The Quiet Referendum: Egypt on the Road to Democracy

The headlines of the past week have portrayed a sombre and melancholic outlook on world affairs.  Dominated by stories of war in Libya and the accompanying issues of morality and legality, fears of nuclear fallout and pictures of tsunami-induced suffering in Japan, tales of violent retaliation against pro-democracy factions across the Middle East and North Africa, and arguments surrounding the utility of a 1p cut in Britain’s fuel duty, one could be forgiven for accepting the view that all is not well in the world.  This is before the weekend’s protests marches through London – which spawned a splinter group intent on causing unnecessary damage by way of “protest” – even enters the equation.  However, one story that brings a glimpse of hope was buried underneath the despondency, broadly failing to make front page news.

On 19 March, voting took place at 54,000 polling stations across Egypt in a referendum on constitutional reforms stimulated by the revolution that began nearly two months earlier.  This, the first green shoot of change to emerge from the upheavals, should spread hope across the region.  While headline analyses do not necessarily make for enthralling reading – turnout, at 41%, was not particularly high by Western standards, while the 77.2% approval rate suggests that the underlying issues were not overly contentious – delving a little deeper allows the true worth of the occasion to be appreciated.

On the issue of turnout, it is important to remember that Egypt is not a democracy; with no tangible value previously attached to votes, coupled with a franchise that was not universal, the sense of civic duty felt across the democratic world had hitherto failed to develop in Egypt.  Thus, in 2010, when legislative elections were last held, turnout was widely reported to be below 25% (some sources reported figures as low as 10%) while instances of judges reporting local officials fabricating figures were not uncommon.  With the referendum billed as the first vote in Egyptian memory whereby the result is not predetermined, a turnout of 41% amongst an expanded electorate looks more like a triumphant achievement and a step towards realising the ambitions of the revolution.  It is no coincidence that this is the highest recorded turnout in Egyptian polls.  Indeed, US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, declared the peaceful exercising of newly won democratic freedoms on a scale never before seen in the country to be ‘cause for great optimism’.  While Mohamed ElBaradei encountered initial difficulties, tweeting concerns regarding an absence of law and order, the presence of some 37,000 soldiers to assist the police in securing the streets ensured that the vote was generally smooth and calm.  Moreover, in a further contrast to those polls experienced under Mubarak, and 2010 in particular, 17,000 judges were on hand to monitor proceedings.

The constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum created greater divisiveness  amongst reformist opinion than results would tend to suggest.  Many insisted the reforms to be insufficient, arguing that the constitution needs fully re-writing before elections are held.  Others professed general satisfaction with the map for progress, opining that a newly elected parliament should have authority to re-write the constitution.  Prior to the ballot, therefore, debate was roughly divided between liberals and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists and conservatives on the other.  This fits nicely with theories that the Muslim Brotherhood, along with remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), would support the proposals in order to trigger a rapid transition of power away from the military.  This, the argument goes, would allow these groups to capitalise on organisational advantages when contesting elections, enabling their dominance within the next parliament and the ability to draft a new constitution firmly in their interests.  Predicting such a scenario, a statement by groups involved in the January 25 Revolution called for a “no” vote in order to negate the ‘attempt to abort revolution’, with Salma Said calling for the poll to be delayed on the grounds that ‘this referendum is based on a constitution that the revolution was meant to stop’.  Revisions to Article 75, for instance, have caused particular upset, implicitly removing the possibility that any Egyptian citizen can aspire to the presidency by introducing regulations precluding marriage to a non-Egyptian and extending restrictions regarding dual nationality to a candidate’s parents.  In a similar vein, the continuing power of the president has also raised eyebrows.  Critics have highlighted how the amendments allow the president to retain the ability to appoint one-third of the shura council, as well as the upper house of parliament and up to ten members of the lower chamber, while preserving the power to unilaterally dissolve parliament.  Undoubtedly, these powers are not symptomatic of a democratic polity.

However, there are flaws in this line of reasoning, and it must be recognised that the democracy achieved in much of the Western world cannot be manufactured overnight, let alone imposed in perfect fashion.  Primarily, drafting a new constitution prior to elections, with the generals still in power, would necessarily entail some level of military influence, be it in drafting the document or in the appointment of a committee to undertake the task.  Clearly, such a move would fly in the face of all that the revolution stood for; better to have a constitution penned by scholars and elected representatives than one dictated by the military which would potentially accommodate interference by the generals in the political sphere.  While it is true that the amendments voted on in the referendum were drawn up by a judicial panel appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military has consistently expressed a desire to relinquish authority to an elected government as quickly as possible to avoid accusations of attempting to hold onto the reigns of power.

