Ken Clarke: Defending the Indefensible?

Justice Secretary Ken Clarke today rejected calls for his resignation amidst controversy surrounding comments pertaining the seriousness of rape, insisting that he was merely describing a ‘longstanding factual situation’.  However, while he pledged to consider his words more carefully in future, Clarke refrained from issuing a public apology, insisting that his comments are being removed from their intended context and that, in his view, ‘all rape is serious’.  He did, however, write a letter of apology to Gabrielle Brown, who had challenged the Justice Secretary during a radio phone-in.

During an interview on BBC Radio 5 Live, Clarke contested reports that the average sentence for rape was a mere five years, suggesting that ‘serious rape’ was punished more heavily.  The Justice Secretary then questioned Victoria Derbyshire’s statement that ‘rape is rape’, contending that: ‘if an 18-year-old has sex with a 15-year-old and she's perfectly willing, that is rape because she is under age … What you and I are talking about is … a man forcibly having sex with a woman and she doesn't want to’.  This, according to Clarke, represents ‘a serious crime’.  While this does, indeed, represent judicial fact (i.e. the circumstances of a crime impact upon the length of any given sentence), critics, including Ed Miliband, have opined that this suggests the existence of ‘other categories of rape’ and marginalises the seriousness of the crime.  Whether this is the case, however, is the subject of debate: recognising, for example, that instances of repeated rape, gang rape, and violent rape will not always share similar circumstances is not the same as denying the profound abhorrence of either crime.  Neither does it necessarily suggest that one is more, or less, serious than another.  Indeed, Clarke’s designation of non-consensual sexual acts as ‘a serious crime’ seemingly indicates that this was not, in fact, his intention.  What is being overlooked in the arguments so far is the detestably low tariff available to judges for such a deplorable crime.

Interestingly, the example cited by Clarke was factually inaccurate, raising questions over the former barrister’s continued competence in his role and potentially giving the Prime Minister grounds to remove him from the Ministry of Justice.  While Miliband’s public calls for Clarke’s resignation render such a move unlikely in the immediate future, a cabinet re-shuffle may well witness the Justice Secretary being transferred elsewhere; the gaffe may have worried Cameron that a liberal-leaning Justice Secretary is not best suited to a Conservative Party traditionally viewed as being tough on law and order.  Clarke’s scheduled appearance on Question Time (from Wormwood Scrubs, no less) may, however, provide an opportunity for the Justice Secretary to regain confidence both within the public and the government.

The Justice Secretary also expressed his disappointment with the Daily Mail for seeking to add ‘sexual excitement’ to their reporting by applying proposals intended for all criminals specifically to cases of rape.  The government, as part of general cost-cutting measures, is currently consulting on plea-bargaining plans to increase sentence reduction to a maximum of 50%, from current limits of 33%.  It is estimated that doing so could free up 3,400 prison places and save some £130m per year by 2015 – 62% of the annual £210m savings the department has to find.  Clarke’s policy proposal, as a result of the association with the early release of sex offenders, may now be dead in the water.  Chris Huhne, however, may be thankful for the distraction.

Theocratic Tensions in Iran

The Jasmine Revolution, born in Tunisia some five moths ago, has spread across North Africa and the Middle East.  While pro-democracy protests and the associated state crackdowns continue, outside interest is steadily waning.  Recent democratic wrangling in Iran, for instance, failed to made front page news, overshadowed by such occasions as the Royal wedding, the events in Pakistan surrounding Osama bin Laden, and questions regarding the stability of the governing coalition as a result of recent electoral outcomes.

