The Dawn of an Arab Summer?

Little over ten months since Mohamed Bouazizi, a former Tunisian market trader, self-immolated and sparked regional uprisings, the Arab Spring is showing its most positive signs yet of blossoming into a late Arab Summer.

On 23 October, voters across Tunisia proudly paraded their pigmented fingers as they emerged from polling stations nationwide, verification that they had exercised their democratic rights and the newfound political implications this signifies: this was the first time in generations that the outcome of such a ballot has not been pre-ordained, and is the first election to be held in the region since protests got underway.  That the vote is taking place three months later than originally scheduled owing to problems with voter registration is of itself an indication of the reverence with which democratic rights and freedoms are increasingly being held.  Accordingly, in keeping with the spirit underlying the Jasmine revolution, turnout is anticipated to be high, following enhanced campaigning and freedom of political discussion facilitated by the dismantling of the secret police.  As many in their fifties and sixties reported voting for the first time, engagement is reaching impressive peaks.

The ballot in Tunisia will elect an assembly consisting of 217 representatives, who will in turn appoint a transitional government.  Rather than a permanent governing body, the assembly’s mandate will be limited to a single year; just enough time to construct a new constitution on democratic foundations (and possibly put proposals to a national referendum).  Only then will the future shape of Tunisian democracy become apparent, with the new document detailing future political configurations and mechanisms.

With strong competition from various parties and no one faction expected to produce an overwhelming majority, coupled with a proportionally representative voting system (albeit of the closed list variety), the election holds huge democratic potential.  Furthermore, Ennahdha’s inclusion in the process could further invalidate long-held assertions concerning an ideological incompatibility between Islam and democracy, blazing a trail for other transitional states to follow, and perhaps even swaying opinion within Saudi Arabia in light of the emerging succession crisis.  Fascinating times lie ahead, and the outside world will await the outcome with bated breath; Tunisia is once again in a position to influence the future of the entire region.

No doubt members of Libya’s National Transitional Council will be paying particularly close attention: following the death of Muammar Gaddafi days earlier, the transitional government declared liberation from Benghazi on the same day that polls were held in Tunisia.  Elections for a similar assembly, also tasked with drafting a new constitution and forming a transitional government, are due in Libya within eight months.  Similarly, the drawn-out process of parliamentary elections in Egypt is due to get underway in late-November following delays caused by military foot-dragging and breakdowns in political coalition-building.  Lessons from Tunis would be welcomed in both as green shoots of democracy begin to emerge across the region.

While the vast pockets of pro-Gaddafi support encountered in Libya will complicate the process and cause potential delays, the complete eradication of the regime will likely be advantageous in the longer term; unlike Tunisia, where elements of Ben Ali’s Democratic Constitutional Rally remain, and Egypt where traces of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party persist, embodied by the military’s continued presence and political involvement, Libyans will have the opportunity to build a political infrastructure afresh.  Western nations need to be prepared to offer assistance and advice where needed, but should seek to cultivate a regionally organic arrangement rather than export and impose specific models; room for flexibility is essential if the Arab summer is to reach full bloom and democracy is to persist.

e-Petitions: Power to the People?

News emerged in the past week that MPs will debate the two e-petitions to have successfully amassed 100,000 online signatures.  On 13 October, in the first such debate to materialise from the government’s latest e-democracy experiment, the House will debate controversial calls to remove benefits from those found guilty of involvement in recent riots that swept the country, while on 17 October the topic of discussion will be the somewhat less contentious issue of releasing documents relating to the 1989 Hillsborough disaster.  High speed rail, however, will not feature on the agenda after the petition presented by campaigners against the £34bn project, despite accruing more than the requisite number of signatures, was deemed to be void as only half were gathered online.

In the previous meeting of the Commons Backbench Business Committee, the first since the e-petitions website went live a mere two days prior to the summer recess, no Member broached either of the issues dominating online activity.  Accordingly, the Committee, tasked with discussing the merits of e-petitions surpassing the 100,000 signature mark and deciding whether or not to assign a Parliamentary slot, did not allocate any time on 15 September to their discussion.  Despite far exceeding the levels of online support deemed necessary to trigger a Commons debate, discussion by MPs in the Chamber was effectively postponed until after the Autumn Party Conference season at the earliest.

