Showing posts with label Reform. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Reform. Show all posts

4 March 2013

The Bedroom Tax: A Looming Social Security Trap


After state pensions and Tax Credits, Housing Benefit payments comprise the largest proportion of welfare spending.  In 2010/11, £21.61 billion was spread across 4.9 million claimants.  The most recent figures put the Housing Benefit bill at £23 billion.  As part of a package of reforms that will change the face of welfare, Ministers have determined that it is not unreasonable to re-examine why the state is providing funding for people renting properties bigger than they need.

The thought process is perfectly rational; there are an estimated one million spare rooms within the social housing sector, with one-third of tenants occupying properties bigger than the Coalition deem their needs to be.  With another 250,000 families living in overcrowded accommodation, the need to better allocate existing housing stock is evident.

On 1 April 2013, an “under-occupancy” charge will apply to council and housing association tenants deemed to have more bedrooms than they need.  Official figures show that 660,000 households will be affected, with savings to the taxpayer of £505m in 2012/13, and £540m the following year.  However, rigid application of new regulations, and the adverse consequences this will cause, has ensured that the policy has been the centre of discontent.  It is difficult to justify the impending chaos with projected savings, which at best amount to 2.3% of Housing Benefit payments.

The forthcoming amendments have been labelled a “bedroom tax”, though the Government has maintained that such benefits changes merely constitute a surcharge, arguing that the underlying aim is to free up more living space for overcrowded families and encourage people to get jobs through enhanced social mobility.  Indeed, during Prime Minister’s Questions on 6 February 2013, David Cameron declared that the issue is a ‘basic question of fairness’, arguing that those in privately-rented housing do not receive benefits for unoccupied rooms – a stance he reaffirmed on 27 February 2013.

Research by the National Housing Federation (NHF) shows that 95,000 people in England will be forced into arrears because there are no smaller homes for them to move into.  With deductions from Housing Benefit to be taken regardless of the insufficiencies of current housing stock, Cameron’s assertions that ‘[t]his is not a tax, this is a benefit’ could hardly be further from the truth.  The malice of this onslaught on the low paid is perfectly demonstrated by the Government’s own savings calculations, which assume by default that people will not move and will suffer a subsequent fall in income.

Further resentment will result from the uneven geographical impact of policy changes.  Largely as a result of the region’s industrial past, which saw strong traditional family values and an abundance or family-size homes, the north has not previously experienced the demand for one- and two-bedroom properties experienced elsewhere.  Consequently, the entire region will be disproportionately affected; the DWP impact assessment shows that the share of northerners disadvantaged will be 38% greater than would be expected.  This despite Coalition rhetoric that ‘we are all in this together’.

This reduction in family income will hamper opportunities to grow the region’s struggling economy, which in turn will make it difficult to attract the necessary investment to recalibrate the social housing stock by building new properties, undermining economic recovery. As Derek Long, NHF Head of Northern Operations, suggests, this may be the beginning of a vicious circle.

To highlight this, Jayne MacDonald of Endeavour Housing in Stockton has said that the majority of social housing tenants in the region ‘literally won't have a spare penny and there is nowhere for that money to come from’.  As Endeavour Housing has 153 families under-occupying two-bedroom homes but no one-bedroom properties for them to move into, rent arrears beckon unless allowances are made.  With moving not a viable option, a failure to address this matter will confirm that the “under-occupancy” surcharge has evolved into a “bedroom tax”.

New Housing Benefit rules also place housing associations in an extremely difficult position; the responsibility to safeguard tenants while continuing to provide affordable homes has to be balanced against a responsibility to assist those impacted by Housing Benefit cuts.  Housing associations, therefore, simply cannot afford to leave rent accounts unsettled.  For this reason, suggestions of reclassifying properties based on the size of any spare bedroom are unsustainable.

Paradoxically, when uncomfortable examples of eviction come to the fore, housing associations will be primary contenders for the blame while Ministers espouse the party line that Discretionary Housing Payments (DHP) were made available to help the hardest cases.  While local authorities and the courts are unlikely to make tenants homeless as a result of arrears incurred as a result of Housing Benefit changes, the very existence of DHPs is an implicit acknowledgement by the Government that these cuts will cause enormous difficulties, particularly for the poorest in society. 

