Little over ten months since Mohamed Bouazizi, a former Tunisian market trader, self-immolated and sparked regional uprisings, the Arab Spring is showing its most positive signs yet of blossoming into a late Arab Summer.
On 23 October, voters across Tunisia proudly paraded their pigmented fingers as they emerged from polling stations nationwide, verification that they had exercised their democratic rights and the newfound political implications this signifies: this was the first time in generations that the outcome of such a ballot has not been pre-ordained, and is the first election to be held in the region since protests got underway. That the vote is taking place three months later than originally scheduled owing to problems with voter registration is of itself an indication of the reverence with which democratic rights and freedoms are increasingly being held. Accordingly, in keeping with the spirit underlying the Jasmine revolution, turnout is anticipated to be high, following enhanced campaigning and freedom of political discussion facilitated by the dismantling of the secret police. As many in their fifties and sixties reported voting for the first time, engagement is reaching impressive peaks.
The ballot in Tunisia will elect an assembly consisting of 217 representatives, who will in turn appoint a transitional government. Rather than a permanent governing body, the assembly’s mandate will be limited to a single year; just enough time to construct a new constitution on democratic foundations (and possibly put proposals to a national referendum). Only then will the future shape of Tunisian democracy become apparent, with the new document detailing future political configurations and mechanisms.
With strong competition from various parties and no one faction expected to produce an overwhelming majority, coupled with a proportionally representative voting system (albeit of the closed list variety), the election holds huge democratic potential. Furthermore, Ennahdha’s inclusion in the process could further invalidate long-held assertions concerning an ideological incompatibility between Islam and democracy, blazing a trail for other transitional states to follow, and perhaps even swaying opinion within Saudi Arabia in light of the emerging succession crisis. Fascinating times lie ahead, and the outside world will await the outcome with bated breath; Tunisia is once again in a position to influence the future of the entire region.
No doubt members of Libya’s National Transitional Council will be paying particularly close attention: following the death of Muammar Gaddafi days earlier, the transitional government declared liberation from Benghazi on the same day that polls were held in Tunisia. Elections for a similar assembly, also tasked with drafting a new constitution and forming a transitional government, are due in Libya within eight months. Similarly, the drawn-out process of parliamentary elections in Egypt is due to get underway in late-November following delays caused by military foot-dragging and breakdowns in political coalition-building. Lessons from Tunis would be welcomed in both as green shoots of democracy begin to emerge across the region.
While the vast pockets of pro-Gaddafi support encountered in Libya will complicate the process and cause potential delays, the complete eradication of the regime will likely be advantageous in the longer term; unlike Tunisia, where elements of Ben Ali’s Democratic Constitutional Rally remain, and Egypt where traces of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party persist, embodied by the military’s continued presence and political involvement, Libyans will have the opportunity to build a political infrastructure afresh. Western nations need to be prepared to offer assistance and advice where needed, but should seek to cultivate a regionally organic arrangement rather than export and impose specific models; room for flexibility is essential if the Arab summer is to reach full bloom and democracy is to persist.