This failure to act was broadly criticised; claims that omitting to allocate time to debating issues raised through official channels confirm that e-petitions are a light-touch gained momentum.  Furthermore, following the HS2 ruling, others viewed e-petitions as failing in their quest to produce a richer democratic framework, being detached from other forms of participation rather than promoting a joined-up system of participation.  How much truth there is in these assertions will only become clear once the procedures and infrastructure mature, though if history is to be our guide, such allegations may prove correct.  Contrary to contentions that the entire notion cheapens democracy, relegating Parliamentary tradition to ‘X Factor style politics’, such a failure would be a missed opportunity for broadening democratic engagement.

The notion of petitioning Parliament dates back centuries and, in its purer paper form, has long been an accepted means through which to convey opinion to the government of the day.  Digitising the process arguably overcomes logistical barriers posed by narrow localism, encouraging participation in the political realm across a wider geographical area and reinvigorating a little-understood and neglected mechanism through the application of twenty-first century technology.  Indeed, with paper petitions being deposited behind the Speaker’s chair in a plastic bag upon receipt, John Bercow has suggested that placing petitions online will enhance legitimacy and the seriousness with which they are taken, in turn enriching democracy by encouraging participation in the political process.

To be sure, online petitions are not an innovation of the Tory-led coalition; Hollyrood began experimenting with cyber suffrage as early as the turn of the new millennium, while localities such as Bristol and the Royal Borough of Kingston upon Thames joined the progressive e-democrats in 2004.  This is not to mention the Number 10 e-petitions website that was suspended immediately prior to the general election in 2010.  Significantly, according to Fergus Cochrane, clerk to the Public Petitions Committee at the Scottish Parliament, e-petitions now outnumber their paper counterparts, confirming the benefits to be had from providing greater participatory opportunities.  

It is important to recognise that any debate emerging from an online petition is not intended to coerce the government into action: the popularly held belief, propagated by the e-petitions homepage, that e-petitions are a simple means to ‘influence government policy’ is misguided.  This is a reality that the government needs to address in order to avoid disengaging those it seeks to galvanise, having been a primary failing of the previous Number 10 petitions website.

Instead, as noted by Peter Riddell, the underlying objective is to enhance public engagement and facilitate debate on issues of popular importance.  In this respect, e-petitions do not bestow upon the public the direct ability to force the government’s hand, and rightly so.  They do, however, allow a degree of influence over the political agenda and provide an additional channel of involvement.  Such is the nature of representative democracy.  Consequently, given the tight limits on Parliamentary time and the deficiency in the number of days allocated to Backbench Business Committee matters, not every petition achieving the 100,000 signature target will be deemed worthy of a full-length debate; some may be adequately dealt with by a ministerial statement on the issue in the House, while others may not warrant any action.  With this being a logistical necessity rather than a broader indictment of e-petitions, it is unfortunate that this reality brings the e-petitions website dangerously close to the failings of its predecessor.

In an interesting contrast to the Westminster model, the Public Petitions Committee in Scotland offers advice and feedback on issues such as wording and topicality, promoting relevance to government business and maximising the potential for success.  With the Committee reacting to petitions covering issues within the Scottish Parliament's remit rather than relying on the court of public opinion to gauge suitability as per the Westminster interpretation, the Hollyrood model provides greater scope for intelligent and inclusive agenda setting, albeit in a less than democratic fashion.  However, this brings the benefit of avoiding strictly populist issues that often verge on the absurd – the petition on the Number 10 petitions website to install Jeremy Clarkson as PM, receiving almost 50,000 votes, is a prime example.

