The headlines of the past week have portrayed a sombre and melancholic outlook on world affairs. Dominated by stories of war in Libya and the accompanying issues of morality and legality, fears of nuclear fallout and pictures of tsunami-induced suffering in Japan, tales of violent retaliation against pro-democracy factions across the Middle East and North Africa, and arguments surrounding the utility of a 1p cut in Britain’s fuel duty, one could be forgiven for accepting the view that all is not well in the world. This is before the weekend’s protests marches through London – which spawned a splinter group intent on causing unnecessary damage by way of “protest” – even enters the equation. However, one story that brings a glimpse of hope was buried underneath the despondency, broadly failing to make front page news.
On 19 March, voting took place at 54,000 polling stations across Egypt in a referendum on constitutional reforms stimulated by the revolution that began nearly two months earlier. This, the first green shoot of change to emerge from the upheavals, should spread hope across the region. While headline analyses do not necessarily make for enthralling reading – turnout, at 41%, was not particularly high by Western standards, while the 77.2% approval rate suggests that the underlying issues were not overly contentious – delving a little deeper allows the true worth of the occasion to be appreciated.
On the issue of turnout, it is important to remember that Egypt is not a democracy; with no tangible value previously attached to votes, coupled with a franchise that was not universal, the sense of civic duty felt across the democratic world had hitherto failed to develop in Egypt. Thus, in 2010, when legislative elections were last held, turnout was widely reported to be below 25% (some sources reported figures as low as 10%) while instances of judges reporting local officials fabricating figures were not uncommon. With the referendum billed as the first vote in Egyptian memory whereby the result is not predetermined, a turnout of 41% amongst an expanded electorate looks more like a triumphant achievement and a step towards realising the ambitions of the revolution. It is no coincidence that this is the highest recorded turnout in Egyptian polls. Indeed, US Ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, declared the peaceful exercising of newly won democratic freedoms on a scale never before seen in the country to be ‘cause for great optimism’. While Mohamed ElBaradei encountered initial difficulties, tweeting concerns regarding an absence of law and order, the presence of some 37,000 soldiers to assist the police in securing the streets ensured that the vote was generally smooth and calm. Moreover, in a further contrast to those polls experienced under Mubarak, and 2010 in particular, 17,000 judges were on hand to monitor proceedings.
The constitutional amendments proposed in the referendum created greater divisiveness amongst reformist opinion than results would tend to suggest. Many insisted the reforms to be insufficient, arguing that the constitution needs fully re-writing before elections are held. Others professed general satisfaction with the map for progress, opining that a newly elected parliament should have authority to re-write the constitution. Prior to the ballot, therefore, debate was roughly divided between liberals and secularists on the one hand, and Islamists and conservatives on the other. This fits nicely with theories that the Muslim Brotherhood, along with remnants of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), would support the proposals in order to trigger a rapid transition of power away from the military. This, the argument goes, would allow these groups to capitalise on organisational advantages when contesting elections, enabling their dominance within the next parliament and the ability to draft a new constitution firmly in their interests. Predicting such a scenario, a statement by groups involved in the January 25 Revolution called for a “no” vote in order to negate the ‘attempt to abort revolution’, with Salma Said calling for the poll to be delayed on the grounds that ‘this referendum is based on a constitution that the revolution was meant to stop’. Revisions to Article 75, for instance, have caused particular upset, implicitly removing the possibility that any Egyptian citizen can aspire to the presidency by introducing regulations precluding marriage to a non-Egyptian and extending restrictions regarding dual nationality to a candidate’s parents. In a similar vein, the continuing power of the president has also raised eyebrows. Critics have highlighted how the amendments allow the president to retain the ability to appoint one-third of the shura council, as well as the upper house of parliament and up to ten members of the lower chamber, while preserving the power to unilaterally dissolve parliament. Undoubtedly, these powers are not symptomatic of a democratic polity.
However, there are flaws in this line of reasoning, and it must be recognised that the democracy achieved in much of the Western world cannot be manufactured overnight, let alone imposed in perfect fashion. Primarily, drafting a new constitution prior to elections, with the generals still in power, would necessarily entail some level of military influence, be it in drafting the document or in the appointment of a committee to undertake the task. Clearly, such a move would fly in the face of all that the revolution stood for; better to have a constitution penned by scholars and elected representatives than one dictated by the military which would potentially accommodate interference by the generals in the political sphere. While it is true that the amendments voted on in the referendum were drawn up by a judicial panel appointed by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military has consistently expressed a desire to relinquish authority to an elected government as quickly as possible to avoid accusations of attempting to hold onto the reigns of power.