With the amount to be distributed totalling just 5% of projected savings, the Coalition’s hardline approach to welfare cuts becomes evident.  Reductions upwards of £500m per year will necessarily condemn many to debts and arrears – a situation made worse by the simultaneous localisation of Council Tax Benefit.  With few directives to regulate the precise distribution of discretionary funds, assistance will inevitably differ between local authorities and vary with time.  It is important, then, to acknowledge that changes are being imposed by the Government, while local authorities are being set the impossible task of dealing with the fallout.

While the need to reform the social housing sector is clear, the Coalition’s policy is marred by glaring flaws and anomalies.  Foremost, despite three-bedroom properties under housing association management often being cheaper than one-bedroom accommodation in the private sector, policy changes dictate that tenants must move if they do not wish to witness reductions in Housing Benefit.  With tenants who are deemed to be over-occupying being encouraged to consider a lodger, one must question the extent of any potential savings; any lodger is also likely to receive Housing Benefit.  Counterintuitively, these cuts potentially incentivise larger families as a “solution”, in many cases attracting additional benefits and circumventing Housing Benefit cuts.

Notably, Armed Forces personnel will not receive a blanket exemption from the new rules; those serving tours of duty longer than 13 weeks will still be liable to face cuts, though it remains to be seen whether provisions in local Armed Forces Covenants will provide a buffer for Servicemen.  There will also be no mandatory protection for foster carers, while some pensioners will lose their protection when welfare benefits migrate to Universal Credit from October 2013.

With only a month until implementation, the issues surrounding Housing Benefit rules need to be addressed swiftly.  As an interim measure, the changes should be postponed until these matters have been resolved.  With DWP to “look again” at how new rules will be applied to disabled people there has already been tacit acceptance that amendments are needed; arguments that it is too late in the day for change are misplaced.

Any changes will require sufficient time for tenants and landlords alike to prepare.  To properly manage the negative impact that cuts will have, any new policy should be focussed on fresh applications for Housing Benefit and current claims experiencing changes in circumstance.  Where suitable accommodation becomes available to facilitate active downsizing, these opportunities should be taken, with penalties imposed only where transfers are refused.  At the very least, a controlled tapering period, with cuts introduced at a gentler pace and in a more targeted fashion to exclude vulnerable groups, should be considered.

A failure to act now will confirm the hardship that the “bedroom tax” is threatening to bring, potentially leading to increased spending on welfare and resulting in a social security trap – an absurdity given the professed aims of the policy.




*UPDATE*

  • On 12 March, the Government announced that both foster carers and the families of Armed Forces personnel would be protected from the upcoming Housing Benefit shake-up.  However, while the U-turn is certainly welcome, safeguarding two groups susceptible to the changes despite often relying on this financial assistance to enable their vital contributions to society, this is not to say that the policy has been “fixed”.  Indeed, with this protection being taken from the existing Discretionary Housing Payments budget previously allocated to local authorities, flexibility to help other vulnerable groups, such as those living in accommodation adapted for specific disabilities or requiring additional space for medical equipment, is necessarily reduced.  Offering these protections is certainly a step in the right direction, though is de facto acceptance of policy imperfection.  Without further amendments, unnecessary hardship is likely to ensue.