With e-petitions not handing the electorate the unqualified power to determine the legislative process that many thought the process promised, opining that the entire notion is failing to empower citizens has become an attractive proposition.  Democratic arrangements in Britain,  however, coupled with the already-manic Parliamentary timetable, preclude such an aim.  Nevertheless, in excess of a million digital signatures have thus far been collected, and debates have been scheduled in the Chamber on issues arising directly from e-petitions.  Broadening the scope for participation in such a way undoubtedly strengthens democratic credentials, with the ability to shape the political agenda, and potentially legislative discourse, empowering citizens with greater leverage.  While the system may not be perfect (the arbitrary 100,000 signature requirement, for example, may require future adjustments), any means that promotes participatory potential can only be good for the health of democracy.

Freedom Of Speech In Post-Riot London

Announcing a 30-day blanket ban on marches across five London boroughs (Tower Hamlets, Newham, Waltham Forest, Islington and Hackney), Home Secretary Theresa May yesterday derailed plans for English Defence League (EDL) demonstrations on 3 September.  Following a request from Scotland Yard Acting Commissioner Tim Godwin, May took the decision to ban ‘all marches’ after having ‘carefully considered the legal tests in the Public Order Act and balanced rights to protest against the need to ensure local communities and property are protected’.  Is this a step too far, illegitimately restricting free speech, or is there a genuine call for pre-emptive action on grounds of preventing public disorder?

Adding another dimension to the already thorny trade-off between liberty and security is the similar ban that May sanctioned in Telford on 13 August amidst similar fears of disorder.  The Met, citing receipt of ‘specific intelligence’ which led it to believe that ‘serious public disorder, violence and damage could be caused by the presence of marches in these areas’, suggested that a ban was the most effective avoidance strategy and cemented a dangerous precedent.  With many such demonstrations resulting in some degree of violence, both with opposition demonstrators and amongst EDL sympathisers, the argument that all future EDL demonstrations should be outlawed on similar grounds will gain momentum.  This would be a clear violation of free speech principles; while the outlook being championed may be abhorrent, such a reaction, flying in the face of liberal democratic values, would prove equally objectionable.  Furthermore, drawing attention to the ban not only allows the EDL to portray an image of a subjugated group, but also retracts some of the rope, through prevention of negative press coverage, afforded to the group with which to hang itself.  In this respect, an outright ban appears counterintuitive.

With Stephen Lennon, the EDL's founder (also known by the name Tommy Robinson), proclaiming that the EDL would ‘still show up’ in Tower Hamlets, vowing to hold a static demonstration and ‘have our voices heard’, the potential exists for any disorder to be amplified by the ban.  While a statement on the EDL website claimed that ‘[n]owadays, the anti-extremism aims of our organisation are clear, and there is no reason to think that an EDL demonstration would contain any dangerous elements’, such contentions are easily refuted by Lennon recently being charged with common assault following an altercation at a demonstration.  Similarly, the assertion is fundamentally flawed insofar as the EDL was formed with the specific objective of protesting against the alleged spread of Islamic extremism; with Tower Hamlets playing home to the sizeable East London Mosque and a large Muslim population, any such action is destined to stoke tensions unless it is starved of the oxygen of publicity.  Indeed, Lennon has already acknowledged that ‘the police have told us that it will be the most hostile environment they have seen. … They say marching through there will be absolute suicide’.  The question then arises as to whether a static meeting similar to that which eventually took place in Telford would pose a greater threat of public disorder than the initial demonstration, with the latter at least having the strategic benefit of wayfaring brevity.

It is indisputably true that disorder in London, in the wake of recent events, would be even more unwelcome than usual.  Nonetheless, rumours that budget constraints limiting further police overtime played a part in deliberations, coupled with favourable consideration for a police force under immense strain, would be detestable if proven.  Indeed, with the threat of a static demonstration, about which the Met are powerless to act, a visible police presence will likely be required regardless.   Equally, spurious links between Anders Behring Breivik and the EDL should not be allowed to carry any weight: many a convicted criminal will undoubtedly have (proven) sympathies to legitimate political groupings.

It would appear, then, that Peter Tatchell was accurate in labelling the blanket ban a ‘complete overreaction’, suggesting that such action has the potential to be vastly counter-productive and correctly asserting that anti-democratic groups can only be defeated through ‘exposing… bigoted and violent views’.  (However, his favouring of ‘mass counter protests’ would perhaps be undesirable in this instance, given the history of EDL disorder and the ethnic composition of the area in question.)  Indeed, the key to overcoming such divisive views in the long run is a policy of engagement and education, promoting tolerance of all views and allowing those based on prejudice and intolerance to be shown as such.  As Thomas Jefferson famously declared, ‘error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it’.