While fears abound that the “yes” vote will be interpreted as tacit approval on articles of the current constitution, granting automatic title to their inclusion in future documents, it is here that revisions to Article 189 are of great significance.  Requiring that a Constitutional Committee be formed within six months of parliament taking office, and with the stipulation that proposals face a public vote, accusations that interim amendments enacted by the referendum are merely cosmetic are effectively neutralised.  Plainly, further changes to meet demands are anticipated, with provision clearly being made to facilitate, rather than merely cater for, constitutional overhaul.  Moreover, had proposed amendments been broader, fears pertaining the “yes” vote as bestowing automatic entitlement to incorporation within any future document would surely have worsened, prompting claims of excessive military involvement.  In this respect, the military faced a “lose-lose” situation.  Similarly, claims that presidential powers would remain unreformed are mistaken.  The revised Article 77, for example, imposes a limit of two four-year presidential terms – a rare restriction across the Arab world – while Article 139 mandates that a vice president be appointed within sixty days.  Furthermore, the president’s right to use military courts would also be cancelled, while Article 88 ensures full judicial oversight of electoral processes.  Crucially, Article 76 opens elections to greater competition, enabling independent candidates to stand alongside those from established parties.  Also, importantly, in a state currently without a president, those retained powers presently serve no purpose.  Revisions to Articles 77 and 139, by this reading, serve as a safeguard only, confirming the military’s desire for stable, civilian-led governance.

Importantly, Article 75 aside, there has been little by way of complaint regarding the direction of reform (and even revisions to Article 75, if read to be a temporary measure designed to apply in the next presidential poll only, could be interpreted as an insurance policy for Egyptian self-determination).  The primary grievance has instead been the view that the short turnaround time will favour Islamists and players associated with the former regime; the weeks that have passed since Mubarak was ousted have not, in the opinion of many activists, been sufficient to reverse the decades of oppression encountered and the distortions to political life that this produced.  Nor will a few months be adequate for new parties to organise and compete effectively in legislative elections.  While it is true that the Brotherhood and the NDP were the primary sources of support for the amendments, this should not be interpreted as anything other than the professed desire for democratic stability.  Undoubtedly, the size of the “yes” vote confirms that these groups continue to exude considerable influence, though this cannot be grounds for suspecting ulterior motives; the true concern should rest with alternative of prolonged military rule and the prospect of sustained military intervention, not with efforts to enact a transition to civilian governance at the earliest opportunity.  As Mostafa Hussein points out, delaying elections through fear of Brotherhood and/or NDP success ‘would be like delaying the World Cup because you are worried Brazil will win’.  Accordingly, in an effort to reassure those unconvinced, Muhammad Abbas, a prominent young Brother, openly professed that the movement hopes to get a third of the seats in the new parliament (contesting perhaps 40%), desiring a broad alliance comprising secular socialists, liberals and Christians alike.  Moreover, the Brotherhood will not put up a candidate for president.  This outlook was confirmed by Mohamed el-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, who professed that the movement would be reserved in their political undertakings ‘until the time there are forces that can compete.  At that point, we will take part in the competition’.

Any effort to delay the transition from military rule to civilian government would be counterintuitive to the premise of the revolution.  Ideally, with presidential powers being only partly tempered, a new constitution would be penned and enacted by a newly elected parliament prior to presidential polls, thereby circumventing the entire issue of amendments not going far enough.  However, such an outcome is unlikely.  As such, installing a civilian president is inherently less objectionable from a democratic perspective than retaining military rule, particularly given the penchant of generals in the region for prolonged political activity – Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, let us not forget, tasted governmental power as minister of defence under Mubarak for some twenty years, perhaps adding to the urgency surrounding transition.  The “yes” vote, therefore, while on amendments that perhaps do not go as far as they could, should be read as a beacon of hope in a sea of turmoil.  Perhaps the upheaval and turmoil have been worthwhile.

*UPDATE*

• On 23 March, in a crucial step towards reinvigorating political life in Egypt, a law easing the restrictions that distorted political life was passed, allowing the formation of new political parties that will be able to compete in legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place later this year.  The law is expected to result in a multitude of new parties, opening up real political choice in the country for the first time.  Amongst the new parties is likely to be the Freedom and Justice Party, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood.