22 December 2011

Reforming the House of Lords: Balancing Efficiency and Legitimacy

In a speech delivered at Demos this week, Nick Clegg sought to defend the precepts of the ‘Open Society’.  Aiming to reinvigorate the drive towards greater political pluralism and democratic involvement, while promoting such values as openness and equality that define his political perspective, the deputy prime minister placed reform of the House of Lords back into the spotlight.
Reform of the Second Chamber is undoubtedly a central issue, both within and beyond liberal reformist circles.  However, the matter is dominated by talk of increasing legitimacy, overshadowing the opportunity, if not the responsibility, to enhance the efficiency of the House.  Strengthening the democratic functioning of the Lords requires a broadening of their ability to act rather than solely focussing on the conviction with which they act.
Chief amongst Parliament’s many activities is the passage of effective legislation.  The bi-cameral nature of Parliament provides for an upper House to review proposed legislation, holding the government to account through deliberation and reassessment.  The incorporation of experts is therefore vastly beneficial to the process of scrutiny.  Unfortunately, the price of such expertise is democratic legitimacy, undermining any authority attached to amendments emerging from the Lords.  While the case for electing the Lords, or at least a significant majority, is therefore a strong one, insufficient attention has been paid to considering how functions could be better performed through concurrent structural and procedural reforms.
Currently, the House of Lords is chamber-oriented, relying on individuals who are both unelected and part-time.  Such working practices under-utilise the wealth of experience and knowledge of the Lords; with much time in the House being dedicated to detailed scrutiny of bills at the committee stage of the legislative process, many central issues fail to be debated by Peers.  This shortcoming adds to the case supporting reform of the House of Lords.  However, responses to questions concerning heightening efficiency and legitimacy need not be mutually exclusive.  
A reformed Chamber should complement the work of the Commons, providing an alternative perspective to legislative scrutiny.  An overriding fear of duplicating the work of the Commons has prevented the emergence of a strong committee system within the House of Lords.  Given the nature of the Lords’ remit, such a development path is peculiar; parallel departmental committees would greatly enhance opportunities for effective scrutiny, potentially producing stronger legislation, while allowing committee chairs in both Houses to coordinate workloads and avoid unnecessary duplication.  
A further advantage of allowing for a stronger committee system in the Lords comes in the shape of a solution to the trade-off between democratic legitimacy and expert input.  Rather than being permanently sitting members of the Lords, experts would continue to be integrated into the legislative process as Special Advisers or, alternatively, being called by committees considering specific legislation.  Expertise would thus remain eminent, while experts would not expected to choose between providing legislative advice and an existing career.  Similarly, the quality and relevance of legislative scrutiny would be improved, while democratic legitimacy would be revived by ensuring that the final say falls to elected representatives, suitably informed.
A revised House of Lords would, despite anticipated reductions in size, likely become more assertive in challenging government proposals as a result of Members’ knowledge that they represent the wishes of voters.  While this will ultimately improve governance through enhanced accountability, formal mechanisms above and beyond the Salisbury Convention and Parliament Acts would need to be established to confirm the continued primacy of the Commons, and to safeguard against legislative deadlock.  The House of Commons, as the driver of reform, could feasibly specify in legislation the powers of a revised Upper Chamber, for example by restricting the selection of ministers to the House of Commons.  However, the establishing of joint legislative committees to reconcile competing drafts of bills, as used in the United States, would further enhance the democratic functionality of Parliament.
With Clegg’s speech serving as a reminder that reform of the House of Lords remains a primary liberal concern, the opportunity for streamlining the structure of the Chamber as well as its composition, is one that should not be passed up.  Making such modifications simultaneously would maximise the efficiency of reform, fulfilling the desire for both democratic legitimacy and expert input into legislation.