Criminal Justice: The Use Of Reasonable Force

Just before midnight on 22 June, four masked men attempted to break into the rear of a house on a quiet cul-de-sac in Salford.  One of the would-be burglars, 27-year-old John Leonard Bennell, was fatally stabbed, dying shortly after having been discovered nearby, abandoned by his accomplices fleeing from the approaching authorities.  The householder, Peter Flanagan, 59, was arrested on suspicion of murder (his son and son’s girlfriend were also initially arrested, though were both released without charge), having telephoned police to alert them to the crime.  Flanagan was later bailed until 25 July.

Chief Superintendent Kevin Mulligan stated that Bennell suffered ‘at least one stab wound’ during an altercation in the house, which involved at least one person from the address and four people breaking in, though Mulligan refused to be drawn on whether the weapon was taken into the property by the intruder or belonged to the householder.  The cause of death was later confirmed to have been a stab wound to the chest.  News of the disturbance has again stimulated discussion regarding the balance of rights between intruder and householder.

The incident in Salford occurred mere hours after David Cameron confirmed families should ‘feel safe in their homes’, promising that homeowners would not be punished for using ‘reasonable force’ to protect themselves and their property.  Seeking to appease public opinion as he announced that controversial proposals concerning plea bargaining are to be scrapped, Cameron said that the new Justice Bill would ‘put beyond doubt that homeowners and small shopkeepers who use reasonable force to defend themselves or their properties will not be prosecuted’.  This pledge will now be put to an immediate test, with the problem of quantifying what is ‘reasonable’ once more being brought to the fore by an encounter that evokes memories of the case of Norfolk farmer Tony Martin.

Current CPS guidelines dictate that anyone in England and Wales can use ‘reasonable force’ to protect themselves, or others, as well as to make a citizen’s arrest or prevent crime.  Similarly, homeowners are safeguarded so long as they act ‘honestly and instinctively’; according to the guidelines, ‘fine judgements’ pertaining to the force employed cannot be expected in the heat of the moment.

To simplify, employing force in self-defence is legally justifiable so long as there is a genuine perceived threat, irrespective of whether this estimation proves to be accurate.  Rightly, homeowners are not required to wait for the smoking gun in defending themselves or their property; to do so would render the homeowner powerless to defend his right to quiet enjoyment of property and potentially produce fatal consequences.  Applying this rule, Flanagan’s arrest is not indicative that he will be charged with an offence.  Instead, this provides an opportunity for law enforcement and prosecution services to establish precisely the chain of events that led to Bennell’s death.

By extrapolation, self-defence can remain reasonable in instances where the intruder dies as a result.  This raises an interesting point alluded to by Mulligan: can a weapon be justifiably used in self-defence only if the attacker is in possession a similar instrument (or if it is the attacker’s weapon that is used against him)?  Morally, such a directive would appear attractive.  However, with no way of confirming whether an intruder is armed, such a precautionary measure is overly prudent: given that an intruder’s presence is necessarily unsolicited and impinges a homeowner’s right to freedom, a default assumption of intent to cause harm or damage is not unreasonable.

Importantly, CPS guidelines require an element of proportionality, warning that prosecution could result from ‘very excessive and gratuitous force’; the 2009 case of Munir and Salem Hussain, for instance, demonstrates that should a homeowner give chase to a fleeing intruder, the reasonableness assessment needs to be recalculated to accommodate the reduced threat posed to the householder.  Equally, the perceived threat emanating from multiple intruders is undoubtedly greater than that posed by a single burglar, thereby vindicating greater force.  This was a factor in the Martin case and will unquestionably be a central consideration in determining whether to prosecute Flanagan.

