‘The world is safer. It is a better place’. With these words, Barack Obama announced that US forces had successfully erased Osama bin Laden from atop the list of America’s most wanted men. Undoubtedly, many throughout the West, and in the US in particular, will feel a curious mixture of liberation and satisfaction: the man responsible for masterminding the 9/11 atrocities and casting a permanent shadow across US foreign policy has, after a decade of defying the $25 million bounty placed upon him, been brought to justice. The timing could be politically salient for Obama, removing focus from America’s floundering economy and bolstering confidence in the President as commander-in-chief. With Republicans traditionally seen as more hawkish on issues of defence and national security, the Democrats will likely score points with the electorate for seeing through Bush’s promise to capture bin Laden, dead or alive. This may well transpire to be the defining moment of the Obama presidency, and could secure his tenure in the White House for a second term. However, the circumstances surrounding the ordeal raise many questions that need to be addressed.
Primarily, the compound in Abbottabad where the bin Laden’s final moments played out is situated just several hundred metres from Pakistan’s Kakul Military Academy – the equivalent to Sandhurst or West Point. Equally, the city also plays host to the headquarters of Pakistan’s Northern Army Corps 2nd Division. Situated within Abbottabad's military district, the area would have experienced a constant and significant military presence. Indeed, Pakistan’s army chief has been noted to be a regular visitor to the Kakul academy. Add to this the conspicuous security measures fortifying the compound (walls reaching 18ft high, many topped with barbed wire; numerous security cameras; reinforced security gates) and the reclusive behaviour of the residents within, and concerns over how bin Laden was able to remain undetected are inevitable. With John Brennan, Obama’s counter-terrorism adviser, suggesting that bin Laden could have been residing in the compound for as long as six years, similar suspicions emerge concerning how the impression of continual perambulation was peddled so successfully. Bin Laden’s ability to disguise himself directly under the noses of Pakistani intelligence, amidst firm denials of his location within their territory, asks difficult questions about precisely how much such officials actually knew of his location; Pakistani intelligence was either ignorant to his presence, corrupted into maintaining silence, or complicit in hiding his whereabouts to provide future leverage over America and her allies. All are troubling scenarios. All justify US inclinations to keep Pakistani intelligence in the dark.
Pakistan’s President, Asif ali Zardari, insists that bin Laden’s killing in Pakistani territory does not signal an inability to tackle terrorism. Indeed, US officials acknowledge that Pakistani officialdom shared intelligence that contributed to the all-important tracing of bin Laden’s trusted courier, with Zardari claiming Pakistan to be ‘perhaps the world’s greatest victim of terrorism’, having ‘as much reason to despise al-Qaeda as any nation’. Foreign Minister Salman Bashir described the fight against terrorism as Pakistan’s ‘number one priority’. Implicit distrust on behalf of the US in withholding intelligence concerning bin Laden’s whereabouts will not, therefore, be taken well; an already tense relationship is likely to become all the more difficult to manage. The incursion of US forces onto Pakistani soil, as with the increasing number of US drone strikes, has already been condemned by Pervez Musharraf as ‘a violation of [Pakistani] sovereignty’. Though the US administration has stopped short of directly accusing Pakistan of harbouring bin Laden, Brennan has suggested it to be ‘inconceivable’ the he ‘did not have a support system in the country’. Future cooperation in the fight against terrorism may be hampered as a result.
Despite bin Laden’s removal, claims pertaining to the implosion of al-Qaeda are premature; in the short term at least, the danger of retaliatory terrorist attacks seeking retribution is liable to increase. While it is true that al-Qaeda, and terrorists of a similar vein, do not need enticement to launch attacks, Western leaders are undoubtedly correct in urging extra vigilance in the coming weeks and months as affiliated groups seek to soothe the hurt caused by the loss of their esteemed commander and to assert their continued capacity to disrupt stability.
In the long term, the displacement of bin Laden is likely to have negligible impact; while he was the charismatic idol to whom al-Qaeda members pledged allegiance, he had not played a frontline role in al-Qaeda’s iniquitous activities for some time. Indeed, al-Qaeda is infamous for its organisational structure, or lack thereof; affiliates and “franchises”, not to mention numerous local jihadi groups, operate across the Middle East and North Africa with great autonomy from any notional central leadership. For instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under the leadership of Nasser al Wahayshi and Anwar al Awlaki, were responsible for instigating such terrorist plots as the Fort Hood shootings and the failed Christmas Day “underpants bomber”, as well as efforts to blow up Chicago-bound cargo planes with explosives concealed in printer cartridges. Bin Laden’s death will do little to alter such terrorist gameplans. That the Abbottabad compound was without internet and telephone connections confirms his detachment from any operational command.
Nonetheless, bin Laden was able to retain his appeal to radicals, influencing Muslims of all ages with deluded calls of jihad through his sermons and statements. Such an ability to inspire will not, however, be lost in death. In this respect, while many in the West view his demise as a major turning point in the war against terrorism, the truth may be that bin Laden’s passing is of greater significance to his adversaries than to his adherents. While the slaying of bin Laden represents an operational success, the consequences for al-Qaeda are likely to be limited. Arguably, the popularity of pro-democracy revolutions that have swept across the region since the turn of the year have anyway rendered al-Qaeda politically defunct, severely restricting al-Qaeda’s realm of influence.
Inevitably, conspiracy theories abound, including the suggestion that bin Laden was killed not in Abbottabad, but along the mountainous border with Afghanistan. The gunfight, the theory runs, was then staged in the dark to embarrass Pakistan’s leaders, with the burial of bin Laden’s body at sea proclaimed to be a convenient cover story. Such accusations are unfortunate; while rejoicing in the death of another is immoral at best, to profess subterfuge and deceit detracts from what is otherwise a triumphant moment in the American psyche, providing some form of closure to a macabre chapter in the war against terrorism. It remains unclear as to whether the US administration will pander to popular opinion and release photos of Bin Laden's remains and DNA evidence used in his identification. However, the delays in doing so will doubtlessly be criticised as having allowed time for evidence to be doctored, perpetuating the cycle.
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