The United Nations Security Council passed, on 17 March, Resolution 1973. The official aim of the Resolution is to protect Libyan civilians from pro-Gaddafi troops and avert a potential humanitarian catastrophe through ‘the immediate establishment of a ceasefire and a complete end to violence’, calling on Libyan authorities to ‘comply with their obligations under international law’ and to ‘take all measures to protect civilians’. However, with pro-Gaddafi forces continuing their violent onslaught eastwards, coalition forces exercised the provision of Resolution 1973, beginning on 19 March, to ‘take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’.
Various claims relating to ulterior motives of regime change and increasing oil market stability, as well as criticisms concerning an alleged continuation of Western “liberal interventionism” in a Blairite mould, have all been voiced. However, Resolution 1973 does not explicitly call for regime change: French President Sarkozy, who has been at the forefront of operations, opines that it is ‘our duty’ to respond to the ‘anguished appeal’ of the Libyan population in their demands to the right to determine their own destiny. This necessarily entails protecting citizens from the ‘mortal danger’ posed by pro-Gaddafi forces. With Gaddafi perched atop of Libya’s military infrastructure, his removal could be seen as a viable (indeed, for some such as Senator Joe Lieberman, the only viable) means through which to achieve this end, though the issue of whether this amounts to de facto regime change should remain subordinate to the ultimate aim of protecting Libyan civilians. Importantly, in this context, no exit strategy has been confirmed, meaning coalition allied forces have to be prepared to maintain a presence until Gaddafi leaves through one means or another. However, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged on 20 March that the end-game of military action in Libya is ‘very uncertain’ and could indeed end in stalemate: with a no-fly zone successfully imposed, Gaddafi would be unable to mount offensive operations, but revolutionary forces would not have the assets to loosen his grip on power.
The outbreak of fighting was accompanied by a concurrent outbreak of high-minded morality. A spokesman from Russia’s foreign ministry stated that Moscow regretted the decision by the Western powers to take military action, despite giving tacit approval through abstaining at the vote of the UNSC. Similarly, a committee of heads of state requested by the African Union to find solutions to the Libyan crisis, also called for an end to hostilities on Sunday, with Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who chaired the AU panel, declaring that the solution ‘must adhere to the value we place in respecting territorial unity and integrity, as well as the rejection of all foreign military intervention, whatever form it takes’. Meanwhile, Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League – who called, on 12 March, for the UN to impose a no-fly zone on Libya amidst claims that Gaddafi’s regime had ‘lost legitimacy’ as a result of efforts to crush a revolution aiming to remove him from power – claimed that the military action in Libya ‘differs from the goal of imposing a no-fly zone’. However, with the issue of a NFZ having been widely discussed prior to the UNSC vote on 17 March, the practical implications of neutralising Libya’s integrated air defence system were broadly understood prior to action being undertaken. The redoubling of fears concerning the legitimacy of Western actions in enforcing Resolution 1973 have seemingly been caused by a confusion between principles of “preemption” and “prevention”, given that pro-Gaddafi forces had not previously utilised air power in a meaningful way in the suppression of pro-democracy revolutionaries. Such fears, however, are unwarranted.
Post-9/11, preemptive and preventive uses of force have caused much controversy, particularly concerns regarding the moral legitimacy of the latter. The distinction lies in the perceived imminence of attack, though the subjectivity of this measure is a potential flaw – as witnessed prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq when allies such as France contested the alleged evidence of WMD. Traditionally, states (and, by extrapolation, individuals) have been afforded the right to utilise force in self-defence. While this has not customarily allowed for an unqualified right to employ force, there exists no obligation to allow an aggressor to fire first: preemption is therefore a derivative of traditional self-defence when an offensive strike is perceived to be imminent. Prevention, on the other hand, is the response to a presumed threat; action undertaken in anticipation of injurious undertakings that are neither in progress nor on the horizon. Prevention is thus widely perceived as illegitimate on the basis that other responses could first be undertaken, meaning that the vital “last resort” requirement of a just conflict remains unfulfilled.
Clearly, the situation in Libya was desperate. With pro-Gaddafi forces surging eastwards towards Benghazi, having already retaken many towns and former rebel strongholds in bloody and violent battles, the threat posed to civilians was plainly imminent. To be certain, claims pertaining military intervention to be covertly aimed at a protection of Western interests are wide of the mark: with Gaddafi’s forces massacring Libyan citizens, civil war and humanitarian crisis loomed. On this basis, the decision to vote in favour of a UNSC Resolution authorising measures to protect civilians, while excluding a foreign occupation force ‘of any form’, was correct. By the same token, targeting military installations housing air defence mechanisms was a necessary step in enabling the implementation of a NFZ. Not only will this allow coalition forces to protect against air strikes with a diminished risk of being themselves fired at, but has also enabled actions against imminent ground surges given the ambiguity surrounding the proscription of the use of ground forces.
No comments:
Post a Comment