, while King Abdullah of Jordan implied al-Qaeda influence and Bahraini authorities proclaimed the meddling of Hizbollah.  That Gaddafi persists in his claims serves only to add further credence to assertions from Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, that Libya’s leader is ‘delusional’ and ‘unfit to lead’.  However, with the issue of religion having been almost wholly absent from the protests, barring (largely Western) concerns raised regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such accusations are alarmingly wide of the mark.  This begs the question of whether Arab despots genuinely misread the situation in horrific fashion, or chose a path of ignorance and further suppression only to be thwarted by a combination of determined revolutionaries and the emergence of powerful social media tools.  

It is something of a necessity that those who promote democracy in the Muslim world will, sooner or later, be forced to deal with Islamists.  To associate all Islamist groups with extremist goals is,  nonetheless, incredibly naive; the mildly Islamic Justice and Development Party that governs in Turkey is the perfect exemplification of the ability of Islam and politics to engage constructively, with a non-secular party having secular objectives and proving itself capable of playing within the democratic framework.  Indeed, as Charlemagne highlights, not all groups bearing an “Islamic” prefix or suffix are puppets of the Iranian ayatollahs or colleagues of Bin Laden.  This failure to distinguish between different strands of Islam-inspired political groups has long been an error of Europeans, purposefully or otherwise, contributing to the prolonged existence of totalitarian regimes.  Thus, while Hamas was indeed an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Brotherhood has declared itself to be non-violent and has embraced democracy, much to the ire of al-Qaeda.  This exodus of radical elements to form separate external factions following failed efforts to influence the Brotherhood’s ideology, coupled with renewed efforts to gain power legitimately through the ballot box, seemingly contradicts Western fears that the embrace of democracy is opportunistic, aimed at a system of “one man, one vote, one time”.

Very mention of the Brotherhood often causes great unease in the West, largely attributable to incomprehension pertaining to the precise nature and objectives of the movement.  No two branches are the same:  the designation of various groups as counterparts is arguably a misnomer, based largely on common ancestry.  Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently announced that they would form a legitimate political party, though they would not field a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections – symptomatic of belief in democratic norms of inclusion and participation rather than a determination to impose a shari’a state.  Talking with Islamists, even those with objectionable views, and including them within a democratic system is not symbolic of “Islamisation” or of an acceptance of their beliefs; inclusion is a fundamental tenet of democracy, with any unpopular worldview being judged by the court of popular opinion.  Such an identification should, as a bare minimum, be afforded such an appraisal.  By equal measure, as the region begins to recognise democratic aspirations, the role of the West must be to assist where needed, but not to interfere where not wanted and attempt to impose democracy at gunpoint.

Possibly the most striking characteristic of the wave of protests is that genuine political protest has been entangled with religion only in the minds of those authoritarian leaders whose tenure was suddenly placed under the microscope.  Even in Bahrain, ruled by a Sunni minority, the protests have remained secular and non-sectarian, focussing on political demands for greater freedoms, fuller democracy and economic improvements.  Sheikh Ali Salman, head of the al-Wefaq party, denied that demonstrations in Manama had been orchestrated by Iran as a means to exert greater political influence in the region, while Jaffar al-Shayeb, a Saudi Shia and political activist, described the demonstrations as being about ‘national demands’ and ‘political reform’ – issues which draw Sunni Bahrainis alongside their Shia brethren.  However, this is where many problems originate.  Demands  for “freedom” and “democracy” carry with them heavy connotations, an understanding of which is not straightforward owing to the dynamic nature of such concepts.  As Maya Zippel correctly points out, ousting a despotic ruler – often seen as the ‘final piece of the puzzle’ – is but the first step of a lengthy transition process that requires compromise on all sides in building a state infrastructure capable of handling political renewal.  Will the demonstrators be capable of maintaining their appetite for democratic reform throughout?