Clearly, the legal framework concerning reasonable force is inherently subjective, leaving an element of circumstantial consideration for jurors; as no two cases are identical, the principles of the law must be applied to the facts of each case individually.  However, contrary to Cameron’s assertion that protection from prosecution needs to be clearer, the current legal stance evidently favours the householder, permitting the application of force, fatal if necessary, to protect oneself and one’s property.  Correctly so.  While not providing license for unremitting aggression, this is consistent with Cameron’s suggestion, in 2010 when leader of the opposition, that ‘[t]he moment a burglar steps over your threshold and invades your property, with all the threat that gives to you, your family and your livelihood, … they leave their human rights outside’.

Given current knowledge of the facts of the case, to prosecute Flanagan would not appear to be in keeping with precedent or in the public interest.  In November 2001, a jury took only fifteen minutes to clear a householder who fatally stabbed an armed intruder in his home.  With Flanagan telephoning police to alert them to the developing situation, a reasonable person would suggest that Flanagan took appropriate steps to prevent a violent situation developing.   Moreover, with multiple intruders being involved in the incident, the use of force in self-defence within his property does not appear to be disproportionate; heavily outnumbered, whether the intruders were armed is a seemingly moot point.

The coincidence of the altercation with Cameron’s speech may prove to be a win-win situation for the Conservative Party.  While CPS guidance concerning reasonable force was issued under a Labour government, a decision not to prosecute will be remembered as having been taken under a Conservative-led coalition.  Alternatively, should the case go to trial, Cameron’s assertions will be proved correct, potentially restoring faith in the Conservatives as a stalwart of law and order following the debacle surrounding proposed sentence reductions.

*UPDATE*

• Ken Clarke, the Justice Secretary, seeking to address the ‘constant doubt’ surrounding the current legal position and in a seeming reference to the Flanagan case, confirmed on 29 June that a householder who knifes a burglar will not be adjudged to have committed a criminal offence.  Individuals should, Clarke opined, be afforded the right to use ‘whatever force necessary’ in protecting themselves and their home, though this does not extend to shooting a fleeing intruder in the back.  This proclamation is wholly in kilter with the spirit of the current legal stance, though replacing direct use of the problematic term “reasonable force” with more assertive phraseology will doubtlessly be portrayed as a deepening of the policy by a Conservative-led government attempting to reinforce their traditional image.

Elections In Turkey: The Constitution and Democracy

The secular establishment within in Turkey is, and has long been, wary of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) headed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Traditionally, prevailing opinion amongst critics has been that the ultimate aim of the Islamist-rooted party is the imposition of sharia law, with examples of efforts to criminalise adultery and ease restrictions relating to the wearing of the headscarf being oft cited.  However, after almost nine years of single-party AKP government, the inaccuracy of such claims is being recognised; the hurdle of incorporating religiously-tinted political organisations into a rigorously laicist political framework while confining the secular generals to their barracks has been a crucial step in Ankara’s democratic epiphany.  With allegations pertaining to the establishment of Turkish theocracy being notably less prominent in the build-up to parliamentary elections on 12 June than in either of the previous two ballots, economic performance and constitutional reform were able to dominate discussions.

The AKP takes much credit for orchestrating steady economic growth and raising living standards following the bust of 2001; with per capita GDP having almost trebled from $3,500 to $10,000 since 2002, coupled with economic misery for European and Mediterranean neighbours, AKP performance appears particularly impressive.  Equally, the AKP has been responsible for opening coveted EU accession talks, albeit so far with little return, as well as instigating welcome policies of “strategic depth” and “zero problems” in the foreign policy sphere.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that opinion polls prior to parliamentary elections indicated a 40-45% share of the popular vote.  While this figure was marginally less than the 47% achieved in 2007, it represented an improvement on the 39% support achieved in the municipal elections of 2009 and a substantial lead over the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP).  Accordingly, the outcome of the election was never in doubt; with Erdogan set to become the first Turkish leader to win three consecutive elections, the only questions being asked concerned the size of the AKP majority.