29 March 2011

The Quiet Referendum: Egypt on the Road to Democracy

The headlines of the past week have portrayed a sombre and melancholic outlook on world affairs.  Dominated by stories of war in Libya and the accompanying issues of morality and legality, fears of nuclear fallout and pictures of tsunami-induced suffering in Japan, tales of violent retaliation against pro-democracy factions across the Middle East and North Africa, and arguments surrounding the utility of a 1p cut in Britain’s fuel duty, one could be forgiven for accepting the view that all is not well in the world.  This is before the weekend’s protests marches through London – which spawned a splinter group intent on causing unnecessary damage by way of “protest” – even enters the equation.  However, one story that brings a glimpse of hope was buried underneath the despondency, broadly failing to make front page news.
On 19 March, voting took place at 54,000 polling stations across Egypt in a referendum on constitutional reforms stimulated by the revolution that began nearly two months earlier.  This, the first green shoot of change to emerge from the upheavals, should spread hope across the region.  While headline analyses do not necessarily make for enthralling reading – turnout, at 41%, was not particularly high by Western standards, while the 77.2% approval rate suggests that the underlying issues were not overly contentious – delving a little deeper allows the true worth of the occasion to be appreciated.
On the issue of turnout, it is important to remember that Egypt is not a democracy; with no tangible value previously attached to votes, coupled with a franchise that was not universal, the sense of civic duty felt across the democratic world had hitherto failed to develop in Egypt.  Thus, in 2010, when legislative elections were last held, turnout was widely reported to be below 25% (some sources reported figures as low as 10%) while instances of judges reporting local officials fabricating figures were not uncommon.  With the referendum billed as the first vote in Egyptian memory whereby the result is not predetermined, a turnout of 41% amongst an expanded electorate looks more like a triumphant achievement and a step towards realising the ambitions of the revolution.  It is no coincidence that this is the highest recorded turnout in Egyptian polls.  Indeed, US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, declared the peaceful exercising of newly won democratic freedoms on a scale never before seen in the country to be ‘cause for great optimism’.  While Mohamed ElBaradei encountered initial difficulties, tweeting concerns regarding an absence of law and order, the presence of some 37,000 soldiers to assist the police in securing the streets ensured that the vote was generally smooth and calm.  Moreover, in a further contrast to those polls experienced under Mubarak, and 2010 in particular, 17,000 judges were on hand to monitor proceedings.
The constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum created greater divisiveness  amongst reformist opinion than results would tend to suggest.  Many insisted the reforms to be insufficient, arguing that the constitution needs fully re-writing before elections are held.  Others professed general satisfaction with the map for progress, opining that a newly elected parliament should have authority to re-write the constitution.  Prior to the ballot, therefore, debate was roughly divided between liberals and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists and conservatives on the other.  This fits nicely with theories that the Muslim Brotherhood, along with remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), would support the proposals in order to trigger a rapid transition of power away from the military.  This, the argument goes, would allow these groups to capitalise on organisational advantages when contesting elections, enabling their dominance within the next parliament and the ability to draft a new constitution firmly in their interests.  Predicting such a scenario, a statement by groups involved in the January 25 Revolution called for a “no” vote in order to negate the ‘attempt to abort revolution’, with Salma Said calling for the poll to be delayed on the grounds that ‘this referendum is based on a constitution that the revolution was meant to stop’.  Revisions to Article 75, for instance, have caused particular upset, implicitly removing the possibility that any Egyptian citizen can aspire to the presidency by introducing regulations precluding marriage to a non-Egyptian and extending restrictions regarding dual nationality to a candidate’s parents.  In a similar vein, the continuing power of the president has also raised eyebrows.  Critics have highlighted how the amendments allow the president to retain the ability to appoint one-third of the shura council, as well as the upper house of parliament and up to ten members of the lower chamber, while preserving the power to unilaterally dissolve parliament.  Undoubtedly, these powers are not symptomatic of a democratic polity.
However, there are flaws in this line of reasoning, and it must be recognised that the democracy achieved in much of the Western world cannot be manufactured overnight, let alone imposed in perfect fashion.  Primarily, drafting a new constitution prior to elections, with the generals still in power, would necessarily entail some level of military influence, be it in drafting the document or in the appointment of a committee to undertake the task.  Clearly, such a move would fly in the face of all that the revolution stood for; better to have a constitution penned by scholars and elected representatives than one dictated by the military which would potentially accommodate interference by the generals in the political sphere.  While it is true that the amendments voted on in the referendum were drawn up by a judicial panel appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military has consistently expressed a desire to relinquish authority to an elected government as quickly as possible to avoid accusations of attempting to hold onto the reigns of power.
