22 December 2011

Reforming the House of Lords: Balancing Efficiency and Legitimacy

In a speech delivered at Demos this week, Nick Clegg sought to defend the precepts of the ‘Open Society’.  Aiming to reinvigorate the drive towards greater political pluralism and democratic involvement, while promoting such values as openness and equality that define his political perspective, the deputy prime minister placed reform of the House of Lords back into the spotlight.
Reform of the Second Chamber is undoubtedly a central issue, both within and beyond liberal reformist circles.  However, the matter is dominated by talk of increasing legitimacy, overshadowing the opportunity, if not the responsibility, to enhance the efficiency of the House.  Strengthening the democratic functioning of the Lords requires a broadening of their ability to act rather than solely focussing on the conviction with which they act.
Chief amongst Parliament’s many activities is the passage of effective legislation.  The bi-cameral nature of Parliament provides for an upper House to review proposed legislation, holding the government to account through deliberation and reassessment.  The incorporation of experts is therefore vastly beneficial to the process of scrutiny.  Unfortunately, the price of such expertise is democratic legitimacy, undermining any authority attached to amendments emerging from the Lords.  While the case for electing the Lords, or at least a significant majority, is therefore a strong one, insufficient attention has been paid to considering how functions could be better performed through concurrent structural and procedural reforms.
Currently, the House of Lords is chamber-oriented, relying on individuals who are both unelected and part-time.  Such working practices under-utilise the wealth of experience and knowledge of the Lords; with much time in the House being dedicated to detailed scrutiny of bills at the committee stage of the legislative process, many central issues fail to be debated by Peers.  This shortcoming adds to the case supporting reform of the House of Lords.  However, responses to questions concerning heightening efficiency and legitimacy need not be mutually exclusive.  
A reformed Chamber should complement the work of the Commons, providing an alternative perspective to legislative scrutiny.  An overriding fear of duplicating the work of the Commons has prevented the emergence of a strong committee system within the House of Lords.  Given the nature of the Lords’ remit, such a development path is peculiar; parallel departmental committees would greatly enhance opportunities for effective scrutiny, potentially producing stronger legislation, while allowing committee chairs in both Houses to coordinate workloads and avoid unnecessary duplication.  
A further advantage of allowing for a stronger committee system in the Lords comes in the shape of a solution to the trade-off between democratic legitimacy and expert input.  Rather than being permanently sitting members of the Lords, experts would continue to be integrated into the legislative process as Special Advisers or, alternatively, being called by committees considering specific legislation.  Expertise would thus remain eminent, while experts would not expected to choose between providing legislative advice and an existing career.  Similarly, the quality and relevance of legislative scrutiny would be improved, while democratic legitimacy would be revived by ensuring that the final say falls to elected representatives, suitably informed.
A revised House of Lords would, despite anticipated reductions in size, likely become more assertive in challenging government proposals as a result of Members’ knowledge that they represent the wishes of voters.  While this will ultimately improve governance through enhanced accountability, formal mechanisms above and beyond the Salisbury Convention and Parliament Acts would need to be established to confirm the continued primacy of the Commons, and to safeguard against legislative deadlock.  The House of Commons, as the driver of reform, could feasibly specify in legislation the powers of a revised Upper Chamber, for example by restricting the selection of ministers to the House of Commons.  However, the establishing of joint legislative committees to reconcile competing drafts of bills, as used in the United States, would further enhance the democratic functionality of Parliament.
With Clegg’s speech serving as a reminder that reform of the House of Lords remains a primary liberal concern, the opportunity for streamlining the structure of the Chamber as well as its composition, is one that should not be passed up.  Making such modifications simultaneously would maximise the efficiency of reform, fulfilling the desire for both democratic legitimacy and expert input into legislation.

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