Despite the party’s favourable record in government and the concomitant approval of public opinion, the AKP’s popularity prior to Sunday’s election had been the cause of much concern.  With the idiosyncrasies of the Turkish electoral system requiring that parties surpass 10% of the popular vote before taking seats in parliament, the AKP could feasibly have returned a “supermajority” of 367 MPs which would enable Erdogan to unilaterally rewrite the constitution and, many feared, “Kremlinise” Turkish politics.  Similarly, a 60% majority (i.e. 330 MPs) would have allowed the party to put constitutional proposals directly to the public without consulting opposition opinion.  Exploiting the lack of institutional safeguards in such a Machiavellian manner would clearly fail to conform with democratic ideals; while achieving a simple majority legitimates the enactment of specific policies, changing the framework within which politics takes place should be subject to sterner requirements.  As a result, constitutional reform became a central electoral issue.

The current constitution is the product of the military coup of 1980.  Attempting to revoke many of the liberalising facets introduced by the previous military constitution of 1961 in seeking to ensure against communist infiltration, the 1982 document placed a disproportionate amount of power in the hands of the state machinery and created a democratic deficit.  Thus, despite numerous amendments, including many passed by the AKP, there is broad consensus on the requirement for a new constitution capable of meeting the demands of a growing and modernising state in the 21st century: the 2007 elections highlighted that Ankara can only consolidate democratic transition once any constitutional validation of military intervention has been removed, thereby enhancing the prospect of longed-for EU accession.

Prior to the election, both AKP and CHP promised to recast the constitution should they be victorious, with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, CHP leader, pledging to ‘bring democracy and freedom to the country’.  However, while Kilicdaroglu vowed extensive changes, including greater rights for Kurds and Alevis, reinforced press freedoms (at a time when Turkey has more journalists in prison than any other country), and a reduction in the 10% electoral threshold, Erdogan remained very nondescript about his visions for a new document, saying little more than that he desired a ‘constitution of the people’ that would be ‘short, compact, [and] open’ with greater presidential powers.  With Erdogan disqualified from running for a fourth term as prime minister yet indicating his intention to retain political influence, campaigning under the slogan “Objective 2023” in an apparent effort to evoke comparison with Ataturk in the build-up to the Republic’s centenary, suspicions arose that Erdogan intended to aggrandise the presidency and create a political system loosely based upon the French model before manoeuvring himself into the role.  Statements made by Erdogan prior to ballots being cast regarding the AKP’s disinclination to make constitutional amendments should the party fail to win 330 seats, pre-emptively renouncing any potential for cross-party collaboration amidst an air of conceit resulting from success in a 2010 referendum on a series of constitutional amendments, did little to avert such scepticism.  A strong AKP mandate could therefore have the adverse effect of reversing aspects of AKP-inspired democratisation.

Near-complete results indicate another AKP victory, winning almost 50% of the popular vote while the CHP polled 26% and the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 13%.  Translating to 326 parliamentary seats (fifteen fewer than in 2007 despite gaining roughly five million additional votes), fears of the AKP being able to unilaterally institutionalise Erdogan’s political control have been quelled – a result of the MHP surpassing the 10% barrier combined with independents scoring an impressive 36 seats.  Accordingly, in something of a volte face, Erdogan proclaimed in his victory speech that ‘the people gave us a message to build the new constitution through consensus and negotiation’, declaring that the AKP would ‘discuss the new constitution with opposition parties’.  While the AKP will be able to act freely as a result of the mandate delivered by the electorate, greater cooperation with newly-strengthened opposition parties will be required if constitutional changes are to be enacted, particularly with the Peace and Democracy Party-backed independents in redressing the Kurdish issue; a continuing failure to deliver on such promises would seriously hamper any future effort by Erdogan to capture the presidency.  Such consensus seeking will doubtlessly reinforce Ankara’s democratic foundations while holding the potential to kick-start faltering negotiations with the EU at a time when relations with Muslim neighbours are under great strain.  In this respect, a reduced majority may serve to strengthen Erdogan as well as democracy.

Ken Clarke: Defending the Indefensible?

Justice Secretary Ken Clarke today rejected calls for his resignation amidst controversy surrounding comments pertaining the seriousness of rape, insisting that he was merely describing a ‘longstanding factual situation’.  However, while he pledged to consider his words more carefully in future, Clarke refrained from issuing a public apology, insisting that his comments are being removed from their intended context and that, in his view, ‘all rape is serious’.  He did, however, write a letter of apology to Gabrielle Brown, who had challenged the Justice Secretary during a radio phone-in.