In the time since the spawning of the revolutions, only two Arab leaders have been toppled.  While four are under sustained heavy pressure, with UN and NATO military involvement in Libya, dictators are managing to hold on.  The remaining fifteen Arab leaders have been relatively unaffected, experiencing only minor protests.  Despite a strong and encouraging start, the success rate of the protests in terms of enacting reform has been limited.  The next leader to fall may, then, come from outside the Arab world.  Enter Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In contrast to scenarios playing out in Syria, Libya, Bahrain and the like, the threat to President Ahmadinejad’s reign comes not from the outside, but from a power struggle within the establishment itself.  (Tehran has continued to voice support for the government in Damascus amidst accusations of assisting the Assad regime to violently suppress protests – hardly surprising when considering the brutality with which the Green movement was crushed in Iran following the 2009 presidential elections.)  When the president discovered that the minister of intelligence, Heidar Moslehi, had been bugging the offices of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s trusted chief of staff and close personal friend, Moslehi was promptly issued with his marching orders.  However, in a move that effectively disenfranchised Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who dislikes Mashaei’s nationalistic views and socio-cultural liberalism and has previously rejected his candidature for a ministerial role, reinstated Moslehi – a conservative whose outlook is more attuned to that of the establishment.  Angry at Khamenei’s efforts to interfere in the running of the cabinet, Ahmadinejad boycotted his duties for eleven days, skipping two cabinet meetings and cancelling an official visit to Qom.

Rather than a cosmetic shootout concerning the composition of the cabinet, the underlying struggle for power could shake the Islamic Republic to its very foundations.  With Iranian security forces preventing more than a dozen demonstrations since February, Khamenei’s actions appear to have been motivated by self-preservation; with the pro-democracy movement threatening to spill into the republic, the Ayatollah looks to have sought to reassert his dominance, thereby preserving both his position and the political system itself by disempowering a president who has increasingly espoused conceptions of an Iranian state based on nationalism and free from clerical influence.  However, in doing so, Khamenei runs the risk of further agitating pro-democracy sentiment; with the Supreme Leader being above politics, and therefore being unelected, any notion of democratic legitimacy provided by an elected president (the 2009 election was heavily criticised and widely condemned) has been trampled.  In the unlikely event that the Jasmine Revolution successfully penetrates the Islamic Republic, the repercussions for the regime could be more intense as a result.

Ahmadinejad, owing to his increasingly nationalistic outlook and preference for the Revolutionary Guards as a guiding force, is understood by senior clerics as posing a sincere threat to the republic’s composition.  The president’s visions of guiding Iran in a new direction, reconfiguring the internal distribution of power in favour of the elected leader, coupled with a series of documentary films portraying Ahmadinejad as the embodiment of a mythical religious figure who will accompany the “Hidden Imam” on the Day of Judgement, have given rise to accusations from within the establishment that Ahmadinejad is influenced by religious “deviants” who believe in supernatural powers and djinns (spirits).  This has been divisive for Ahmadinejad, with many supporters of the president backing Khamenei: Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a religious mentor of the president, openly criticised Ahmadinejad, opining that the ‘restoration of anti-clerical thinking could be the next great sedition in this country’ and warning that rebelling against the Supreme Leader was tantamount to ‘apostasy from God’.  Such accusations are inherently harmful to the regime, assigning to the president a religious status transcending that of the clerical establishment and thus questioning the legitimacy of the Iranian regime. 

Nonetheless, with calls for a closed debate on the president’s boycotting of official duties (read: calls for impeachment) being overlooked, the target of the clerics’ displeasure appears to be Mashaei rather than Ahmadinejad.  With Iran’s constitution barring more than two consecutive presidential terms, Ahmadinejad cannot run for office in 2013.  Instead, it seems the president is attempting to groom Mashaei as his successor, though having long claimed not to need the clergy to interpret religious texts for him, many within the clerical establishment have taken the view that it is Mashaei who is the real source of influence.  With the clerical establishment determined to prevent the rise of Mashaei, it appears that the only way in which Ahmadinejad can retain meaningful power is to submit to Khamenei’s will and dispense with Mashaei’s services.

