Rhetoric and Retaliation: North Korea’s Nuclear Gamesmanship

Joint military drills on the Korean peninsula involving Seoul and Washington are a regular occurrence, taking place annually as a show of continued co-operation between the United States and her South Korean allies.  Equally predictable is Pyongyang’s response, regularly denouncing such exercises as covert preparation for combative engagement.

Foal Eagle operations began this year amidst elevated tensions.  As anticipated, North Korea’s reaction entailed vociferous objection.  That the antagonism and posturing attributed to Kim Jong-un has been particularly acute this time around, however, is symptomatic of a young leader attempting to demonstrate proficiency beyond his years.

Supplementary drills, termed Key Resolve, have involved 10,000 South Korean troops and 3,000 Americans, as well as the 10,000 US personnel involved in Foal Eagle.  In response to increasingly fiery rhetoric from North Korea, the US also deployed sophisticated military technologies and advanced delivery systems over the peninsula: during March, Washington co-ordinated flights of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers and B-2 stealth fighters over South Korea, dropping munitions on a South Korean island range in a demonstration of military superiority and a timely reminder of the pinpoint accuracy of American weapons technology.

Kim Jong-un condemned the sorties as an “ultimatum that they will ignite a nuclear war at any cost on the Korean Peninsula” and ordered the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) to ready strategic rockets to stand-by, declaring that North Korea should “mercilessly strike” the US and her military outposts.  The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland similarly described Key Resolve exercises as “a clear declaration of war”.

The increased bombast reverberating from Pyongyang comes at a time of strengthened UN sanctions, designed to prohibitively increase the cost of illicit nuclear programmes following a third nuclear test in February and a three-stage rocket test in December 2012.  That the Kim dynasty has been able to oversee these developments is testament to the laxity with which previous rounds of sanctions were administered.

In the weeks since tighter sanctions were imposed, numerous threats have been directed towards both America and her allies; a “pre-emptive nuclear strike” was promised against the US, while once more threatening to dispense with the Korean War armistice and cut diplomatic ties with Seoul.  When these provocations went unrewarded, Mr Kim announced plans to “readjust and restart” nuclear facilities at Yongbyon.  Refusing to bow to Pyongyang’s ostentation, the US called Mr Kim’s bluff: Chuck Hagel vowed to “make clear” that such provocations “are taken ... very seriously”, while John Kerry affirmed that Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo and Washington had “committed to take action together” and to “making that goal of denuclearisation a reality”.

The 15-0 vote at the UN Security Council in March is particularly significant insofar as China, despite being North Korea’s only ally, co-sponsored extended sanctions.  This is a strong indication that pressure on the Kim regime is beginning to escalate.  Encouragingly, in a display of continuing displeasure, Beijing appears to have stepped up inspections of cargo bound for North Korea, though must now proceed cautiously so as not to upset the perceived regional balance of power and risk triggering a North Korean implosion.  As Pyongyang’s lifeline, China must make careful calculations concerning the cutting of vital supplies; to restrict aid too far, particularly in terms of fuel or food, could spark a chain reaction of instability and volatility.

Recent political transitions across the region have seemingly been central in efforts to enhance Pyongyang’s regional standing.  Both Japan and South Korea have recently elected new premiers who, like the young Kim, are still in the process of consolidating power and finding their political footings.  Similarly, in Beijing, the Communist Party has recently undergone the decennial process of political handover, with a new staff now manning the Politburo Standing Committee.

Surrounded by leaders of equal inexperience, Mr Kim has attempted to seize an opportunity to assert himself and bolster support at home by demonstrating strength on the international stage.  By conducting further rounds of nuclear and weapons tests, Mr Kim would have hoped to exploit any resultant response from the international community as a rationale for readying the troops, denouncing the armistice agreement with southern neighhbours, and threatening to strike the US.

Such shows of perceived strength, along with any associated concessions secured or repercussions avoided as a result, appear designed to cement confidence in Mr Kim’s leadership at home.  Indeed, with Washington announcing in early-April the postponement of planned Minuteman 3 ballistic missile tests to prevent misinterpretation, Pyongyang will likely wax lyrical about an enforced American climbdown following diplomatic and military pressure.

However, this is a principal reason to suspect that threats emanating from Pyongyang are bravado; efforts to secure political power through military means have been intended primarily for domestic consumption by a leader whose rapid rise through the KPA has led to questions concerning his ability and qualification to lead.  Given countervailing sentiments from both Washington and Seoul, the Kim regime is highly unlikely to escalate the current situation beyond hostile rhetoric and chance the assured destruction that provoking a retaliatory onslaught would bring.  While the US is not ignoring threats emanating from Pyongyang, spending $1 billion to strengthen ballistic missile interception systems in Fort Greely, Alaska, that this additional capacity will not become operational until 2017 indicates strong doubts over Mr Kim’s intentions and the abilities of Pyongyang’s military hardware.

It is doubtful that an act of North Korean aggression will be immediately forthcoming.  At a time of heightened international tensions, and amidst promises of retaliation directed from all angles, to do so would be a seemingly suicidal move for the already-isolated regime.  At the same time, while not completely implausible, it remains unlikely that Pyongyang will seek to further intensify or extend the current bout of belligerent sentiment.  With Washington, Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing responding in kind to Mr Kim’s attempted browbeating, and possessing proven military potential to follow through with such promises, the North Korean regime is unlikely to risk actual conflict through miscalculation.