During an interview on BBC Radio 5 Live, Clarke contested reports that the average sentence for rape was a mere five years, suggesting that ‘serious rape’ was punished more heavily.  The Justice Secretary then questioned Victoria Derbyshire’s statement that ‘rape is rape’, contending that: ‘if an 18-year-old has sex with a 15-year-old and she's perfectly willing, that is rape because she is under age … What you and I are talking about is … a man forcibly having sex with a woman and she doesn't want to’.  This, according to Clarke, represents ‘a serious crime’.  While this does, indeed, represent judicial fact (i.e. the circumstances of a crime impact upon the length of any given sentence), critics, including Ed Miliband, have opined that this suggests the existence of ‘other categories of rape’ and marginalises the seriousness of the crime.  Whether this is the case, however, is the subject of debate: recognising, for example, that instances of repeated rape, gang rape, and violent rape will not always share similar circumstances is not the same as denying the profound abhorrence of either crime.  Neither does it necessarily suggest that one is more, or less, serious than another.  Indeed, Clarke’s designation of non-consensual sexual acts as ‘a serious crime’ seemingly indicates that this was not, in fact, his intention.  What is being overlooked in the arguments so far is the detestably low tariff available to judges for such a deplorable crime.

Interestingly, the example cited by Clarke was factually inaccurate, raising questions over the former barrister’s continued competence in his role and potentially giving the Prime Minister grounds to remove him from the Ministry of Justice.  While Miliband’s public calls for Clarke’s resignation render such a move unlikely in the immediate future, a cabinet re-shuffle may well witness the Justice Secretary being transferred elsewhere; the gaffe may have worried Cameron that a liberal-leaning Justice Secretary is not best suited to a Conservative Party traditionally viewed as being tough on law and order.  Clarke’s scheduled appearance on Question Time (from Wormwood Scrubs, no less) may, however, provide an opportunity for the Justice Secretary to regain confidence both within the public and the government.

The Justice Secretary also expressed his disappointment with the Daily Mail for seeking to add ‘sexual excitement’ to their reporting by applying proposals intended for all criminals specifically to cases of rape.  The government, as part of general cost-cutting measures, is currently consulting on plea-bargaining plans to increase sentence reduction to a maximum of 50%, from current limits of 33%.  It is estimated that doing so could free up 3,400 prison places and save some £130m per year by 2015 – 62% of the annual £210m savings the department has to find.  Clarke’s policy proposal, as a result of the association with the early release of sex offenders, may now be dead in the water.  Chris Huhne, however, may be thankful for the distraction.

Theocratic Tensions in Iran

The Jasmine Revolution, born in Tunisia some five moths ago, has spread across North Africa and the Middle East.  While pro-democracy protests and the associated state crackdowns continue, outside interest is steadily waning.  Recent democratic wrangling in Iran, for instance, failed to made front page news, overshadowed by such occasions as the Royal wedding, the events in Pakistan surrounding Osama bin Laden, and questions regarding the stability of the governing coalition as a result of recent electoral outcomes.

In the time since the spawning of the revolutions, only two Arab leaders have been toppled.  While four are under sustained heavy pressure, with UN and NATO military involvement in Libya, dictators are managing to hold on.  The remaining fifteen Arab leaders have been relatively unaffected, experiencing only minor protests.  Despite a strong and encouraging start, the success rate of the protests in terms of enacting reform has been limited.  The next leader to fall may, then, come from outside the Arab world.  Enter Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

In contrast to scenarios playing out in Syria, Libya, Bahrain and the like, the threat to President Ahmadinejad’s reign comes not from the outside, but from a power struggle within the establishment itself.  (Tehran has continued to voice support for the government in Damascus amidst accusations of assisting the Assad regime to violently suppress protests – hardly surprising when considering the brutality with which the Green movement was crushed in Iran following the 2009 presidential elections.)  When the president discovered that the minister of intelligence, Heidar Moslehi, had been bugging the offices of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s trusted chief of staff and close personal friend, Moslehi was promptly issued with his marching orders.  However, in a move that effectively disenfranchised Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who dislikes Mashaei’s nationalistic views and socio-cultural liberalism and has previously rejected his candidature for a ministerial role, reinstated Moslehi – a conservative whose outlook is more attuned to that of the establishment.  Angry at Khamenei’s efforts to interfere in the running of the cabinet, Ahmadinejad boycotted his duties for eleven days, skipping two cabinet meetings and cancelling an official visit to Qom.

