When European foreign ministers met in Brussels last week, the agenda was dominated by discussion of measures to be taken against Iran. Such considerations were primarily a response to an IAEA report, released in early November, suggesting that activities in the Republic indicate the conducting of tests necessary for the ‘development of a nuclear device’. However, the magnitude of such discussions was undoubtedly elevated by the recent assault on the British embassy in Tehran, which has been asserted by senior figures to have been state-supported and has accordingly been interpreted as a direct attack on Western interests.
Despite continued protestations from Tehran that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes only, Britain has been particularly keen to impose further sanctions. The storming of Britain’s embassy has done little to remedy an already delicate situation: Iranian diplomats were expelled from London on 2 December in response to the attack, with British diplomats from Tehran being similarly evacuated, while an announcement was made on 22 November that Britain was severing ‘all financial ties with Iran’. As a result, Iran became the first country to have its entire banking sector cut off from UK financial institutions, being denigrated from all sides in the process amidst growing concern regarding Tehran’s increasingly secretive behaviour and political infighting.
The Iranian parliament (majlis) responded by voting, with a large majority, to downgrade diplomatic relations with the UK, effectively expelling Britain’s newly appointed ambassador, Dominick Chilcott. In so doing, Tehran is teetering towards the diplomatic wilderness. While sustaining diplomatic relations would arguably not be enough to avert mounting tensions, let alone definitively resolve the nuclear impasse, such outcomes appear markedly less likely in their absence.
This situation has potential diplomatic implications beyond Iranian borders. Prior to the recent restructuring of relations, Britain had played a frontline role in efforts to manoeuvre Iran into conforming with internationally agreed nuclear protocols. While foreign minister William Hague insists that British-Iranian relations have not been cut completely, with the possibility remaining of dialogue at international meetings as occurs between Iran and the US, former minister Mark Malloch-Brown observes that London’s role in negotiations will, in all probability, shrink significantly. By necessity, being less well-informed than previously, Britain will cease to be the primary point of contact for other nations; Britain, without an embassy to remain in the loop, will become a ‘bystander’, and a check on Iranian actions will be lost.
Elsewhere, confirming widespread objection, France, Germany and the Netherlands all recalled their respective ambassadors from Tehran for consultations on the developing situation. Italy and Sweden both summoned Iranian ambassadors, while Norway temporarily closed its embassy in Tehran, citing security concerns. Hillary Clinton declared that the US ‘condemns this attack in the strongest possible terms’, describing the events in Tehran as ‘an affront not only to the British people but also the international community’. Thus, while the storming of the British embassy was a response to the decision to impose further sanctions over Iran’s nuclear programme, the move could have boomeranged: many Western countries may now be persuaded that more rigorous measures are required.
Bernard Valero, a spokesman for the French foreign ministry, announced that President Sarkozy had taken the initial step of proposing a freezing of the Iranian Central Bank’s assets and banning oil imports from the Republic – a notion that has Hague’s support as part of a package prescribing further punitive measures and an intensification of existing sanctions. Such measures are an obvious extension of current restrictions placed on Tehran, aiming to introduce further obstacles in an economic climate that is already difficult for Iran to operate in. However, with the developing eurozone debt crisis and parts of Europe on the verge of another recession, the potential for increased crude oil prices as the result of an EU oil embargo render such a strategy highly contentious.
The latest IAEA report reaffirms suspicions surrounding the potential for hostile ambitions to be underpinning nuclear developments in the Republic, providing greater detail than previously available. Alarmingly, the report states that Tehran has undertaken activities ‘relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device’. Indeed, some such undertakings, notably experiments on detonating a nuclear weapon and techniques with which to adapt a device to fit into the nose-section of a missile, are condemned as useful only in the pursuit of such an end. While this is not conclusive proof that Iran has made progress towards successfully weaponising these technologies, such signs cast an ominous shadow over the underlying intent. Regardless of persistent assurances to the contrary, Tehran’s prior record of concealing the enrichment programme continues to drive suspicion. As long as such ambiguity exists, relations with the West will remain hesitant.
Nonetheless, the IAEA report failed to convince officials in Beijing, while Moscow dismissed the sanctions as ‘seriously [complicating] efforts for constructive dialogue with Tehran’. With China and Russia remaining unwilling to allow deeper UN sanctions to be imposed, the inconsistency with which the sanctions regime is applied is gradually deepening. Indeed, Iran’s strengthening ties with Beijing, primarily based around energy, encourage sanctions to be sidestepped. In this regard, the direction and pace of development depends on political factors as much as on technological constraints.
Mehdi Ghazanfari, Iran’s trade minister, described sanctions as ‘a lose-lose game’ with all concerned making a loss, with the West standing to ‘lose an appealing market‘ through failing to invest in Iranian oil projects. Rostam Qasemi, Iran’s oil minister, further suggested that Iran was willing to use oil as a political tool. However, such concealed threats will likely be difficult to act upon. Primarily, Iran is not capable of slowing production without OPEC co-operation – other OPEC members would willingly pick up any slack to maintain output levels. Similarly, despite Mehdi Mehdizadeh, a majlis member, claiming that oil price rises would result if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, it is important to recognise that Oman, not Iran, is responsible for controlling the Strait. Ultimately, Tehran does not have the authority to carry through this threat unilaterally, and lacks the necessary support for a collective effort at disrupting supply. Equally, to do so would represent an ill-targeted response, impacting upon non-Western consumers and severely constraining oil income, particularly in emerging Asian markets.
The measures emerging from the meeting of EU foreign ministers were relatively weak, continuing with a sanctions regime that has thus far failed to entice Tehran back to the negotiating table while failing to agree an oil embargo. This will do little to resolve tensions and restore diplomatic relations. However, with the Iranian issue firmly back on the agenda, and rumours of pre-emptive invasion led by Tel Aviv or Washington gaining ground since the IAEA report was released, this is unlikely to be the final scenario. Accordingly, the need to push for a diplomatic solution has increased – a failure to do so could result in yet further turmoil in the Middle East, be it in the shape of direct conflict or the reincarnation of nuclear arms racing in response to a nuclear armed Iran.