• On 28 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced legislative elections are to be held in September, with emergency laws being lifted prior to the polls.  This gives parties, many of whom were crushed under Mubarak, some five months to prepare for the first free elections in decades.  However, Mamdouh Shaheen, a member of the Council, said that a date had yet to be set for presidential elections.  With power not being transferred to the civilian-led government until after presidential polls, the military’s initial target of transition within six months is destined to be missed.  However, this raises hopes that a new constitution can be approved prior to a president taking over.

The Arab Revolt: Revolution Without Religion

The scent of jasmine carries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) on the winds of change that continue to blow across the region.  As the revolutionary bent that was born in Tunisia continues to spread, the Arab world is awakening to the potential for change: no longer do the peoples of the MENA region feel constrained to a life dominated by authoritarian strongmen who embezzle state funds and suppress political freedoms in all manifestations.  Importantly, another conclusion being broadly realised as a result of the pro-democracy demonstrations is that, although related, politics and religion in the region need not be inseparable; the choice in the region is not restricted to Islamism and dictatorship alone.

In an address broadcast on state television, Colonel Gaddafi this week proclaimed that the anti-government protests that have crippled Libya, provoking a violent response that has attracted international condemnation, were directly linked to Osama Bin Laden; al-Qaeda, Gaddafi proposed, is responsible for proselytising youths below the age of prosecution, through a combination of drugs and alcohol, to partake in ‘destruction and sabotage’.  Similarly, both Ben Ali and Mubarak blamed “the Islamists” for stirring dissent, while King Abdullah of Jordan implied al-Qaeda influence and Bahraini authorities proclaimed the meddling of Hizbollah.  That Gaddafi persists in his claims serves only to add further credence to assertions from Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, that Libya’s leader is ‘delusional’ and ‘unfit to lead’.  However, with the issue of religion having been almost wholly absent from the protests, barring (largely Western) concerns raised regarding the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, such accusations are alarmingly wide of the mark.  This begs the question of whether Arab despots genuinely misread the situation in horrific fashion, or chose a path of ignorance and further suppression only to be thwarted by a combination of determined revolutionaries and the emergence of powerful social media tools.  

It is something of a necessity that those who promote democracy in the Muslim world will, sooner or later, be forced to deal with Islamists.  To associate all Islamist groups with extremist goals is,  nonetheless, incredibly naive; the mildly Islamic Justice and Development Party that governs in Turkey is the perfect exemplification of the ability of Islam and politics to engage constructively, with a non-secular party having secular objectives and proving itself capable of playing within the democratic framework.  Indeed, as Charlemagne highlights, not all groups bearing an “Islamic” prefix or suffix are puppets of the Iranian ayatollahs or colleagues of Bin Laden.  This failure to distinguish between different strands of Islam-inspired political groups has long been an error of Europeans, purposefully or otherwise, contributing to the prolonged existence of totalitarian regimes.  Thus, while Hamas was indeed an offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Brotherhood has declared itself to be non-violent and has embraced democracy, much to the ire of al-Qaeda.  This exodus of radical elements to form separate external factions following failed efforts to influence the Brotherhood’s ideology, coupled with renewed efforts to gain power legitimately through the ballot box, seemingly contradicts Western fears that the embrace of democracy is opportunistic, aimed at a system of “one man, one vote, one time”.

Very mention of the Brotherhood often causes great unease in the West, largely attributable to incomprehension pertaining to the precise nature and objectives of the movement.  No two branches are the same:  the designation of various groups as counterparts is arguably a misnomer, based largely on common ancestry.  Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently announced that they would form a legitimate political party, though they would not field a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections – symptomatic of belief in democratic norms of inclusion and participation rather than a determination to impose a shari’a state.  Talking with Islamists, even those with objectionable views, and including them within a democratic system is not symbolic of “Islamisation” or of an acceptance of their beliefs; inclusion is a fundamental tenet of democracy, with any unpopular worldview being judged by the court of popular opinion.  Such an identification should, as a bare minimum, be afforded such an appraisal.  By equal measure, as the region begins to recognise democratic aspirations, the role of the West must be to assist where needed, but not to interfere where not wanted and attempt to impose democracy at gunpoint.