Rather than a cosmetic shootout concerning the composition of the cabinet, the underlying struggle for power could shake the Islamic Republic to its very foundations.  With Iranian security forces preventing more than a dozen demonstrations since February, Khamenei’s actions appear to have been motivated by self-preservation; with the pro-democracy movement threatening to spill into the republic, the Ayatollah looks to have sought to reassert his dominance, thereby preserving both his position and the political system itself by disempowering a president who has increasingly espoused conceptions of an Iranian state based on nationalism and free from clerical influence.  However, in doing so, Khamenei runs the risk of further agitating pro-democracy sentiment; with the Supreme Leader being above politics, and therefore being unelected, any notion of democratic legitimacy provided by an elected president (the 2009 election was heavily criticised and widely condemned) has been trampled.  In the unlikely event that the Jasmine Revolution successfully penetrates the Islamic Republic, the repercussions for the regime could be more intense as a result.

Ahmadinejad, owing to his increasingly nationalistic outlook and preference for the Revolutionary Guards as a guiding force, is understood by senior clerics as posing a sincere threat to the republic’s composition.  The president’s visions of guiding Iran in a new direction, reconfiguring the internal distribution of power in favour of the elected leader, coupled with a series of documentary films portraying Ahmadinejad as the embodiment of a mythical religious figure who will accompany the “Hidden Imam” on the Day of Judgement, have given rise to accusations from within the establishment that Ahmadinejad is influenced by religious “deviants” who believe in supernatural powers and djinns (spirits).  This has been divisive for Ahmadinejad, with many supporters of the president backing Khamenei: Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a religious mentor of the president, openly criticised Ahmadinejad, opining that the ‘restoration of anti-clerical thinking could be the next great sedition in this country’ and warning that rebelling against the Supreme Leader was tantamount to ‘apostasy from God’.  Such accusations are inherently harmful to the regime, assigning to the president a religious status transcending that of the clerical establishment and thus questioning the legitimacy of the Iranian regime. 

Nonetheless, with calls for a closed debate on the president’s boycotting of official duties (read: calls for impeachment) being overlooked, the target of the clerics’ displeasure appears to be Mashaei rather than Ahmadinejad.  With Iran’s constitution barring more than two consecutive presidential terms, Ahmadinejad cannot run for office in 2013.  Instead, it seems the president is attempting to groom Mashaei as his successor, though having long claimed not to need the clergy to interpret religious texts for him, many within the clerical establishment have taken the view that it is Mashaei who is the real source of influence.  With the clerical establishment determined to prevent the rise of Mashaei, it appears that the only way in which Ahmadinejad can retain meaningful power is to submit to Khamenei’s will and dispense with Mashaei’s services.

The timing of the affair is unlikely to have been coincidental.  With parliamentary elections scheduled for 2012, Ahmadinejad has a vested interest in controlling the intelligence ministry; with the department being charged with conducting background checks on potential candidates, an opportunity to veto potential challengers and secure a strong majority for backers of the president was undoubtedly a consideration for Ahmadinejad.  In this respect, the president could be the architect of his own downfall, prompting conservatives and clerics alike to band together to safeguard the establishment.  For Geneive Abdo, while Khamenei's victory may have preserved a political system that is not fully understand in the West, crucially, it is one that remains somewhat predictable; the survival of Khamenei and the conservatives once referred to as “hard-liners” by the West is now preferred to the erratic and volatile Ahmadinejad.  With the Ayatollah’s unconditional support no longer a certainty, the president may well see out the remainder of his term as a lame duck.