The answer so far appears to be a resounding “yes”, despite actual reform throughout MENA getting off to a slow start.  After twelve straight days of protests, the Bahraini government declared on 25 February that it was ready for compromise, with King Hamad ordering the release of several Shia prisoners under royal pardon and inviting protesters to talks on political reform.  Protesters, however, insist the move is not enough; demands that the government resign, the deaths of protesters be investigated, and political reforms leading to a constitutional monarchy be implemented continue to echo around Manama.  Similarly in Egypt, the Supreme Military Council has moved only slowly: while 10 days of consultations have produced a cabinet reshuffle, with members of the opposition Wafd and Tagammu parties now being represented, as well as a constitutional reform committee, controversial and disliked figures, such as Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Ahmed Shafiq, remain within the regime.  However, such a slow pace of reform was the topic of further demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square; protesters vowed to return every Friday until change is enacted, though such gatherings represent more a celebration of the undertaking of reform and the dawn of a new era, gently seeking to move the process along, rather than displaying the emotional revolutionary fervour that Mubarak sought to dampen.  Likewise in Tunisia, Mohammed Ghannouchi, a veteran of many Ben Ali governments, resigned only this week after prolonged protests that saw him dismiss many of the old guard from the cabinet.  They may be moving slowly, but, importantly, the wheels of change are turning.  So far, protesters have not been duped by token tweeks that would prolong the regime.

Another important and interlinked feature of the pro-democracy demonstrations that have swept across the MENA region is that of Israel.  Or, more precisely, the lack of Israel’s mention.  That Tel Aviv has been a background issue at most should not be surprising, given the secular nature of the demands of the protesters.  While Mark LeVine suggests that the second intifada movement was a source of much solidarity that aided the coordination and fortitude of the protesters as a result of Cairo’s active branch of the Palestine Solidarity Committee, what is more interesting is the potential that the pro-democracy movement in the region holds to unseat opposition to Israel as the dominant unifying force throughout the Muslim world.  Recognition that the prominence of corruption and oppression are the root causes of many problems across the region, while currently overshadowing peace talks, may in the long run contribute to jolting the Middle East peace process into meaningful action.

With demonstrations continuing across the MENA region, exactly how far they will spread remains to be seen.  Oman, which had avoided much of the regional unrest, recently experienced pro-reform rallies that stimulated a cabinet reshuffle and an increase in social benefits for students.  Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, on returning to the Kingdom following a 3-month medical absence, announced a series of benefits totalling $10.7bn, including funding to offset high inflation and to aid the many young unemployed people and Saudi citizens studying abroad, as well the writing off some loans.  These are clearly efforts to placate any revolutionary ferment before substantial pro-democracy sentiment has chance to assimilate.  Demonstrations, however, are unlikely in the Saudi kingdom as a consequence of the vast oil wealth that enables the House of Saud to “buy”  popular acquiescence.

As an interesting aside, many MENA states share several features with regimes in Asia: autocratic regimes holding power for decades, widespread political repression, and a harsh economic environment with instances of drastic inequality between the ruling elites and many within the general populace.  Could the “Jasmine Revolution” spread into totalitarian Asia?  While similar underlying conditions are present, the flight to Asia is unlikely.  Significant structural differences, such as the prominence of party machines throughout the state infrastructure in authoritarian countries such as China and North Korea, complicate the notion of pro-democracy (or anti-regime) protests.  Equally, the alarming efficiency with which repressive media controls are implemented by such regimes prevents the flow of information.  For instance, Linkedin, the business networking site, was shut down by Beijing authorities on 25 February after a user set up a forum discussing the notion of a “Jasmine Revolution”, while internet users inside China reported that some sites were also blocking information on Jon Huntsman, the US ambassador to Beijing spotted attending a pro-democracy protest.  While the authorities continue to scrupulously censor micro-blogging and internet sites, preventing the spread of revolutionary fever, the chances of unrest remain minimal.