While fears abound that the “yes” vote will be interpreted as tacit approval on articles of the current constitution, granting automatic title to their inclusion in future documents, it is here that revisions to Article 189 are of great significance.  Requiring that a Constitutional Committee be formed within six months of parliament taking office, and with the stipulation that proposals face a public vote, accusations that interim amendments enacted by the referendum are merely cosmetic are effectively neutralised.  Plainly, further changes to meet demands are anticipated, with provision clearly being made to facilitate, rather than merely cater for, constitutional overhaul.  Moreover, had proposed amendments been broader, fears pertaining the “yes” vote as bestowing automatic entitlement to incorporation within any future document would surely have worsened, prompting claims of excessive military involvement.  In this respect, the military faced a “lose-lose” situation.  Similarly, claims that presidential powers would remain unreformed are mistaken.  The revised Article 77, for example, imposes a limit of two four-year presidential terms – a rare restriction across the Arab world – while Article 139 mandates that a vice president be appointed within sixty days.  Furthermore, the president’s right to use military courts would also be cancelled, while Article 88 ensures full judicial oversight of electoral processes.  Crucially, Article 76 opens elections to greater competition, enabling independent candidates to stand alongside those from established parties.  Also, importantly, in a state currently without a president, those retained powers presently serve no purpose.  Revisions to Articles 77 and 139, by this reading, serve as a safeguard only, confirming the military’s desire for stable, civilian-led governance.
Importantly, Article 75 aside, there has been little by way of complaint regarding the direction of reform (and even revisions to Article 75, if read to be a temporary measure designed to apply in the next presidential poll only, could be interpreted as an insurance policy for Egyptian self-determination).  The primary grievance has instead been the view that the short turnaround time will favour Islamists and players associated with the former regime; the weeks that have passed since Mubarak was ousted have not, in the opinion of many activists, been sufficient to reverse the decades of oppression encountered and the distortions to political life that this produced.  Nor will a few months be adequate for new parties to organise and compete effectively in legislative elections.  While it is true that the Brotherhood and the NDP were the primary sources of support for the amendments, this should not be interpreted as anything other than the professed desire for democratic stability.  Undoubtedly, the size of the “yes” vote confirms that these groups continue to exude considerable influence, though this cannot be grounds for suspecting ulterior motives; the true concern should rest with alternative of prolonged military rule and the prospect of sustained military intervention, not with efforts to enact a transition to civilian governance at the earliest opportunity.  As Mostafa Hussein points out, delaying elections through fear of Brotherhood and/or NDP success ‘would be like delaying the World Cup because you are worried Brazil will win’.  Accordingly, in an effort to reassure those unconvinced, Muhammad Abbas, a prominent young Brother, openly professed that the movement hopes to get a third of the seats in the new parliament (contesting perhaps 40%), desiring a broad alliance comprising secular socialists, liberals and Christians alike.  Moreover, the Brotherhood will not put up a candidate for president.  This outlook was confirmed by Mohamed el-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, who professed that the movement would be reserved in their political undertakings ‘until the time there are forces that can compete.  At that point, we will take part in the competition’.
Any effort to delay the transition from military rule to civilian government would be counterintuitive to the premise of the revolution.  Ideally, with presidential powers being only partly tempered, a new constitution would be penned and enacted by a newly elected parliament prior to presidential polls, thereby circumventing the entire issue of amendments not going far enough.  However, such an outcome is unlikely.  As such, installing a civilian president is inherently less objectionable from a democratic perspective than retaining military rule, particularly given the penchant of generals in the region for prolonged political activity – Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, let us not forget, tasted governmental power as minister of defence under Mubarak for some twenty years, perhaps adding to the urgency surrounding transition.  The “yes” vote, therefore, while on amendments that perhaps do not go as far as they could, should be read as a beacon of hope in a sea of turmoil.  Perhaps the upheaval and turmoil have been worthwhile.
*UPDATE*
  • On 23 March, in a crucial step towards reinvigorating political life in Egypt, a law easing the restrictions that distorted political life was passed, allowing the formation of new political parties that will be able to compete in legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place later this year.  The law is expected to result in a multitude of new parties, opening up real political choice in the country for the first time.  Amongst the new parties is likely to be the Freedom and Justice Party, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood.
  • On 28 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced legislative elections are to be held in September, with emergency laws being lifted prior to the polls.  This gives parties, many of whom were crushed under Mubarak, some five months to prepare for the first free elections in decades.  However, Mamdouh Shaheen, a member of the Council, said that a date had yet to be set for presidential elections.  With power not being transferred to the civilian-led government until after presidential polls, the military’s initial target of transition within six months is destined to be missed.  However, this raises hopes that a new constitution can be approved prior to a president taking over.