The timing of the affair is unlikely to have been coincidental.  With parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012, Ahmadinejad has a vested interest in controlling the intelligence ministry; with the department being charged with conducting background checks on potential candidates, an opportunity to veto potential challengers and secure a strong majority for backers of the president was undoubtedly a consideration for Ahmadinejad.  In this respect, the president could be the architect of his own downfall, prompting conservatives and clerics alike to band together to safeguard the establishment.  For Geneive Abdo, while Khamenei's victory may have preserved a political system that is not fully understand in the West, crucially, it is one that remains somewhat predictable; the survival of Khamenei and the conservatives once referred to as “hard-liners” by the West is now preferred to the erratic and volatile Ahmadinejad.  With the Ayatollah’s unconditional support no longer a certainty, the president may well see out the remainder of his term as a lame duck.

The AV Referendum: A Wasted Opportunity?

Today the nation goes to the polls in the first nationwide referendum since 1975.  In the past six weeks, both David Cameron and Nick Clegg have returned to their roles as respective party leaders, rather than coalition partners.  The promised maturity was delivered while the campaigns were in their infancy; speeches announcing both “Yes” and “No” campaigns were timed so as not to coincide, partisan mudslinging was absent, and both even agreed that the referendum should select a voting system that promotes democratic fairness.  However, the arguments set out on both sides of the divide, despite aiming to promote a vibrant democracy, have consistently been at odds with one another.  This, unfortunately, resulted in the build-up to polling day being dominated by deceptive factional disparagement, rather than informed discourse concerning the benefits, or otherwise, to be had from each of the systems in question.  Paradoxically, the course of campaigning could itself be a blow for the very democracy that the referendum initially sought to promote.

Take two examples.  Firstly, Chris Huhne, the LibDem energy secretary, recently vented frustration over campaign literature focusing on Clegg’s broken election pledges, opining that Cameron personally ‘had the power to stop these’ by virtue of the Conservatives’ role in financing the “No” lobby.  (Previously, Huhne went so far as to suggest that the “Yes” camp would take legal action amidst allegations of untruths being promulgated by George Osborne.  While the Electoral Commission ruled itself not to have the necessary powers to investigate the contentions, Huhne did not rule out resignation over the issue.)  Secondly, Lord Mandelson suggested that many within the Labour Party were displaying misplaced priorities prior to the ballot, namely ‘a short-term desire to kick Nick Clegg, rather than see the long-term benefit of defeating Cameron’.  It is detestable that support for, or hatred of, an individual representative or partisan grouping should play a central role in determining the conduct of future elections; personality politics should not be allowed to intrude on matter of such constitutional significance.

Hidden within the name-calling, backbiting, and claims of attempting to defend the indefensible, a significant political issue is at stake.  The serious debate surrounding the referendum should not be ignored.  The “Yes” campaign has variously argued that the AV system makes (would-be) representatives work harder, minimising so-called “safe” seats while ensuring that every vote counts.  Equally, weight has been assigned to the assertion that AV is a relatively simple upgrade to the current FPTP system, potentially providing a steppingstone towards fully proportional representation.  In contrast, the “No” camp has countered that AV would place more power in the hands of politicians, arguing change to be expensive not only financially, but also ideologically; adopting AV, the argument runs, would lead to the democratic principle of “one man, one vote” being abandoned in the long grass.  Who, then, is right?

Clearly, arguments exist on both sides.  Some, however, are more rational than others, while still more are founded upon flawed logic.  A study by the New Economics Foundation has, for instance, estimated that AV would only marginally reduce, rather than abolish, safe seats – 16% rather than 13% of seats would typically change hands at elections under the alternative vote.  (Interestingly, the notion of the safe seat is often misconstrued; there is nothing inherently undemocratic about a candidate or party being able to hold a constituency for sustained periods as a result of voter satisfaction.)  Similarly, claims that AV would require all representatives to gain majority support are wide of the mark: the potential for ‘plumping’ under AV would ensure this.  Declarations that voting “yes” will cost in the region of £250 million and, by association, detract from spending on health and defence, are farfetched – expensive vote-counting machinery, while widely used in mayoral elections, is not a requisite of AV, while some £120 million has already been set aside for the next general election (let us not forget that all elections cost money, not just those employing AV; this is a cost of democracy).  Suggestions that a “yes” outcome would result in some voters effectively being able to vote more than once are likewise confused; while secondary preferences would be granted equal weight to first preference votes, detracting from the notion of equality, no voter would be entitled to cast more than one ballot.  This mistake, as made recently by John Humphrys when interviewing Cameron on voting reform, casts an ironic shadow over claims that AV is ‘terribly simple’.  The list goes on.