While fears abound that the “yes” vote will be interpreted as tacit approval on articles of the current constitution, granting automatic title to their inclusion in future documents, it is here that revisions to Article 189 are of great significance. Requiring that a Constitutional Committee be formed within six months of parliament taking office, and with the stipulation that proposals face a public vote, accusations that interim amendments enacted by the referendum are merely cosmetic are effectively neutralised. Plainly, further changes to meet demands are anticipated, with provision clearly being made to facilitate, rather than merely cater for, constitutional overhaul. Moreover, had proposed amendments been broader, fears pertaining the “yes” vote as bestowing automatic entitlement to incorporation within any future document would surely have worsened, prompting claims of excessive military involvement. In this respect, the military faced a “lose-lose” situation. Similarly, claims that presidential powers would remain unreformed are mistaken. The revised Article 77, for example, imposes a limit of two four-year presidential terms – a rare restriction across the Arab world – while Article 139 mandates that a vice president be appointed within sixty days. Furthermore, the president’s right to use military courts would also be cancelled, while Article 88 ensures full judicial oversight of electoral processes. Crucially, Article 76 opens elections to greater competition, enabling independent candidates to stand alongside those from established parties. Also, importantly, in a state currently without a president, those retained powers presently serve no purpose. Revisions to Articles 77 and 139, by this reading, serve as a safeguard only, confirming the military’s desire for stable, civilian-led governance.
Importantly, Article 75 aside, there has been little by way of complaint regarding the direction of reform (and even revisions to Article 75, if read to be a temporary measure designed to apply in the next presidential poll only, could be interpreted as an insurance policy for Egyptian self-determination). The primary grievance has instead been the view that the short turnaround time will favour Islamists and players associated with the former regime; the weeks that have passed since Mubarak was ousted have not, in the opinion of many activists, been sufficient to reverse the decades of oppression encountered and the distortions to political life that this produced. Nor will a few months be adequate for new parties to organise and compete effectively in legislative elections. While it is true that the Brotherhood and the NDP were the primary sources of support for the amendments, this should not be interpreted as anything other than the professed desire for democratic stability. Undoubtedly, the size of the “yes” vote confirms that these groups continue to exude considerable influence, though this cannot be grounds for suspecting ulterior motives; the true concern should rest with alternative of prolonged military rule and the prospect of sustained military intervention, not with efforts to enact a transition to civilian governance at the earliest opportunity. As Mostafa Hussein points out, delaying elections through fear of Brotherhood and/or NDP success ‘would be like delaying the World Cup because you are worried Brazil will win’. Accordingly, in an effort to reassure those unconvinced, Muhammad Abbas, a prominent young Brother, openly professed that the movement hopes to get a third of the seats in the new parliament (contesting perhaps 40%), desiring a broad alliance comprising secular socialists, liberals and Christians alike. Moreover, the Brotherhood will not put up a candidate for president. This outlook was confirmed by Mohamed el-Beltagi, a Brotherhood leader, who professed that the movement would be reserved in their political undertakings ‘until the time there are forces that can compete. At that point, we will take part in the competition’.
Any effort to delay the transition from military rule to civilian government would be counterintuitive to the premise of the revolution. Ideally, with presidential powers being only partly tempered, a new constitution would be penned and enacted by a newly elected parliament prior to presidential polls, thereby circumventing the entire issue of amendments not going far enough. However, such an outcome is unlikely. As such, installing a civilian president is inherently less objectionable from a democratic perspective than retaining military rule, particularly given the penchant of generals in the region for prolonged political activity – Field Marshal Mohammed Tantawi, let us not forget, tasted governmental power as minister of defence under Mubarak for some twenty years, perhaps adding to the urgency surrounding transition. The “yes” vote, therefore, while on amendments that perhaps do not go as far as they could, should be read as a beacon of hope in a sea of turmoil. Perhaps the upheaval and turmoil have been worthwhile.
*UPDATE*
- On 23 March, in a crucial step towards reinvigorating political life in Egypt, a law easing the restrictions that distorted political life was passed, allowing the formation of new political parties that will be able to compete in legislative and presidential elections scheduled to take place later this year. The law is expected to result in a multitude of new parties, opening up real political choice in the country for the first time. Amongst the new parties is likely to be the Freedom and Justice Party, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood.
- On 28 March, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced legislative elections are to be held in September, with emergency laws being lifted prior to the polls. This gives parties, many of whom were crushed under Mubarak, some five months to prepare for the first free elections in decades. However, Mamdouh Shaheen, a member of the Council, said that a date had yet to be set for presidential elections. With power not being transferred to the civilian-led government until after presidential polls, the military’s initial target of transition within six months is destined to be missed. However, this raises hopes that a new constitution can be approved prior to a president taking over.
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