Possibly the most striking characteristic of the wave of protests is that genuine political protest has been entangled with religion only in the minds of those authoritarian leaders whose tenure was suddenly placed under the microscope.  Even in Bahrain, ruled by a Sunni minority, the protests have remained secular and non-sectarian, focussing on political demands for greater freedoms, fuller democracy and economic improvements.  Sheikh Ali Salman, head of the al-Wefaq party, denied that demonstrations in Manama had been orchestrated by Iran as a means to exert greater political influence in the region, while Jaffar al-Shayeb, a Saudi Shia and political activist, described the demonstrations as being about ‘national demands’ and ‘political reform’ – issues which draw Sunni Bahrainis alongside their Shia brethren.  However, this is where many problems originate.  Demands  for “freedom” and “democracy” carry with them heavy connotations, an understanding of which is not straightforward owing to the dynamic nature of such concepts.  As Maya Zippel correctly points out, ousting a despotic ruler – often seen as the ‘final piece of the puzzle’ – is but the first step of a lengthy transition process that requires compromise on all sides in building a state infrastructure capable of handling political renewal.  Will the demonstrators be capable of maintaining their appetite for democratic reform throughout?

The answer so far appears to be a resounding “yes”, despite actual reform throughout MENA getting off to a slow start.  After twelve straight days of protests, the Bahraini government declared on 25 February that it was ready for compromise, with King Hamad ordering the release of several Shia prisoners under royal pardon and inviting protesters to talks on political reform.  Protesters, however, insist the move is not enough; demands that the government resign, the deaths of protesters be investigated, and political reforms leading to a constitutional monarchy be implemented continue to echo around Manama.  Similarly in Egypt, the Supreme Military Council has moved only slowly: while 10 days of consultations have produced a cabinet reshuffle, with members of the opposition Wafd and Tagammu parties now being represented, as well as a constitutional reform committee, controversial and disliked figures, such as Ahmed Aboul Gheit and Ahmed Shafiq, remain within the regime.  However, such a slow pace of reform was the topic of further demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square; protesters vowed to return every Friday until change is enacted, though such gatherings represent more a celebration of the undertaking of reform and the dawn of a new era, gently seeking to move the process along, rather than displaying the emotional revolutionary fervour that Mubarak sought to dampen.  Likewise in Tunisia, Mohammed Ghannouchi, a veteran of many Ben Ali governments, resigned only this week after prolonged protests that saw him dismiss many of the old guard from the cabinet.  They may be moving slowly, but, importantly, the wheels of change are turning.  So far, protesters have not been duped by token tweeks that would prolong the regime.

Another important and interlinked feature of the pro-democracy demonstrations that have swept across the MENA region is that of Israel.  Or, more precisely, the lack of Israel’s mention.  That Tel Aviv has been a background issue at most should not be surprising, given the secular nature of the demands of the protesters.  While Mark LeVine suggests that the second intifada movement was a source of much solidarity that aided the coordination and fortitude of the protesters as a result of Cairo’s active branch of the Palestine Solidarity Committee, what is more interesting is the potential that the pro-democracy movement in the region holds to unseat opposition to Israel as the dominant unifying force throughout the Muslim world.  Recognition that the prominence of corruption and oppression are the root causes of many problems across the region, while currently overshadowing peace talks, may in the long run contribute to jolting the Middle East peace process into meaningful action.

With demonstrations continuing across the MENA region, exactly how far they will spread remains to be seen.  Oman, which had avoided much of the regional unrest, recently experienced pro-reform rallies that stimulated a cabinet reshuffle and an increase in social benefits for students.  Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, on returning to the Kingdom following a 3-month medical absence, announced a series of benefits totalling $10.7bn, including funding to offset high inflation and to aid the many young unemployed people and Saudi citizens studying abroad, as well the writing off some loans.  These are clearly efforts to placate any revolutionary ferment before substantial pro-democracy sentiment has chance to assimilate.  Demonstrations, however, are unlikely in the Saudi kingdom as a consequence of the vast oil wealth that enables the House of Saud to “buy”  popular acquiescence.

As an interesting aside, many MENA states share several features with regimes in Asia: autocratic regimes holding power for decades, widespread political repression, and a harsh economic environment with instances of drastic inequality between the ruling elites and many within the general populace.  Could the “Jasmine Revolution” spread into totalitarian Asia?  While similar underlying conditions are present, the flight to Asia is unlikely.  Significant structural differences, such as the prominence of party machines throughout the state infrastructure in authoritarian countries such as China and North Korea, complicate the notion of pro-democracy (or anti-regime) protests.  Equally, the alarming efficiency with which repressive media controls are implemented by such regimes prevents the flow of information.  For instance, Linkedin, the business networking site, was shut down by Beijing authorities on 25 February after a user set up a forum discussing the notion of a “Jasmine Revolution”, while internet users inside China reported that some sites were also blocking information on Jon Huntsman, the US ambassador to Beijing spotted attending a pro-democracy protest.  While the authorities continue to scrupulously censor micro-blogging and internet sites, preventing the spread of revolutionary fever, the chances of unrest remain minimal.