14 March 2011

Nick Clegg’s Leadership and the Health of the Coalition

Amidst chants of ‘shame on you for turning blue’ outside the Sheffield City Hall venue this weekend, Nick Clegg addressed the LibDem Spring Conference.  Throughout, he maintained that the party – which he has led since 2007 – will ‘never lose their soul’ and that, despite assuming the office of Deputy Prime Minister, he has not changed ‘one bit’.  While Clegg attempted to reassert the individuality and independence of the LibDems in the build-up to May’s local elections, dubiously proclaiming the party to ‘own the freehold to the centre ground of British politics’ and thereby rendering any attack on the Conservatives redundant, the whole affair was dominated by one headline issue that could determine the future direction of the governing coalition: Tory-led reforms of the NHS.
Clegg warned his party at a rally on Friday to ‘get used’ to protesters now that they had become a party of government, defending his party’s record so far through such policies as increasing the income tax threshold.  Indeed, Clegg pleaded with party members to ‘hold their nerve’, insisting that the LibDems are helping to build ‘a new economy from the rubble of the old’.  However, Clegg was dealt a blow on Saturday when delegates voted overwhelmingly in favour of amending controversial proposals to overhaul the NHS, placing GPs in charge of 80% of health service budgets for commissioning services in England while introducing private sector competition into care provision.
The amendment declared many of the proposed reforms to have ‘never been Liberal Democrat policy’, having failed to feature in either the 2010 election manifesto or in the agreed coalition programme.  Indeed, with the plans also failing to feature in the Conservative Party’s manifesto, the coalition agreement had pledged instead to end the very ‘large-scale top-down reorganisations’ that the legislation proposes – a factor which has angered party members and the wider public, neither of whom were consulted on the proposals prior to the general election.  With the vote at the conference constituting the only view that the party as a whole has expressed on the issue, LibDem ministers have necessarily been granted a mandate to seek changes to Andrew Lansley’s tension-causing reforms; Clegg and his ministerial team must convey this message through seeking substantial changes to governmental health policy.  However, while Clegg promised to take delegates’ concerns seriously, vowing to look ‘in detail’ at the proposals during a Q&A session, he refused to be bound by them.  This could have serious implications not only for the party, but also for Clegg’s leadership.
Primarily, further questions will be raised regarding the nature of the coalition; the issue of health reform, when considered alongside ongoing themes such as Trident and electoral reform, represents a further crack in the bond that holds together two parties who, prior to the general election, seemed to be diametrically opposed (barring a desire to prevent Labour retaining power).  Sadiq Khan, the Shadow Justice Minister, has remarked that ‘Nick Clegg is propping up a Tory-led government that is undermining our economy and destroying our communities’.  A failure to respond to the expressed will of the party would seemingly confirm this interpretation of Britain’s coalition rule, doubtlessly prompting further accusations of Clegg becoming increasingly “blue blooded” and calling into question the continued workability of the Conservative-LibDem partnership.  Equally, given the reductions in popular support, rifts within the party itself could prompt calls for Clegg to step aside as party leader, or even contribute to a potential split in the party.  While such outcomes are not immediate threats, owing largely to the party’s ascendency to the position of co-governing party, disgruntlement and disaffection within party ranks is unsustainable if the LibDems are serious about maintaining this rank.
To his credit, Clegg, in his speech to the conference, vowed not to let the ‘profit motives drive a coach and horses through the NHS’, pledging to pursue reform but not privatisation.  Baroness Williams rightly described the reorganisation as ‘stealth privatisation’: with private companies looking to ‘cherry pick’ profitable services rather than treat patients according to need, the NHS would be privatised via the back door.  With most profitable sections of the health service likely to be the first to be tied up, the viability of what remains of the NHS will be somewhat compromised.  Thus, reforms would not only damage the holistic nature of the health service and the efficiencies that this produces, but would place the very existence of the NHS itself at risk.  Furthermore, by placing GPs in charge of commissioning services, there arises a potential conflict of interest: the incentive for rapid and effective treatment is arguably diminished under a system incorporating private competition, with unscrupulous GPs potentially being more concerned with protecting a budget than providing first class healthcare for patients.
Facing growing public and professional discontent – the BMA is scheduled to meet to discuss the reforms, while 38 Degrees collected in excess of 80,000 signatures against the proposed reforms over the weekend – Lansley signalled a willingness to make concessions.  Speaking after the LibDem vote, he suggested that reforms were not set in stone, maintaining that ‘[o]ur proposals are always under review’.  However, despite these overtures, Downing Street has ruled out making ‘significant’ changes to the proposals.  With no agreement being discussed prior to the formation of the coalition, MPs are under no obligation to back Tory-led reforms – the passage of the proposals through parliament without substantial modifications and alterations being imposed is thus by no means guaranteed.  However, Clegg’s inability to assert any meaningful influence in stimulating a government rethink on such a high profile issue that has little by way of mandate within his party could spell disaster for the LibDems: Clegg has been portrayed to be, at best, a weak leader who values power over principle; at worst, as having Conservative tendencies that are ideologically incompatible with the outlook of the party he leads.
Highlighting the discontent with the party, the LibDems, for the second time in as many weeks, lost ground in an electoral contest, falling from first place to third in a council by-election at Burnley Borough (the LibDems also took the Commons seat in 2010).  Labour scored another landslide victory, with winning candidate Beatrice Foster gaining an 11.8% swing compared to last May’s polls.  The BNP came second, though failied to repeat the performance of 2002 when they returned a councillor in the ward.  If such trends continue into May’s local elections, as is widely expected, greater pressure will be placed on Clegg’s leadership and the feasibility of the coalition.