In a week where international news concerning North Korea was dominated by a breaking scandal concerning the BBC and LSE, military tensions appear to have taken a back seat.  With the Kim regime having nowhere further to go using rhetoric alone, it is likely that this is where they will remain until the next round of military drills.

Military Action in Libya and the Arab League’s Cold Feet

The United Nations Security Council passed, on 17 March, Resolution 1973.  The official aim of the Resolution is to protect Libyan civilians from pro-Gaddafi troops and avert a potential humanitarian catastrophe through ‘the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence’, calling on Libyan authorities to ‘comply with their obligations under international law’ and to ‘take all measures to protect civilians’.  However, with pro-Gaddafi forces continuing their violent onslaught eastwards, coalition forces exercised the provision of Resolution 1973, beginning on 19 March, to ‘take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’.

Various claims relating to ulterior motives of regime change and increasing oil market stability, as well as criticisms concerning an alleged continuation of Western “liberal interventionism” in a Blairite mould, have all been voiced.  However, Resolution 1973 does not explicitly call for regime change: French President Sarkozy, who has been at the forefront of operations, opines that it is ‘our duty’ to respond to the ‘anguished appeal’ of the Libyan population in their demands to the right to determine their own destiny.  This necessarily entails protecting citizens from the ‘mortal danger’ posed by pro-Gaddafi forces.  With Gaddafi perched atop of Libya’s military infrastructure, his removal could be seen as a viable (indeed, for some such as Senator Joe Lieberman, the only viable) means through which to achieve this end, though the issue of whether this amounts to de facto regime change should remain subordinate to the ultimate aim of protecting Libyan civilians.  Importantly, in this context, no exit strategy has been confirmed, meaning coalition allied forces have to be prepared to maintain a presence until Gaddafi leaves through one means or another.  However, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged on 20 March that the end-game of military action in Libya is ‘very uncertain’ and could indeed end in stalemate: with a no-fly zone successfully imposed, Gaddafi would be unable to mount offensive operations, but revolutionary forces would not have the assets to loosen his grip on power.

The outbreak of fighting was accompanied by a concurrent outbreak of high-minded morality.  A spokesman from Russia’s foreign ministry stated that Moscow regretted the decision by the Western powers to take military action, despite giving tacit approval through abstaining at the vote of the UNSC.  Similarly, a committee of heads of state requested by the African Union to find solutions to the Libyan crisis, also called for an end to hostilities on Sunday, with Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who chaired the AU panel, declaring that the solution ‘must adhere to the value we place in respecting territorial unity and integrity, as well as the rejection of all foreign military intervention, whatever form it takes’.  Meanwhile, Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League – who called, on 12 March, for the UN to impose a no-fly zone on Libya amidst claims that Gaddafi’s regime had ‘lost legitimacy’ as a result of efforts to crush a revolution aiming to remove him from power – claimed that the military action in Libya ‘differs from the goal of imposing a no-fly zone’.  However, with the issue of a NFZ having been widely discussed prior to the UNSC vote on 17 March, the practical implications of neutralising Libya’s integrated air defence system were broadly understood prior to action being undertaken.  The redoubling of fears concerning the legitimacy of Western actions in enforcing Resolution 1973 have seemingly been caused by a confusion between principles of “preemption” and “prevention”, given that pro-Gaddafi forces had not previously utilised air power in a meaningful way in the suppression of pro-democracy revolutionaries.  Such fears, however, are unwarranted.

Post-9/11, preemptive and preventive uses of force have caused much controversy, particularly concerns regarding the moral legitimacy of the latter.  The distinction lies in the perceived imminence of attack, though the subjectivity of this measure is a potential flaw – as witnessed prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when allies such as France contested the alleged evidence of WMD.  Traditionally, states (and, by extrapolation, individuals) have been afforded the right to utilise force in self-defence.  While this has not customarily allowed for an unqualified right to employ force, there exists no obligation to allow an aggressor to fire first: preemption is therefore a derivative of traditional self-defence when an offensive strike is perceived to be imminent.  Prevention, on the other hand, is the response to a presumed threat; action undertaken in anticipation of injurious undertakings that are neither in progress nor on the horizon.  Prevention is thus widely perceived as illegitimate on the basis that other responses could first be undertaken, meaning that the vital “last resort” requirement of a just conflict remains unfulfilled.

Clearly, the situation in Libya was desperate.  With pro-Gaddafi forces surging eastwards towards Benghazi, having already retaken many towns and former rebel strongholds in bloody and violent battles, the threat posed to civilians was plainly imminent.  To be certain, claims pertaining military intervention to be covertly aimed at a protection of Western interests are wide of the mark: with Gaddafi’s forces massacring Libyan citizens, civil war and humanitarian crisis loomed.  On this basis, the decision to vote in favour of a UNSC Resolution authorising measures to protect civilians, while excluding a foreign occupation force ‘of any form’, was correct.  By the same token, targeting military installations housing air defence mechanisms was a necessary step in enabling the implementation of a NFZ.  Not only will this allow coalition forces to protect against air strikes with a diminished risk of being themselves fired at, but has also enabled actions against imminent ground surges given the ambiguity surrounding the proscription of the use of ground forces.