Whether the electorate will have been able, or, indeed, willing, to see beyond partisan tussling remains to be seen.  What has become obvious, however, is that the suspicions of politicians held by voters are reciprocal; elected representatives forwent the opportunity to engage electors in serious dialogue on the future of British democracy (sustained debate on future proportional representation, for instance, was conspicuously absent) as well as to reverse some of the damage caused to their collective reputation as a result of the expenses scandal.

A Sunday Times/YouGov poll indicated on Sunday a 10-point lead for the “No” camp.  While this is down from 18 points, the lead remains considerable and represents a turnaround from earlier in the campaign.  However, when polling stations opened, the contest was still considered to be wide open.  Indeed, results will not be known for another twenty-four hours.  With national turnout likely to be low despite over 9,000 local council seats also being up for grabs, coupled with the immature campaigning tactics all round, the outcome will be more politicised than political.

Osama’s Demise: Consequences and Questions

‘The world is safer.  It is a better place’.  With these words, Barack Obama announced that US forces had successfully erased Osama bin Laden from atop the list of America’s most wanted men.  Undoubtedly, many throughout the West, and in the US in particular, will feel a curious mixture of liberation and satisfaction: the man responsible for masterminding the 9/11 atrocities and casting a permanent shadow across US foreign policy has, after a decade of defying the $25 million bounty placed upon him, been brought to justice.  The timing could be politically salient for Obama, removing focus from America’s floundering economy and bolstering confidence in the President as commander-in-chief.  With Republicans traditionally seen as more hawkish on issues of defence and national security, the Democrats will likely score points with the electorate for seeing through Bush’s promise to capture bin Laden, dead or alive.  This may well transpire to be the defining moment of the Obama presidency, and could secure his tenure in the White House for a second term.  However, the circumstances surrounding the ordeal raise many questions that need to be addressed.

Primarily, the compound in Abbottabad where the bin Laden’s final moments played out is situated just several hundred metres from Pakistan’s Kakul Military Academy – the equivalent to Sandhurst or West Point.  Equally, the city also plays host to the headquarters of Pakistan’s Northern Army Corps 2nd Division.  Situated within Abbottabad's military district, the area would have experienced a constant and significant military presence.  Indeed, Pakistan’s army chief has been noted to be a regular visitor to the Kakul academy.  Add to this the conspicuous security measures fortifying the compound (walls reaching 18ft high, many topped with barbed wire; numerous security cameras; reinforced security gates) and the reclusive behaviour of the residents within, and concerns over how bin Laden was able to remain undetected are inevitable.  With John Brennan, Obama’s counter-terrorism adviser, suggesting that bin Laden could have been residing in the compound for as long as six years, similar suspicions emerge concerning how the impression of continual perambulation was peddled so successfully.  Bin Laden’s ability to disguise himself directly under the noses of Pakistani intelligence, amidst firm denials of his location within their territory, asks difficult questions about precisely how much such officials actually knew of his location; Pakistani intelligence was either ignorant to his presence, corrupted into maintaining silence, or complicit in hiding his whereabouts to provide future leverage over America and her allies.  All are troubling scenarios.  All justify US inclinations to keep Pakistani intelligence in the dark.

Pakistan’s President, Asif ali Zardari, insists that bin Laden’s killing in Pakistani territory does not signal an inability to tackle terrorism.  Indeed, US officials acknowledge that Pakistani officialdom shared intelligence that contributed to the all-important tracing of bin Laden’s trusted courier, with Zardari claiming Pakistan to be ‘perhaps the world’s greatest victim of terrorism’, having ‘as much reason to despise al-Qaeda as any nation’.  Foreign Minister Salman Bashir described the fight against terrorism as Pakistan’s ‘number one priority’.  Implicit distrust on behalf of the US in withholding intelligence concerning bin Laden’s whereabouts will not, therefore, be taken well; an already tense relationship is likely to become all the more difficult to manage.  The incursion of US forces onto Pakistani soil, as with the increasing number of US drone strikes, has already been condemned by Pervez Musharraf as ‘a violation of [Pakistani] sovereignty’.  Though the US administration has stopped short of directly accusing Pakistan of harbouring bin Laden, Brennan has suggested it to be ‘inconceivable’ the he ‘did not have a support system in the country’.  Future cooperation in the fight against terrorism may be hampered as a result.

Despite bin Laden’s removal, claims pertaining to the implosion of al-Qaeda are premature; in the short term at least, the danger of retaliatory terrorist attacks seeking retribution is liable to increase.  While it is true that al-Qaeda, and terrorists of a similar vein, do not need enticement to launch attacks, Western leaders are undoubtedly correct in urging extra vigilance in the coming weeks and months as affiliated groups seek to soothe the hurt caused by the loss of their esteemed commander and to assert their continued capacity to disrupt stability.

In the long term, the displacement of bin Laden is likely to have negligible impact; while he was the charismatic idol to whom al-Qaeda members pledged allegiance, he had not played a frontline role in al-Qaeda’s iniquitous activities for some time.  Indeed, al-Qaeda is infamous for its organisational structure, or lack thereof; affiliates and “franchises”, not to mention numerous local jihadi groups, operate across the Middle East and North Africa with great autonomy from any notional central leadership.  For instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under the leadership of Nasser al Wahayshi and Anwar al Awlaki, were responsible for instigating such terrorist plots as the Fort Hood shootings and the failed Christmas Day “underpants bomber”, as well as efforts to blow up Chicago-bound cargo planes with explosives concealed in printer cartridges.  Bin Laden’s death will do little to alter such terrorist gameplans.  That the Abbottabad compound was without internet and telephone connections confirms his detachment from any operational command.

Nonetheless, bin Laden was able to retain his appeal to radicals, influencing Muslims of all ages with deluded calls of jihad through his sermons and statements.  Such an ability to inspire will not, however, be lost in death.  In this respect, while many in the West view his demise as a major turning point in the war against terrorism, the truth may be that bin Laden’s passing is of greater significance to his adversaries than to his adherents.  While the slaying of bin Laden represents an operational success, the consequences for al-Qaeda are likely to be limited.  Arguably, the popularity of pro-democracy revolutions that have swept across the region since the turn of the year have anyway rendered al-Qaeda politically defunct, severely restricting al-Qaeda’s realm of influence.

Inevitably, conspiracy theories abound, including the suggestion that bin Laden was killed not in Abbottabad, but along the mountainous border with Afghanistan.  The gunfight, the theory runs, was then staged in the dark to embarrass Pakistan’s leaders, with the burial of bin Laden’s body at sea proclaimed to be a convenient cover story.  Such accusations are unfortunate; while rejoicing in the death of another is immoral at best, to profess subterfuge and deceit detracts from what is otherwise a triumphant moment in the American psyche, providing some form of closure to a macabre chapter in the war against terrorism.  It remains unclear as to whether the US administration will pander to popular opinion and release photos of Bin Laden's remains and DNA evidence used in his identification.  However, the delays in doing so will doubtlessly be criticised as having allowed time for evidence to be doctored, perpetuating the cycle.